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Abstract 
Timely elective surgery is a contentious and unresolved dilemma internationally and 
domestically in public health systems. Considering that such surgery is both necessary, and 
for some, life-saving, receiving timely elective surgery is not only important for individuals 
physically, psychologically, socially and economically; it is also important socially and 
economically to the community. Despite improvement in the waiting times of patients due to 
national elective surgery targets, there are still patients waiting too long for elective surgery 
and suffering adverse consequences.  Patients currently have no legal right to receive timely 
elective surgery domestically or at international law. The thesis will make a significant 
contribution to knowledge by examining Queensland as a case study, to determine whether 
patients should have an enforceable right to timely elective surgery in public hospitals.   
Firstly, this thesis identifies and synthesises the current legal and policy frameworks and 
practice strategies in Queensland to ascertain the possible need for a right to timely elective 
surgery. Secondly, the thesis undertakes a theoretical analysis to determine whether there 
should be a right to timely surgery, including the nature and scope of that right. Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach1 is used to support this analysis in relation to the existence 
of such a right. Thirdly, as there is a lacuna of qualitative data considering a patient’s right to 
timely elective surgery in Queensland, this research has been augmented with empirical 
findings from the first small qualitative study. 
This thesis indicates there is a need for a right to timely elective surgery (which extends to 
the outpatient waiting time) for patients waiting outside their clinically indicated category 
time frame who are below the health capabilities threshold. To ensure the right will be 
sustainable in a resource limited health system, the right needs to be prioritised according to 
a patient’s clinical need and the level of benefit that patient would receive from the surgery. 
This right should be enforceable by patients through an independent complaints body, such 
as an expert tribunal.   
  
                                                
 
1 See generally, Martha C Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(The Belknap Press, 2011). 
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Chapter 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
A Background 
A health system providing timely elective surgery is a catalyst to the health of its patients.3 
Despite the reference to the term “elective” in elective surgery, such surgery does not equate 
to optional surgery.4 Frequently, elective surgery is ‘life saving’ or minimally, ‘very 
important to patients’ health and well-being’.5 Failure to treat patients within clinically 
recommended time frames for elective surgery may have significant or even fatal 
consequences for patients, as demonstrated by the investigation of the Queensland Office of 
the State Coroner concerning the death of Sylvia Crane:6   
Sylvia Crane was a 66 year old woman who collapsed suddenly and died at 
her daughter’s home... on 4 October 2012... Mrs Crane was scheduled for 
surgery at the Royal Brisbane & Women’s Hospital (RBWH) on 5 October 
2012 to remove a cancerous kidney.  
She had been assigned as a category 1 patient7 – the most urgent category where the 
clinically indicated time frame to receive elective surgery is 30 days. However, Mrs Crane 
waited for five months.8 During her wait, Mrs Crane attended her general practitioner 
where:9 
Mrs Crane was noted to be upset during this consultation, as she felt her 
surgery was taking a long time to be organised. She declined her doctor’s 
offer to provide her with a private referral, as she did not have private health 
insurance and could not afford to have private hospital treatment.    
                                                
 
3 Luigi Sicilani, Michael Borowitz and Valerie Moran, Waiting Time Policies in the Health Sector: 
What Works? (2013) OECD, 27 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264179080-en>; National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission, A Healthier Future for All Australians, (June 2009), 3. 
4 See, Council of Australian Governments, Expert Panel Review of Elective Surgery and Emergency 
Targets under the National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospitals Services (30 June 
2011), 35.	
5 See, ibid.	
6 Office of the State Coroner, Investigation into the Death of Sylvia Crane (11 August 2014) 
Queensland Courts, 1 <http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/276540/cif-crane-s-
20140811.pdf>. 
7 Ibid 11. 
8 Ibid 12. 
9 Ibid 2. 
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Because Mrs Crane was unable to afford private health treatment she was dependent on the 
public health system and their capacity to undertake surgery. The Coroner’s report into the 
death found that:10 
earlier intervention may have prevented her death by removing the 
cancerous kidney before the tumour spread into the inferior vena cava and 
lessening the risk of pulmonary thromboembolism, which caused her death.  
Before further exploring the elective surgery problem, it is firstly necessary to define the 
meaning of elective surgery. The term “elective” refers to surgery that may be placed in 
abeyance in excess of one day; thereby, distinguishing it from surgery that is emergency 
surgery.11 In Queensland, at the present time, government policy classifies elective surgery 
into three urgency categories, as follows: 
(a) Category 1 – surgery that is ‘clinically indicated within 30 days’;12 
(b) Category 2 – surgery that is ‘clinically indicated within 90 days’;13 
(c) Category 3 – surgery that is ‘clinically indicated within 365 days’.14 
Although receiving surgery is medically indicated within the above time frames for each 
category – there is no enforceable waiting time right to receive surgery within such time 
frames. The categories only dwell in the realm of policy, and not in law.15  Further, the above 
time frames only include time waited on the elective surgery waiting list, not the total time 
waited from placement on the precursor to the elective surgery waiting list (ie the outpatient 
waiting list).16 That is, a patient may have been waiting an excessive duration of time on the 
outpatient list (which does not currently count towards the elective surgery waiting time), 
before being placed on the elective surgery waiting list.   
Failing to provide patients with elective surgery in accordance with the above clinically 
indicated time frames may adversely impact upon individual patients, including having fatal 
consequences, as demonstrated in the above Coroner’s findings. Also, delaying the provision 
                                                
 
10 Ibid 11. 
11 See, Council of Australian Governments, above n 4, 35.	
12 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, National Elective Surgery Urgency Categorisation 
(April 2015) Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, 5 
<http://www.ranzcog.edu.au/component/search/?searchword=urgency&searchphrase=all&Itemid=1>; 
Queensland Health, Elective Surgery Service Implementation Standard Version QH-IMP-342-1:2015 
(3 June 2015), 7. 
13 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, above n 12, 5; Queensland Health, above n 12, 7. 	
14 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, above n 12, 5; Queensland Health, above n 12, 7.	
15 See generally, Queensland Health, above n 12. 
16 See generally, Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, Version No 
1.0 (25 November 2010); Queensland Health, Elective Surgery Service Implementation Standard 
Version No 1.0 (15 November 2011). 	
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of necessary surgery may negatively impact upon patients’ families, and ultimately, the 
community.17 Yet, despite the gravity of potential consequences for patients waiting too 
long, the delivery of timely elective surgery in public health systems throughout many 
international countries and domestically has yet to be achieved.18 Accordingly, providing 
timely elective surgery remains an unresolved, contentious and topical issue. 
Compounding this current elective surgery waiting list dilemma is the strain of an increasing 
and ageing population, the rise of chronic disease including obesity, and advancing medical 
technologies within the sphere of a growing consumer centred society.19 In an attempt to 
manage the escalating surgical wait, time frame guarantees have been introduced by some 
international jurisdictions.20 Internationally, time frame guarantees usually equate to mere 
policy targets and do not create individual enforceable rights to timely elective surgery.21 
Domestically, until July 2015, the strategy was to manage elective surgery waiting lists with 
National Elective Surgery Targets (NEST). However, NEST was a creature of a policy 
agreement between the Commonwealth government and its states to give states reward 
funding if elective surgery targets were achieved within stipulated time frames.22 These 
targets did not impute any individual entitlement or right to timely elective surgery. Further, 
there was a failure to meet all stipulated NEST, which means there are many patients still 
waiting for elective surgery.23 It is therefore not surprising that, ‘international healthcare 
facilitators continue to report steady increases in patients travelling overseas for elective 
                                                
 
17 Sicilani, Borowitz and Moran, above n 3, 3. 
18 Ibid; Colleen Flood and Kathryn May, ‘A Patient Charter of Rights: How to Avoid a Toothless 
Tiger and Achieve System Improvement’ (2010) Canadian Medical Association Journal 1583, 1584; 
Janelle Miles, Patients Wait Years for Elective Surgery in Queensland Public Hospitals (1 February 
2013) Courier Mail <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/patients-wait-years-for-
elective-surgery-in-queensland-public-hospitals/story-e6freoof-1226566260242>. 
19 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, Beyond the Blame Game, (2008), 11, 12. 	
20 Sicilani, Borowitz and Moran, above n 3, 51; Council of Australian Governments, The National 
Health Reform Agreement – National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services 
(2011).	
21 Lauren Vogel, ‘International Patient Charters Are Often Nonbinding or Feature Fuzzy Metrics’ 
(2010) 183(13) Canadian Medical Association Journal E641, E641. 	
22 Sicilani, Borowitz and Moran, above n 3, 51; Council of Australian Governments, above n 20. 
23 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Elective Surgery Waiting Times 2014-15: Australian 
Hospital Statistics (2015) AIHW <http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=60129553174>, 23, 
24, 44; See, Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2012 
<http://www.coagreformcouncil.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/National%20Partnership%20Agreeme
nt%20on%20Improving%20Public%20Hospital%20Services-
%20Performance%20report%20for%202012.pdf>;  Council of Australian Governments Reform 
Council, National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance 
Report for 2013 <http://www.coagreformcouncil.gov.au/reports/healthcare/national-partnership-
agreement-improving-public-hospital-services-performance-0.html>. 
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procedures from every state and territory’ in Australia.24 ‘SkyGen, a medical travel facilitator 
based in Queensland, is one such agent that opens doors across locations like Germany and 
Thailand to Australian patients’ who are ‘on domestic waiting lists for orthopaedic surgery’ 
but who are not receiving timely elective surgery.25 SkyGen provided the following example 
of a patient who needed to travel to Bangkok to receive elective surgery:26 
By the time one of our earliest hip replacement patients contacted us, he had 
grown both tired, and heavier, after patiently waiting on a public waiting list.  
He eventually gave up waiting and started paying his monthly premiums for 
private health insurance.... After waiting another 12 months for his insurance 
to cover his pre-existing hip condition, he was ultimately denied his surgery. 
Immobilised by pain, he gained weight while waiting for surgery and this 
excluded him from cover as a high-risk patient. 
Placing further strain on the current waiting list problem is the proposed Commonwealth 
government strategy of funding the hospital system (discussed further in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis) according to consumer price index (CPI) and population growth,27 meaning decreased 
resources for hospitals, in fact, the Australian Medical Association president has warned 
that:28 
There’s no way that states and territories can even maintain their current 
frontline clinical services under that sort of funding regime, let alone build 
any capacity we actually need to address the shortfalls now. 
Accordingly, with a ‘huge black hole in public hospital funding’, patients risk waiting even 
longer times for elective surgery.29 Therefore, currently in the domestic context, the public 
hospital system is likely moving further away from a resolution of the waiting list dilemma. 
Some international literature argues that the catalyst to timely treatment may be the 
                                                
 
24 Dan Donner, Public Surgery Waiting Lists See Ageing Patients Leave Australia (16 June 2015) 
SkyGen <http://www.skygen.com.au/news-and-press/public-surgery-waiting-lists-see-ageing-
patients-leave-australia/>. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Amanda Biggs, Health Funding Agreements: Budget Review2014-15 Index Parliament of Australia 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/rp/
budgetreview201415/healthfunding>. 
28 Emma Griffiths, Hospital Funding Black Hole Looms, Australian Medical Association Warns (16 
April 2015) ABC News Radio Australia <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2015-04-
16/hospital-funding-black-hole-looms-australian-medical-association-warns/1437458>. 
29 Ibid. 
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augmentation of time frame guarantees with enforceable rights supported by an impartial 
complaints body.30   
Although the percentage of patients receiving timely surgery31 has improved in Queensland 
in recent years, there has been an overall failure to achieve the National Elective Surgery 
Targets.32 Further, the median time waited by patients for elective surgery33 has also not 
significantly improved.34 Compounding the problem is that the elective surgery waiting 
times conceal the real times patients wait to receive surgery, this is because:35 
The time that patients wait – from when they are referred by their general 
practitioner to actually seeing a specialist for assessment – is not counted. It 
is only after patients have seen the specialist that they are added to the 
official waiting list. This means that the publicly available elective surgery 
waiting list data actually understate the real time people wait for surgery. 
Some people wait longer for assessment by a specialist than they do for 
surgery. 
This thesis will show that there is no applicable constitutional, legislative or common law 
right for patients to enforce timely elective surgery in Queensland.36 There may be a human 
right to health care based on international instruments, and therefore perhaps a right to timely 
elective surgery; however, Australia has not incorporated such a right into the constitution or 
domestic legislation.37 The absence of a legal right to timely elective surgery is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
During 2014, it was announced Queensland would introduce a wait time guarantee that was 
to be based on Scandinavian health systems.38 The guarantee was to ensure that if a patient’s 
hospital was unable to provide timely treatment, then the patient would be ‘offered the next 
                                                
 
30 Colleen M Flood and Tracey Epps, ‘Waiting for Health Care: What Role for a Patients’ Bill of 
Rights?’ (2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 515, 517.	
31 Australian Medical Association, Public Hospital Report Card 2016; An AMA Analysis of Australian 
Public Hospital System (January 2016), 7 <https://ama.com.au/ama-public-hospital-report-card-2016 
AMA>. 
32 Ibid 11. 
33 Ibid 19. 
34 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 23. 
35 Australian Medical Association, above n 31, 8. 
36 Note, the absence of a legal right to timely elective surgery in Queensland is discussed in Chapter 4 
of this thesis; see generally, Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2008), 70.	
37 Anand Grover, Briefing Paper on Key Issues on the Right to Health in Australia (September, 2009) 
Health Rights Law Resource Centre Ltd, 3 <http://www.hrlrc.org.au/files/Briefing-Paper-Health-in-
Austalia-September-2009.pdf>. 	
38 Lawrence Springborg, Australia’s First Surgery Guarantee (23 November 2014) Queensland 
Government <http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2014/11/23/australias-first-surgery-guarantee>. 
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available appointment in a public or private hospital elsewhere in the state at no cost’.39 
However, internationally, wait time guarantee policies (without legal enforcement) have 
experienced difficulties, as Hurst and Siciliani explained:40 
Several countries have chosen to act directly on waiting times by 
establishing ‘maximum waiting-time guarantees’. Such policy has been used 
successfully for many years in England to bring down maximum waiting 
times, step by step, but has been unsuccessful in reducing the average 
waiting time of the patients admitted for treatment. Indeed, ‘maximum 
waiting-time guarantee’ policies tend to conflict with clinical prioritisation. 
That is to say, surgeons will be expected to treat less urgent cases before 
more urgent cases, because the former have reached their waiting-time 
ceilings. Surgeons and providers may in this way change the distribution of 
waiting times among patients, leaving the average unchanged. In countries 
like Norway and Sweden, the guarantees have been abandoned or reformed. 
To solve the clinical prioritisation issue, mentioned above, an alternative 
formulation of the guarantee has also been proposed, which provides the 
guarantee only to the patients with higher ‘need’. However, this formulation 
has also proved to be unsuccessful as it is difficult to determine uniform 
criteria for need.  
 
It is not surprising that with a change of Queensland government in 2015, the wait time 
guarantee was discontinued and labelled a ‘gimmick’.41 The incoming Queensland Health 
Minister’s view was that the wait time guarantee would not solve a patient’s entire waiting 
journey for elective surgery, as the outpatient wait time was not included in the guarantee.42 
Further, Queensland Health already privately and publically outsources some patients on the 
elective surgery waiting list at no cost to the patients.43 Instead of the wait time guarantee, 
the new Queensland government decided to introduce their own targets for elective surgery 
waiting times and increase funding for outpatients.44 However, considering the targets set by 
NEST were not the solution for the excessive waiting times and failed to be achieved, it is 
difficult to imagine how Queensland’s new targets will solve the dilemma. Patients are still 
                                                
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Jeremy Hurst and Luigi Siciliani, Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A 
Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries (7 July 2003) Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 51 <http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/5162353.pdf>. 
41 Jason Tin, ‘Surgery Uncertainty Guaranteed’, Courier Mail (Queensland) 11 March 2015, 4.   
42 Ibid.   
43 Queensland Health, Elective Surgery Service Implementation Standard, above n 12, 14-17. 
44 Tin, above n 41, 4.   
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waiting too long for surgery and without any right of enforcement or even a guarantee. The 
Queensland Opposition Leader warned that by ceasing the guarantee there will ‘be more 
patients languishing in pain’ – ‘leaving thousands of Queenslanders forgotten about, waiting 
too long for their surgery’.45  
The solution to timely elective surgery may be implementing an enforceable right to timely 
elective surgery for patients. Although there is a human right to health care at international 
law, and therefore perhaps a right to timely elective surgery, Australia has not incorporated 
such rights into their constitution or domestic legislation, and therefore there exists no legal 
right.46 International literature, namely, articles by Colleen Flood, Kathryn May and Tracey 
Epps,47 argue that patients require more than wait time guarantees or non-enforceable patient 
charters and need a right of complaint with an independent non-adversarial complaints body 
(such as a health ombudsman) endorsed with the power to remedy their complaint.48 That is, 
a wait time ‘right’ needs to be more than a ‘toothless tiger’ for patients, otherwise the ‘right’ 
is meaningless.49 Considering a normative right to timely elective surgery may be the 
solution to the waiting list dilemma and that there is a legal lacuna around discussing rights 
to timely elective surgery in Queensland, it is expedient to examine literature arguing for the 
imputation of any such legal right. Further since there is an absence of any qualitative data 
considering the imputation of elective surgery rights in Queensland, it is also important to 
augment the examination of the literature with qualitative findings. These qualitative 
findings were obtained from the primary carers (that is, general practitioners) for patients 
requiring elective surgery for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a need for timely 
elective surgery, whether there should be a right to timely elective surgery, and the scope of 
such a right.   
B Contribution to Knowledge 
The thesis contributes to knowledge by exploring whether the creation of an enforceable 
right to timely elective surgery should be considered. Doctrinal and theoretical analysis 
examines the relevant law and policy applied to the current Queensland case study. 
Qualitative analysis of a sample of general practitioners assists in closing the literature gap 
by providing insights into the Queensland waiting list dilemma and views on a patient’s right 
to timely elective surgery.   
                                                
 
45 Ibid.   
46 Grover, above n 37, 3. 	
47 Flood and May, above n 18, 1583; Flood and Epps, above n 30. 
48 Flood and May, above n 18, 1583. 
49 Ibid. 
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The thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge by exploring Queensland as a case 
study concerning a right to timely elective surgery. Other than the authors of Flood, May and 
Epps50 generally discussing the idea of a right to timely treatment, there is an absence of any 
further literature (other than case law and associated commentary as considered in chapter 3 
of the thesis) discussing a legal or moral right to timely surgery. This thesis advances 
knowledge beyond what is already evident in the literature. Specifically, the contributions to 
knowledge are made by:  
a) conducting the first systematic exploration of the legal and policy framework in 
Queensland in relation to a right to timely elective surgery; 
b) conducting the first analysis of international law in relation to a right to timely 
elective surgery; 
c) exploring Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as the basis for a robust 
theoretically grounded right to timely elective surgery; 
d) analysing distributive justice theories (namely, Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-
egalitarian sufficiency theory and Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarian 
theory) to explore the nature and scope, respectively, of a right to timely elective 
surgery; 
e) conducting the first qualitative study of general practitioners to ascertain their 
views about the need for, nature of and implementation of a right to timely 
elective surgery.  
The literature reviews included in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis reveal that the above 
five contributions to knowledge have not been previously considered.  Accordingly, this 
thesis closes the literature gap in relation to these issues.  
C Research Problem and Methodology 
The theoretical and analytical framework is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
1 Research Problem  
The research problem explores whether a legislative regime with an enforceable right to 
timely elective surgery should be created. Focusing upon Queensland as a case study, the 
research questions involve examining the current Queensland framework regarding a right to 
timely treatment, establishing whether patients have an enforceable right to timely treatment, 
and examining the implications of effectively implementing an enforceable right to timely 
treatment. The research questions are discussed further in Chapter 2.  
                                                
 
50 Ibid; Flood and Epps, above n 30. 
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2 Methodology  
A doctrinal analysis of the literature (law, policy and practice including international health 
rights instruments) will inform the above research questions by ‘finding the law’51 and 
‘background commentary’ and ‘analysing and linking the information to that already 
established’.52 Additionally, qualitative data obtained from general practitioners also informs 
the research problem. The research methodology is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.   
D Conceptual Framework 
This thesis explores approaches for empowering patients with a right to timely elective 
surgery, with a focus on Queensland as a case study. The thesis also explores the ancillary 
issues of empowering patients through providing improved transparency about waiting times 
and waiting list management and independent and effective complaint mechanisms for those 
who believe they have waited too long. The selection of Queensland is timely, as the 
demands on Queensland public hospital elective surgery waiting lists will inevitably increase 
with its population growing ‘by one-third to 6.1 million people between 2011 and 2026’ and 
with its overweight/obesity rate rising to 65.4 per cent53 and the further risk the waiting list 
may increase with the newly proposed public hospital funding strategy. Although 
Queensland has a patient charter attributing patients with an access right to treatment – it is 
essentially an unenforceable right.54 There is currently a knowledge gap in the literature 
concerning the imputation of a legal right to timely elective surgery in Queensland. 
Therefore, international literature arguing for an enforceable rights approach to timely 
elective surgery will create a platform to explore implementing patient rights in the 
Queensland system.   
However, since international, federal and Queensland legal and policy instruments omit to 
impute patients with any enforceable rights to timely elective surgery, this thesis 
conceptualises the basis of a right to timely elective surgery with a theory of justice. The 
selected theory of justice is Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.  Nussbaum’s 
approach supports individuals attaining a threshold of health sufficient to restore human 
                                                
 
51 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law, (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2010) 37.	
52 Lawrence O’Gostin, ‘Law and Ethics in Population Health’ (2004) 28(1) Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health 7, 11.	
53 Queensland Health, Blueprint for Better Healthcare in Queensland (February 2013) Queensland 
Health, 10 <http://www.health.qld.gov.au/blueprint/docs/print.pdf>; Council of Australian 
Governments Reform Council, Healthcare 2011-12: Comparing Performance Across Australia 
Council of Australian Governments, 29, 30 
<http://www.coagreformcouncil.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Health%202011-12(1).pdf>. 
54See generally, Queensland Health, Public Patient Charter Booklet Queensland Health 
<http://www.health.qld.gov.au/qhppc/docs/booklet.pdf>.	
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dignity.55 Although Nussbaum’s approach forms a basis for a right to timely elective surgery 
for those below this threshold; in a public health system inherently constrained by resources, 
it is difficult to envisage how Nussbaum’s ideal capabilities threshold would be sustainable, 
especially as a system of prioritisation is not provided for conflicts below the threshold. 
Accordingly, the nature of the right will be limited by Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s sufficiency of 
capabilities approach.56   
Applying Ram-Tiktin’s theory to the elective surgery context, individuals would be fairly 
prioritised according to their need for the surgery and degree of benefit they would receive 
from the surgery.57 Finally, whether the right would be a sustainable right needs to be 
assessed, otherwise its implementation would be futile. Accordingly, Amitai Etzioni’s theory 
of responsive communitarianism58 has been selected to assess the scope of the right to timely 
elective surgery to establish whether the right adequately balances individual and community 
interests. It is concluded that a right to timely elective surgery for Queensland should be a 
sustainable right as assessed against Etzioni’s theory.  
E Overview of Thesis 
An overview of the chapters outlining the thesis’ argument is provided below: 
Chapter 2: Methodology  
The research questions, doctrinal and qualitative methodology are detailed in Chapter 2 to 
provide the underlying structure for the thesis’ research process. 
Chapter 3: Australian Health System Framework – Focus on Queensland Public Hospitals  
Provides an explanation of the framework of the health system with a focus on Queensland 
public hospitals to understand the overall health system, and particularly, elective surgery 
policy and the need for a solution to the elective surgery waiting dilemma. 
Chapter 4: Is there a Basis in International Law for a Right to Timely Elective Surgery?  
An analysis of international health rights instruments reveals there is an absence of a legally 
enforceable right to timely elective surgery at international law.   
Chapter 5: A Theoretical Basis for A Right to Timely Elective Surgery and the Nature and 
Normative Scope of the Right  
                                                
 
55 Nussbaum, above n 1, 36. 
56 Efrat Ram-Tiktin, ‘The Right to Health Care as a Right to Basic Human Functional Capabilities’ 
(2012) 15 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 337, 350. 
57 Ibid 343. 
58 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Communitarianism Revisited’ (2014) 19 Journal of Political Ideologies 241, 244. 
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A moral right to timely elective surgery can be based on Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach. To improve the likelihood of the right existing in a resource constrained society, 
the nature of the right will be curtailed by Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s sufficiency of capabilities 
approach. Finally, the scope of the distilled right will be analysed against Amitai Etzioni’s 
responsive communitarianism theory to ensure the right is likely to be sustainable.  
Chapter 6: Qualitative Study of General Practitioners  
The qualitative data supports that the interviewed GPs generally accepted that there exists a 
need for timely elective surgery in Queensland, and theoretically, that there should be a right. 
However, GP’s practical concerns around implementing the right limited their support for 
the creation of such a right. Chapter 5 discusses how these concerns may be resolved. 
General practitioners were in favour of an independent body (expert tribunal) implementing 
a right – this is generally consistent with Flood and May’s support for a non-adversarial 
independent body enforcing wait time complaints.59  
Although the qualitative study is limited by the size of the sample group; the lack of 
participants interviewed in regional, remote and very remote areas of Queensland; and 
further limited by the fact that the participating GPs’ perspectives are not generalisable for 
GPs across Queensland, the study is important to augment the literature with practical 
insights. However, the size of the study is within expected parameters and had reached 
saturation;60 the geographical areas of the GPs’ interviewed represented the majority of 
regions (that is, 78.3% of regions) where Queenslanders reside; and the lack of 
generalisability is an unavoidable problem of qualitative research.61 Nevertheless, the GPs’ 
views provide a ‘thick description’62 of the issues to assist in catalysing the resolution of the 
research problem.  
Chapter 7: Application of a Right to Timely Elective Surgery in Queensland and Conclusion  
The legal, policy and theoretical analysis within this thesis supported a legislative regime 
with an enforceable right to timely treatment for those patients who are below the 
capabilities threshold waiting outside clinically indicated time frames on the elective surgery 
waiting list (including the outpatients list) at Queensland public hospitals. This right to 
                                                
 
59 Flood and May above n 18. 
60 See, Sharan B Merriam, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation, (Jossey-
Bass, 2009), 80; see, Margaret Sandelowski, ‘Sample Size in Qualitative Research’ (1995) 18 
Research in Nursing and Heath 179, 179-80; see, Anton J Kuzel, ‘Sampling in Qualitative Inquiry’ in 
Benjamin F Crabtree and William L Miler (eds), Doing Qualitative Research (Sage Publication, 2nd 
ed, 1999) 33, 34. 
61 Merriam, above n 60, 226. 
62 Pranee Liamputtong, Qualitative Research Methods, (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2013) 26; See 
generally, Robert K Yin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish, (Guilford Press, 2011) 79. 
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timely elective surgery should be prioritised below the capabilities threshold to those patients 
who are ‘worse off’ and who would receive greater ‘benefit size’ from the surgery.63 This is 
to ensure the distribution of health care resources among the population will be sustainable 
in the long term and ultimately so that the right to timely elective surgery remains available 
to those patients in need of surgery to function in society.64 Yet, even if a right to timely 
elective surgery fails to remedy patients’ complaints, then the right should nevertheless 
pressure the government to improve waiting list transparency and attend to waiting list 
efficiency issues; thereby creating a better surgical waiting time experience (including less 
time waiting) for patients.65  
However, operationalisation of a right to timely elective surgery is outside the scope of this 
thesis (including stipulating the circumstances for determining when a patient would be 
considered to be below the capabilities threshold; when priority should be assigned to those 
who are ‘worse off’, and who would receive greater ‘benefit size’ from the surgery66). The 
focus of this thesis is whether there is a right to timely elective surgery in domestic 
law/policy or international law; whether the capabilities approach supports a just basis for a 
right to timely elective surgery; what Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory 
indicates about the nature of this right; and what Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarian 
theory indicates about the scope of this right.   
 
 
                                                
 
63 Ram-Tiktin, above n 56, 343. 
64 See generally, Patricia Illingworth and Wendy E Parmet, Ethical Health Care (Pearson Press Hall, 
2006) 83, 61-2. 	
65 See generally, Andrea Curtis et al, ‘Waiting Lists and Elective Surgery: Ordering the Queue’ (2010) 
192(4) Medical Journal of Australia 217. 
66 Ram-Tiktin, above n 56, 343. 
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II DESIGN OF RESEARCH INVESTIGATION 
A Objective, Methodology and Research Plan 
1 Objective 
The overall objective is to explore the legal and policy framework regarding the right to 
timely elective surgery in Queensland; to analyse the existence, nature and scope of such a 
right in theory; and to conduct a qualitative study with general practitioners to obtain their 
attitudes towards such a right.  Queensland was the sole case study selected as it was not 
viable to consider other case studies within the recommended time frame for the thesis.  
2 Research Questions 
The research questions are: 
1. What is the current Queensland legal and/or policy framework concerning rights 
to timely elective surgery? 
2. Is there a basis in international law for a right to timely elective surgery? 
3. What does Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach indicate about the existence 
of a theoretical basis for a right to timely elective surgery? 
4. What does Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory suggest about 
the nature of a right to timely elective surgery? 
5. What does Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism theory suggest about 
the scope of a right to timely elective surgery? 
6. As primary carers for patients requiring elective surgery, what insights can be 
obtained from seeking the views of general practitioners about: 
(i) The need (from their own practical experience) for the provision of 
timely access to elective surgery? 
(ii) Whether there should be (from a normative perspective) an enforceable 
right to timely elective surgery? 
(iii) The scope of an enforceable right to timely elective surgery? 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
As detailed previously, the theoretical framework of the research is assessed through a 
theory balancing liberalism and communitarianism.67 A balance is needed between these 
opposing spectrums to ensure a sustainable waiting list solution.68 Attributing too much 
weight upon individual rights will place significant strain on the health system and the 
general community, thereby defeating the very goal of decreasing waiting 
lists.69 Nevertheless, the right to health is fundamental to the general functioning of society.70 
Accordingly, this research assesses whether the right distilled to timely elective surgery will 
balance individual interests with societal interests.  
4 Doctrinal Methodology   
Research questions 1 to 5 are explored by doctrinal research and analysis of relevant 
literature. In addition to a doctrinal methodology, research questions 3 to 5 are explored with 
a theoretical analysis. Specifically, in relation to each research question: 
1. Legislation, common law and government policy are identified and analysed to 
ascertain the nature and extent/enforceability of any current rights possessed by 
patients to timely elective surgery in Queensland; 
2. Current rights to health contained in international instruments are identified and 
examined to determine the nature and extent/enforceability of any current rights 
possessed by patients to timely elective surgery at international law; 
3. Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is examined to assess whether there is 
a theoretical basis for a right to timely elective surgery; 
4. Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory is examined to assess the nature 
of a theoretical right to timely elective surgery; 
5. Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism theory is examined to assess what 
the theory suggests about the scope of the right to timely elective surgery.   
5 Qualitative Data Research Strategy  
The components of the qualitative data research strategy of the study; namely, the 
philosophical and methodological framework, selected sample, data collection strategy, data 
analysis, study rigour, and the ethical requirements are discussed below.  
                                                
 
67 See, Etzioni, above n 58, 244. 
68 See generally, Ole Frithjof Norheim, ‘Rights to Specialized Health Care in Norway: A Normative 
Perspective’ (2005) The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 641, 641-5; also see, Illingworth and 
Parmet above n 64.  
69 See generally, Norheim, above n 68, 641-5; also see generally, Illingworth and Parmet above n 64. 
70 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, above n 3, 3.   
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(a) Qualitative Interpretative Approach  
The study framework employs a qualitative data methodology overarched by an 
interpretative philosophy.71 The aim of utilising this philosophical perspective is to explain 
the ‘multiple realities’ of the study’s participants.72 According to Gregory and Merriam, 
these perspectives encompass the participants’ personal73 and heterogeneous interpretations74 
of the study’s ‘phenomenon of interest’.75 It is considered that by analysing these varied 
participant interpretations of the elective surgery dilemma and possible elective surgery 
solutions – the study yields ‘comprehensive’ findings to the research questions.76 The 
theoretical type of qualitative study supporting such interpretivism adheres with Merriam’s 
principles of a basic qualitative study.77 Selecting a basic qualitative study frames the 
research’s methods as follows:  
(i) the data is obtained through interviewing participants, using semi-structured 
interviews (discussed in more detail below);78 
(ii) the participants were selected purposefully;79  
(iii) the questioning strategy employed is reliant upon the ‘disciplinary theoretical 
framework of the study’; that is, the study is framed to obtain participants’ views 
of the ‘phenomenon of interest’ from the perspective of the discipline of law;80  
(iv) the research focuses upon how the participants ‘interpret’, ‘construct’ and attach 
‘meaning’81 to the ‘phenomenon of interest’;82 that is, an interpretative strategy is 
utilised;83 
(v) the data collected from participants is analysed comparatively and inductively;84  
(vi) the study’s outcomes are ‘richly descriptive’ and sorted by category;85  
                                                
 
71 Note, an interpretative philosophy is also referred to as a constructivist philosophy: see Merriam, 
above n 60, 11. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Judy Gregory, Research Paradigms – A Comparison (Institute of Health and Biomedical Innovation 
– Self-Help Resource, 2013) 5. 
74 Ibid 3. 
75 Merriam, above n 60, 34.  
76 Ibid 18. 
77 See generally, ibid 22-4. 
78 Ibid 23. 
79 Ibid 38. 
80 Ibid 23. 
81 Ibid; see also, Ellie Fossey et al, ‘Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research’ (2002) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 717, 719. 
82 Merriam, above n 60, 24.  
83 Ibid 11. 
84 Ibid 23, 38.  
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(vii) the researcher is the pivotal figure in gathering data and interpreting the 
‘participants understanding of the phenomenon of interest’.86  
The above methodology distilling ‘richly descriptive’87 data from a purposively selected 
sample of participants88 expressing their multifaceted insights89 into the ‘phenomenon of 
interest’90 is considered the most suitable framework for yielding valuable findings to the 
study’s research questions.  
(b) Selected Sample 
 (i) Purposive Strategy  
As detailed above, a purposive sample of participants was selected for the study.  That is, the 
sample of participants with the greatest level of knowledge was purposively selected for the 
semi-structured interviews.91 According to DiCicco-Bloom, this data dense sample strategy 
endeavours to optimise the findings to answer the qualitative questions.92 Initially three 
purposeful samples were identified for the study to provide the greatest insight into the 
research questions. The three sample groups considered were the general public, Queensland 
Health surgeons, and general practitioners. However, for the feasibility of the study, and to 
remain within the parameters drawn and the research questions as designed, this qualitative 
study was limited to general practitioners. From the selection below, it is considered that 
general practitioners were the most appropriate sample group:  
• General Public Sample Group    
Obtaining qualitative data from the public may have been beneficial to the research project 
as ‘[s]cholars and government reports have advocated for increased public involvement in 
wait time management’.93 Also, international and domestic jurisdictions are increasingly 
attributing greater value upon the ethos of patient-centred care to obtain the best health care 
outcomes.94 Therefore, obtaining information from the public would align with the emerging 
trend of patient centred care. However, it is likely the general public will be unfamiliar with 
Queensland Health policy and the dynamics of the waiting list situation. While it is expected 
                                                                                                                                     
 
85 Ibid 38.  
86 Ibid 24, 266. 
87 Ibid 38. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid 18. 
90 Ibid 24. 
91 Ibid 77.  
92 DiCicco-Bloom, Barbara and Benjamin F Crabtree, ‘The Qualitative Research Interview’ Medical 
Education (2006) 314, 317. 
93 Rebecca A Bruni et al, ‘Public Views on a Wait Time Management Initiative: A Matter of 
Communications’ (2010) 10 BMC Health Services Research 228, 228.  
94 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, above n 19, 36; Flood and May, above n 18, 1. 
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the general public will have definitive views on elective surgery, general practitioners are 
able to provide greater insights of information in the context of Queensland Health policy 
than a general public sample group. Although research including a general public sample 
group would have been informative, due to time constraints and the anticipated sufficiency 
of information collected from general practitioners, the general public sample group was not 
included in this thesis.   
• Queensland Health Surgeons Sample Group 
In contrast to the general public, Queensland Health surgeons would likely have a very good 
understanding of the elective surgery policy and the waiting lists for the study. However, 
surgeons have a potential conflict of interest, as some surgeons operate in both public and 
private facilities. This conflict has the potential to bias surgeons, who may have an agenda to 
strengthen their private practice. A further potential conflict of interest is that Queensland 
Health is their employer. Although the interviews would have been confidential, the risk of 
bias could affect the data obtained from this group.  
• General Practitioner Sample Group 
As general practitioners principally receive funding from the federal government,95 general 
practitioners have the greatest level of neutrality within the system.  Also, general 
practitioners have the regular care of patients waiting for elective surgery and are therefore 
privy to patients’ experiences waiting for elective surgery; whereas surgeons are not 
involved with the regular care of patients and are unlikely to be as aware of patients’ 
ongoing elective surgery experiences. In addition, general practitioners are involved in 
communicating the status of their patients’ condition while on the waiting list with the 
hospital and general practitioners have also been nominated by Queensland Health as an 
elective surgery complaints avenue,96 accordingly, general practitioners have an 
understanding of the effectiveness of waiting list management from the perspective of their 
practice.97  However, a limitation of selecting general practitioners is that their views are 
only perceptions of patients’ experiences instead of actual patient experiences.  Nevertheless, 
the quantity of patients that general practitioners represent should mitigate the limitation of 
not interviewing patients directly.  That is, general practitioners represent a broad range of 
individuals across all elective surgery categories and illnesses and have contact with multiple 
hospitals – which generated meaningful data for the study. Additionally, general 
practitioners may have an understanding of the elective surgery framework. 
                                                
 
95 That is, GPs receive funding through Medicare (Cth) subsidies for patient’s appointments.  
96 Queensland Health, Waiting Lists (27 March 2015) Queensland Health 
<https://www.qld.gov.au/health/services/hospital-care/waiting-lists/>. 
97 Queensland Health, above n 16, [5.5.1]. 
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 (ii) Sample Recruitment  
Initially, it was intended that participants would be selected from the Greater Metro South 
Brisbane Medical Local Area (since 1 July 2015 this area has been re-named the Brisbane 
South Primary Health Network). Recruitment was attempted via the participant’s 
‘gatekeepers’.98 Organisations that have access to general practitioners were requested to 
assist in the recruitment of suitable participants for the study; namely, the Royal Australasian 
College of General Practitioners, the Australian Medical Association (Queensland), and the 
Greater Metro South Brisbane Medicare Local. According to Pranee, there is a potential 
limitation to utilising gatekeepers for the study, as gatekeepers may ‘take it upon themselves 
to deny access to some participants who might otherwise be willing to take part’.99 However, 
given the below results, the limitation of utilising gatekeepers was not applicable for the 
study:  
(i) Australian Medical Association (Queensland) – a request for participants was 
included in the AMA (Queensland) Online News – no participants were recruited 
from this newsletter. 
(ii) RACGP (Queensland) – there was no response to the request for recruiting 
participants from this gatekeeper and therefore no participants.  
(iii) Greater Metro South Brisbane Medicare Local – a request for participants was 
included in the GMSBML News - no participants were recruited from this 
newsletter. 
Therefore, it was necessary to increase the geographical area to improve the 
likelihood of recruiting sufficient participants. The new area selected was South-East 
Queensland. There were ten participants interviewed who practised across a total of 
three Primary Health Care Networks (PHN) in South-East Queensland – 10% from 
Brisbane South PHN; 30% Darling Downs and West Moreton PHN; and 60% from 
Brisbane North PHN. Methods utilised to recruit these participants included: 
(i) a letter of request sent to randomly selected general practitioners across the 
South-East Queensland area; 
(ii) networking from existing contacts; and 
                                                
 
98 See generally, Liamputtong, above n 62, 18. 
99 Ibid. 
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(iii) ‘snowballing’.100 The snowballing strategy involved seeking potential participants 
from participants already recruited for the study.101 
Within this purposeful sampling strategy, the general practitioner sample selected generally 
represents ‘the broader population from which it is drawn’.102 That is, there are a 
considerable number of public hospitals (a total of eleven) across the three PHN areas for the 
study in which the general practitioners practice103 – this quantity of public hospitals 
supports representivity for the case study of Queensland.  Also, across the three PHN areas, 
participants practiced in a total of seven different suburbs, which supports the representivity 
of Queensland in terms of patient demographics.  
To ensure the thesis was completed within the recommended time frame, it was not viable to 
select a sample group representing Queensland’s remote geographical areas.  The omission 
to include remote/very remote areas in the sample group is acknowledged as a limitation of 
the study. Nevertheless, the participants recruited extended across two of the five Australian 
Standard Geographical Classification Remoteness Areas;104 including, major cities areas 
(seven participants) and an inner regional area (three participants).105 The areas not included 
for the sample are outer regional, remote and very remote districts as derived from the 
Australian Standard Geographical Classification Remoteness Area map.106 However, as the 
majority of the Queensland population (78.3%) reside in major cities (52.4%) and inner 
regional areas (25.9%), it is unlikely the lack of outer regional (17.8%), remote (2.5%) and 
very remote (1.5%) representation significantly limits the representivity strategy and value of 
the study.107   
                                                
 
100See generally, Merriam, above n 60, 17. 
101 See generally, ibid. 
102 William J Gibson and Andrew Brown, Working with Qualitative Data (SAGE, 2009), 57. 
103 Note the PHN areas are essentially the same as the Hospital and Health Service Districts. The 
Brisbane North PHN covers the Metro North Hospital and Health Service District; the Brisbane South 
PHN covers the Metro South Hospital and Health Service District; and, the Darling Downs and West 
Moreton PHN covers the West Moreton Hospital and Health Service District. See generally, 
Department of Health, Metro North Hospital and Health Service (2016) Department of Health 
<https://www.health.qld.gov.au/metronorth/ >; Department of Health, Metro South Health (2016) 
Department of Health <https://metrosouth.health.qld.gov.au/>; Department of Health (Qld), West 
Moreton Hospital and Health Service District: Facilities and Locations (2016) Department of Health 
<https://www.westmoreton.health.qld.gov.au/facilities-and-locations/>. 
104See generally, Department of Health (Cth), DoctorConnect, Department of Health                                         
< http://www.health.gov.au/internet/otd/Publishing.nsf/Content/RA-intro>. 
105 Medicare Local (Cth), Greater Metro South Brisbane: Profile Report Medicare Local 
<http://www.medicarelocals.gov.au/internet/medicarelocals/publishing.nsf/Content/DACDE2165A93
05D4CA257B7B00207E12/$File/ML%20Profile%20Report%20-
%20Greater%20Metro%20South%20Brisbane%20-%20Dec%2012.pdf>.  
106 See, ibid. 
107Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia (2004) Australian Bureau of Statistics, 94 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article22004?opendo
cument&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2004&num=&view=>.  
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 (iii) Sample Size  
As discussed earlier, ten general practitioners were interviewed for the study. The sample 
size selected was sufficient to address the research questions.108 Such sufficiency for the 
study was obtained by recruiting a sample size until saturation was attained; that is, until the 
data reached the saturation threshold.109 Although the sample size is limited, according to 
Sandelowski a ‘sample size of 10 may be judged adequate for certain kinds of homogeneous 
or critical case sampling’ provided saturation has been attained.110 Considering ‘nothing 
new’111 was being generated by approximately the eighth interview, saturation had been 
reached even before the tenth interview was concluded. In addition, Kuzel suggests that 
‘sample size in a qualitative study is typically small – often between five to 20 units of 
analysis’.112  
(c) Data Collection Strategy  
As discussed previously, study data was collected from semi-structured interviews with 
participants. The design of the interview questions was informed by the answers to research 
questions 1 to 5 of the thesis, which also influenced the qualitative data analysis. The 
interview questions mainly involved open-ended questions to obtain information regarding 
waiting lists across all categories of elective surgery and also to obtain participants’ 
perceptions about an enforceable right approach to timely elective surgery (see Appendix 
A).113 According to Rapley, open-interviewing distils a ‘rich, deep and textured picture’ of 
the data.114 Therefore, it is considered that open-interviewing strengthened the data and 
increased the value of the findings to the research questions.115 The semi-structured 
interviews for the study consisted of the same primary questions amongst all participants; 
similar to the approach of a structured interview.116 However, unlike unstructured interviews, 
the semi-structured interviews employed the flexibility of probing questions that may have 
unearthed issues not previously intended to be examined in the study.117 Such flexibility may 
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have yielded further topical issues and heightened the value of answers to the research 
questions.118  
The interviews were in-person and proceeded for approximately 30 minutes. The relatively 
limited time frame was selected to ensure adequate recruitment for the study. Prior to 
proceeding with the interviews, the interviews were piloted to ensure the actual interviews 
proceeded efficiently119. Interviews with participants were confidential.120 Interviews were 
audio recorded and transcribed.121 A transcript of the interview responses was forwarded to 
the participants to ensure accuracy of the data.122   
(d) Data Analysis  
The data obtained from participants above was analysed inductively. That is, the answers to 
the research questions, presented as themes/categories, were ‘inductively derived’ from the 
specifics of the data.123 However, according to Merriam, this inductive approach would be 
inevitably influenced ‘by some discipline-specific theoretical framework’ during the data 
analysis.124 The study accords with Merriam’s view in that the doctrinal research relating to 
the phenomenon of interest has guided the interview questions and inescapably influences 
the data analysis.125   
The above inductive approach is employed within a thematic data analysis. The thematic 
analysis strategy is a tool utilised for ‘identifying, analysing and reporting’ the 
categories/themes from the study data.126 As described above, such categories/themes are the 
components essentially resolving the research questions.127  Specifically, according to 
Gibson and Brown, thematic analysis involves firstly considering data similarities and 
divergences.128 Additionally, in Ryan and Bernard’s view, themes in the data will emerge by 
identifying repetitive data, uncommonly construed comments,129 the use of common 
metaphors,130 the contextual usage of ‘linguistic connectors’,131 and any omissions of the 
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participants to discuss issues.132  The second limb to thematic analysis, according to Gibson 
and Brown, involves exploring the interactions between the groups of data.133 This thematic 
analysis commenced while obtaining study data; that is, following the first qualitative 
interview.134 Following the first interview, notes were transcribed adjacent to information 
that appeared to have purpose to the research questions.135 Identifying such information as 
key words equated to open coding of the data.136 Draft categories were then formed by 
deciphering similar open coded data into groups.137 With further analysis and data collection, 
the draft categories were attributed titles with particular relevance to the research 
questions.138 With the formation of such categories, subcategories were also identified.139 
Upon examination of the category groups and sub-groups, gaps between these groups 
surfaced.140 To connect these categories, a theoretical interpretation was formulated to 
resolve the significance of the study’s data, and ultimately answer the research questions.141  
(e) Study Rigour  
To ensure the above data analysis and findings were rigorous, accurate and valid, the study 
was designed to contain several key features of process and methodology.142  Pranee 
identified the following measures to ensure research process rigour – ‘internal validity’, 
‘external validity, ‘objectivity’, and ‘reliability’.143 Internal validity refers to the degree to 
which the study is deemed credible.144 To ensure the study is credible the participants 
reviewed their data obtained at the interview (i.e. by participants checking their data), the 
data and draft interview findings were reviewed by the study’s supervisors (peer 
reviewed),145 the interviews were tape recorded to substantiate the data collected,146 the 
sample was selected purposefully, and a detailed description of the research processes 
utilised in the design and analysis of the study was employed (‘audit trail’).147 In contrast to 
internal validity, external validity refers to the generalisability of the study;148 that is, the 
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applicability of the data to related studies.149 However, there is an inherent flaw in the 
concept of generalisability for qualitative studies, as information does not accrue, it is merely 
broadens ‘our kit of conceptual tools’.150 Nevertheless, the external validity was attained by 
ensuring there was a ‘thick description’151 of the data to enable reviewers to situate the study 
and evaluate its generalisability.152 Also, external validity was achieved by concurrently 
reviewing the literature on the topic, further strengthening the study’s external validity.153 
The objectivity of the study  
refers to the alignment of the study’s data with the study’s analysis outcomes.154 Such 
objectivity is supported by providing an audit trail of the study.155 Finally, the reliability of 
the study was enforced by peer review, 156an audit trail, member checking, and by recording 
the interviews on tape.157  
In addition to the above strategies, the rigour is also critical to the overall validity and 
reliability158 of the study.159 Pranee considered the methodology to be a support to the study 
design, as the selected methodology informs the choice of methods and the links ‘between 
the aim of the research, the choice of methods, and the approach to data analysis’.160 Fossey 
et al identified the following as ‘methodological rigour’ measures – ‘transparency’, 
‘appropriateness’, ‘adequacy’, ‘responsiveness to social context’, and ‘congruence’.161 To 
ensure transparency, the method of obtaining the data and data analysis must be apparent.162 
Such transparency is achieved through an audit trail. Appropriateness is attained through 
selecting a data dense sample of participants in a representative data region to ensure optimal 
resolution of the research questions within the thesis time frame.163 By undertaking semi-
structured interviews with participants to ‘respond to the real-life situations’, the research has 
‘responsiveness to the social context’.164 The congruence of the research is supported by 
aligning the research methods with the principles of an interpretative and basic qualitative 
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study.165 Further, such congruence is evident in the selection of methodology to catalyse 
optimal research findings;166 that is, by the purposeful selection of participants to yield the 
greatest insight into the ‘phenomenon of interest’.167 
(f) Ethical Requirements  
The research project involved human participation with a low risk of harm to the 
participants.168 A low risk application for human ethical clearance was required for the 
study.169 Ethical approval was granted by the Queensland University of Technology’s 
Human Research Ethics Committee (approval number HREC 1400000290 on 1 May 2014). 
The information discussed in the study is not sufficiently ‘unique, unusual, or deviant in 
some way’ to remove the ‘cloak of anonymity’ of the participants.170 Therefore the research 
involves non-identifiable experiences with the only foreseeable risk to participants being 
discomfort.171 The confidentiality/privacy of the participants is further protected by ensuring 
the research data is securely stored.172 Prior to collecting the research data, informed and 
voluntary consent was obtained from the participants.173 That is, participants received 
disclosure of the research purpose, structure and the negatives/positives of electing to engage 
in the study.174 The integrity of the project was strengthened by adhering with these ethical 
requirements.175  
However, prior to analysing the study’s qualitative research outcomes, it is necessary to 
detail the dynamics of the Australian health system to understand the law, policy, political 
and cultural parameters of elective surgery.  
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Chapter 3 
III AUSTRALIAN HEALTH SYSTEM FRAMEWORK - FOCUS ON 
QUEENSLAND PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
A  Introduction 
This chapter explores research question 1, that is, what is the current Queensland legal 
and/or policy framework concerning rights to timely elective surgery? The methodology for 
this research question involves identifying and analysing legislation, common law and 
government policy to ascertain the nature and extent/enforceability of any current rights 
possessed by patients to timely elective surgery in Queensland. This chapter concludes that 
there is an absence of a legal and/or policy framework imputing patients with a right to 
timely elective surgery in Queensland.   
However, it is firstly important to explore the Australian health system framework, as this 
federal framework plays a role in the funding and policy instruments for Queensland public 
hospitals, including elective surgery. Therefore, Queensland law and policy cannot be 
analysed in isolation from the labyrinth of legal, policy, political and cultural parameters of 
the federal framework. Secondly, understanding the various ineffective strategies of the 
federal health system framework to resolve the elective surgery dilemma will later support a 
need for a right to timely elective surgery for Queensland, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis.  
Part B of this chapter explores the components of the federal system’s framework. This 
exploration involves an examination of the primary mechanics of a health system: the 
influence of government policy incentives and disincentives on that health system, the 
constitutional origins of health power and funding constraints within the system, and the 
imputation of legal and policy health reform within this politically and culturally 
multifaceted framework. Part M of this chapter then explores the current Queensland legal 
and policy framework in relation to timely elective surgery, and specifically, whether there is 
any right to timely elective surgery for patients.  
B Mechanics of a Health System  
According to Duckett and Willcox, the basic kinetics of a health system comprise a series of 
‘inputs’, ‘processes, outputs and outcomes’.176 The fundamental input being finance, with 
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other input components consisting of the provision of health and administrative staff, 
infrastructure, equipment and information technology.177 Such inputs create processes.178 An 
example of a health system process is the procedural treatment of patients by way of 
surgery.179 As inputs create processes; processes create outputs.180 An output, for example, is 
a cured patient following surgery.181  Patient outputs affect the overall outcomes of a health 
system.182 Duckett and Willcox distilled outcomes into solitary outcomes, that is, the 
measure of an individual’s contentment and the broader outcome of social stability.183   
Prima facie, the mechanics of a health system equate to a one-directional equation 
commencing with system inputs and concluding with system outcomes.184 However, system 
outcomes are not solely end-products, outcomes affect the system’s fundamental input of 
finance – the impetus of the system.185 According to McKee, a health system creating good 
health outcomes will generate societal economic prosperity through its healthy society 
generating higher productivity.186 That is, a healthy society has increased work outputs and 
income; thereby, creating further funds available to the health system from taxation of that 
income.187 More specifically, Duckett and Willcox suggested  that a health system that 
creates strong health outcomes for its patients will evoke a level of social trust in the system 
and increase its leverage to ‘garner additional resources’188 from its society; thereby, further 
strengthening the system.189 Figure 1 below depicts the health system, health and economic 
perpetual cycle.190  
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Figure 1: The Health System Cycle 
 
In effect, the approach of Duckett and Willcox, and McKee is that a health system generating 
good health outcomes creates greater economic wealth available to that system and 
specifically, Duckett and Willcox suggested that the economic wealth channelled into the 
health system would be greater if the health system generates a level of trust in the system at 
a societal level (that is, creates societal trust through generating good health outcomes).191 
Conversely, a health system creating poor outcomes for its patients will result in community 
mistrust in that system.192 For example, one of the criteria consumers judge a health system 
by is timely access.193 If a health system fails to meet this need, it may affect the health of the 
patients and destabilise patients’ trust in the system; thereby, adversely affecting the 
system’s ability to acquire further funds – the repercussion being a further deterioration in 
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the system.194 However, governments have the power to improve these health system 
outcomes and thereby generate patient trust through skilful utilisation of policy instruments, 
as discussed below.195  
C Health System Governance: Utilisation of Policy Instruments  
Governments exert their power through policy instruments to result in desired health 
outcomes.196 A policy instrument is defined as ‘everything a policy actor may use to obtain 
certain goals’.197 Despite the wide interpretation of the term ‘policy instruments’, the types of 
instruments can be distilled into three categories.198  According to Vendung’s theory, the 
three categories of policy instruments are regulation (‘sticks’), economic policy (‘carrots’) 
and information (‘sermons’).199 ‘Sticks’ represent the greatest level of government control, 
whereby rules stipulate required actions with any breach of the rules resulting in a 
sanction.200 ‘Carrots’ involve an exertion of lesser government power to effect change by 
utilising economic incentives (for example, subsidies) or economic disincentives (for 
example, levies). Conversely, with a ‘carrot’ incentive or disincentive the ‘addressees are not 
obligated to take the measures involved’.201 Similar to ‘carrots’, ‘sermons’ do not require the 
‘addressees’ to conform to a government’s wishes.202 However, ‘sermons’ are a weaker form 
of government control than ‘carrots’ as ‘sermons’ involve merely a ‘pure transfer of 
knowledge’ to try to acquire support for government’s policy. 203 This section will examine 
the ‘stick’, ‘carrot’ and ‘sermon’ policy instruments the government has utilised to shape 
outcomes within the health system (Figure 2 below depicts the power levels of ‘carrots’, 
‘sticks’ and ‘sermons’).  If the appropriate policy instruments have been selected, such 
policy will serve to strengthen the ‘health’ of the system; society’s trust of the system, and 
ultimately, it may also impact upon the impetus of the system – finance.204    
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Figure 2: Descending Government Power Hierarchy of Policy Instruments 
 
D Financial Power of Australia’s Public Hospital System 
As detailed above, it is important that governments select the appropriate policy instruments 
to create good health outcomes, as there is a need to capture societal support to ensure 
sufficient finances are gathered to fund the health system – as such funds are primarily 
obtained from society via taxation.205 Medicare – a ‘compulsory, universal, health insurance 
scheme, based on the principle of equal access for all Australians’ is funded through general 
taxation and the Medicare levy.206 As taxation is received by the Commonwealth government 
by virtue of section 51(ii) of the Constitution,207 the Commonwealth has notable control of 
the pool of finances for health, including public hospitals.208 Conversely, the states have 
regulatory power over public hospitals, yet are reliant on significant funds distributed by the 
Commonwealth conditional upon the Medicare scheme to deliver hospital care.209 According 
to Wheelwright, such discord between the Commonwealth’s financial power and the states’ 
regulatory power creates a lacuna for the development of conflict between the entities and 
ultimately acts as a considerable inhibitor to the delivery of optimal patient care.210 To 
comprehend the conflict and resultant ‘blame game’ between the entities discussed later in 
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this section, it is necessary to firstly consider the basis of this Constitutional power discord. 
211  
E Constitutional Conundrum of Australia’s Public Hospital System  
The public hospital power of the states originated from a deliberate intention of the 
Commonwealth government for states to manage hospital services.212 However, this 
intention was formulated during the drafting of the Constitution during an era where the idea 
of a Commonwealth controlled health system was not considered an option.213 With the 
emergence of national health, it was only then that the Commonwealth/state finance and 
policy power discord surfaced.214 Wheelwright considered the discord to be amplified when 
the Commonwealth government was at a different political persuasion from state 
governments.215 Examples of this discord are examined later in this section with regard to 
Queensland.     
In the absence of a Constitutional provision providing the Commonwealth with 
responsibility for the management of the health system, the Commonwealth must use a 
number of its Constitutional powers to change health policy.216 These provisions have 
included the power of appropriation in section 81 and the power of making conditional 
grants in section 96 of the Constitution, and also the 1946 addition of health and welfare 
powers in section 51(xxiiiA).217 However, section 96 of the Constitution is the pivotal 
provision enabling the Commonwealth to leverage indirect power over public hospitals.218 
Section 96 provides the Commonwealth with power to ‘grant financial assistance to any state 
on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit’.219 Applying Vendung’s theory, 
this enables the Commonwealth to manoeuvre the states to its way of thinking by way of 
‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ conditions.220 Although Wheelwright did not consider the Constitutional 
grant power as a ‘coercive power’ over state governments, Wheelwright conceded that states 
would have difficulties refusing a grant due to the Commonwealth’s funding power.221 Such 
difficulties are evidenced in the current Commonwealth/state funding regime discussed later 
in this section.   
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However, despite the financial auspices of the Commonwealth, the state governments 
manage public hospitals using significant funds distributed by the Commonwealth.222 Yet the 
extent of the power imbalance between the Commonwealth and the states (states refers to 
Australian states and territories) remains ambiguous – creating a platform for a ‘blame game’ 
between them.223 This power imbalance was demonstrated with the introduction of health 
reform in 2007.  
F National Health Reform  
The issue of health reform remerged in 2007 when the newly elected Rudd Labor 
government embarked upon a process to support the ‘welfare state model’ component of the 
health system.224 By February 2008, the National Health and Hospital Reform Commission 
(NHHRC) was created with an agenda to create a sustainable reform strategy for Australia225 
– a society facing the strain of an ageing community, increasing chronic disease, new 
technologies and demanding consumerism.226 The NHHRC reform recommendations 
included the implementation of hospital performance benchmarks with corresponding 
financial incentives, an increased consumer involvement in the health system, and an end to 
the blame game between the Commonwealth and states.227 As a result of the Commission’s 
recommendations, the Australian Health Care Agreement was replaced with the National 
Health and Hospitals Network Agreement (NHHN Agreement).228 The NHHN Agreement 
was approved by the Council of Australian Governments in April 2010, except Western 
Australia.229 While the Agreement established the Commonwealth as the significant funder 
for public hospitals, the states were to continue as the system managers and establish 
authorities to administer Commonwealth funding.230 The Agreement also required states to 
create local hospital networks to ensure public hospitals were managed locally.231 
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By 2011, a National Health Reform Agreement (NHR Agreement) superseded the NHHN 
Agreement.232 The new additions to the agreement tried to achieve a greater balance of 
funding responsibilities between the states and Commonwealth for public hospital growth 
costs, as well as an improved transparent funding model.233 The NHR Agreement agreed by 
COAG is a policy agreement – it does not equate to law.234 In essence, the health reform 
agreements resulted in the Commonwealth having increased policy control over the states 
and increased funding to the states.235 The further control by the Commonwealth was 
justified on the basis that by ‘2045-46, health spending alone would be more than all the 
revenue collected by states and local government’; hence, limiting the ability of states to 
manage any other sectors, for example, police services.236   
However, with a change to a conservative Commonwealth government, it was announced in 
2015 that funding pursuant to the NHR Agreement would end from July 2017; that is, 
instead of using efficient pricing, the contribution from the federal government will be 
‘linked to movements in consumer price index (CPI) and population growth’.237 Further, 
guarantee payments pursuant to the NHR Agreement would cease from 2014-15.238 These 
amendments have been made because the Commonwealth government considers the current 
levels of health spending to be unfeasible239 and are attempting to transition to more 
sustainable funding – this will mean further agreements with the states.240 These changes will 
equate to approximately $1.8 billion for the Commonwealth government over four years.241 
This will mean less funding for state hospitals and the Australian Medical Association warns 
that this will cause hospitals to have ‘insufficient funding to meet the increasing demand for 
services’ – described as a ‘crisis point in public hospital funding’.242 Again, this recent 
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change demonstrates the power the Commonwealth has in controlling the state hospitals’ 
funding.  
G National Health Reform Agreement 
As detailed above, the NHR Agreement distributes efficient funding between the 
Commonwealth and states on a more level basis – this was to be achieved by 2017-18 with 
the Commonwealth funding ‘half of every dollar required to meet increases in the efficient 
price of hospital services’.243 However, as discussed above, this contribution will cease from 
2017.244 A central funding body has been created to administer Commonwealth funds to the 
states - the National Health Funding Body overseen by an Administrator.245 A further 
aspiration of the agreement is to increase community participation in health care by ensuring 
the following: 
a) The requirement for states to maintain a health complaints body.246 In 
Queensland, this was to be achieved through the Health Quality Complaints 
Commission (HQCC). However, Queensland replaced the HQCC with a Health 
Ombudsman on 1 July 2014.247 This change was due to a finding of delays with 
complaints handled by the HQCC.248 The goal of establishing a Health 
Ombudsman is to achieve improved time efficiency of complaints (that is, the 
goal is improved service quality rather than improving delays in health service 
access).249 According to Vendung’s theory, the government has utilised its most 
powerful policy option to manage health complaints with a ‘stick’ policy 
approach to compel compliance.250 
b) Requiring states to maintain a public charter.251 Patient’s rights in Queensland are 
encapsulated in Queensland Health’s Public Charter.252  Charter rights include the 
right to be involved in decisions concerning their health and the patient’s right to 
treatment; however, the Charter does not include a specific right to timely 
elective surgery.253 This ‘sermon’ approach is the weakest usage of policy 
instrument power and the most ineffective type of policy instrument, as such 
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information equates to the government merely seeking community support for 
health reform.254 The charter’s lack of legal enforceability is discussed later in 
this paper. 
c) The establishment of local health authorities to ensure health becomes ‘locally 
controlled’.255 Queensland has established 17 Hospital and Health Services 
(HHSs) across the state to adhere to a more community based hospital structure 
pursuant to Queensland’s Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011.256 Ensuring 
HHSs adhere to legislation is a ‘stick’ type policy and will be discussed later in 
this section;257 however, to understand the ‘stick’ approach to HHSs, the 
operational framework of HHS must be firstly explored.  
H Health and Hospital Boards 
In Queensland, HHSs are managed by the systems manager, that is, Queensland Health via 
the Director-General of Queensland Health through a service agreement.258 Since 1 July 
2012, HHSs have been independent of the systems manager;259 although the system manager 
remains involved with the operation of public hospitals by undertaking the following:260  
a) Health policy development;261 
b) Issuing Health Service directives;262  
c) Monitoring HHSs performance;263 
d) Negotiating with National Health Reform authorities.264  
Although HHSs are independent, HHSs are answerable to the Queensland Minister for 
Health for the HHS’ operations.265 HHSs are monitored by health service auditors and 
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inspectors to ensure continued performance compliance and statutory compliance, 
respectively.266 Each HHS consists of a chair, board members and is managed by a chief 
executive appointed by the board and approved by the Minister for Health.267 The role of 
HHSs is to locally manage their district of hospitals by:268 
a) Providing hospital services;269 
b) Operating their hospitals efficiently;270 
c) Complying with legal, contractual and policy obligations.271 
HHSs are also required to consult with the community regarding health services.272   This is a 
statutory requirement pursuant to the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011.273 In this regard, 
Queensland has implemented a Health Consumers Queensland Consumer and Community 
Engagement Framework through Health Consumers Queensland to assist is complying with 
this requirement.274 Therefore, HHSs will be managed within their local community rather 
than from a state or Commonwealth base, and therefore better meet community voices and 
needs.275  However, since Queensland public hospitals are historically State controlled 
entities, such culturally entrenched power may potentially impair the autonomy of HHSs.276 
By analogy, the United Kingdom’s creation of ‘autonomous’ foundation trusts from the 
Department of Health proved difficult due to the history of the Department’s control.277 
Timmins revealed that these foundation trusts ‘find themselves progressively eroded by the 
Department of Health’.278 Applying Timmins’ argument to Queensland, it appears the degree 
of engagement by Queensland Health indicates that ‘local autonomy’ may ‘not be won by 
simply rebranding governances’.279 For example, the level of funding control over HHSs 
may undermine the concept of HHS autonomy.  
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I National Health Reform Public Hospital Funding  
Despite HHSs locally managing public hospitals, funds received from the Commonwealth 
bypass HHSs and are deposited to state government accounts.280  From the state government 
accounts, Commonwealth funding and any supplementary state funding is distributed to the 
HHSs.281 The two forms of hospital funding provided to the states from the Commonwealth 
are Specific Purpose payments (SPP)/National Health Reform Funding (NHRF) and 
National Partnership payments.282 Figure 3 below details the National Health Reform public 
hospital hierarchy structure. 
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1 Specific Purpose Payments/National Health Reform Funding  
(a) Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) 
In 2008, the Council of Australian Governments agreed to increase the existing health 
specific purpose funding to the states.283 The SPP is also referred to as base funding and is 
calculated according to estimated population increases; the ‘cost index’ for health fixed by 
the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare; and the ‘technology factor’ percentage set by 
the Productivity Commission.284 The new specific purpose funding commenced on 1 July 
2009.285 The variability of the SPP formula created conflict between the states and the 
Commonwealth with the release of the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook in 2012-
13.286 The Commonwealth over-estimated the population growth and index cost during their 
specific purpose funding advance payments to the states in 2011-12.287 The revised estimates 
prompted the Commonwealth to recover the overpayments from the states.288 In Queensland, 
this equated to a loss of approximately $476.1 million over the 2012-13 to 2015-16 financial 
years and ultimately, a decrease in ‘services and staffing levels’289 in Queensland Health. 
Arguably, the Commonwealth ‘seized the opportunity to cut its share’ of health funding.290 A 
senate committee has ‘call[ed] into question the commitment of the Commonwealth to the 
provision of a stable and viable public hospital sector’.291   
As evidenced above, the Commonwealth’s ‘carrot’ incentive to the states initiated a funding 
‘blame game’/, enhanced by the differing political persuasions of the governments.292 
Applying Vendung’s theory, SPP funding equates to a specific grant-in-aid ‘carrot’.293 That 
is, the payments were to support the government’s specific agenda for health reform.294 Such 
payments were intended to increase the legitimacy of the government’s agenda; however, 
unpredictable funding, as occurred in 2012-13, will only serve to mitigate legitimacy.295 
Further, without also including economic disincentives, the effectiveness of the 
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government’s health reform objectives were less than ideal.296 NHRF, discussed below, is a 
further ‘carrot’ funding policy without a disincentive – a similar constraint to the efficiency 
of health reform.297  
(b) National Health Reform Funding  
Since 1 July 2012, SPP has been rebranded as National Health Reform Funding.298  
However, funding practically continued as specific purpose funding during the NHRF 
transition until 2013-14.299 NHRF funding is also referred to as efficient growth funding or 
Activity Based Funding (ABF).300 The premise for implementing efficient growth funding 
instead of base funding is to strengthen public hospitals by forcing ongoing progress and 
more efficient hospital service delivery.301 Forty-five percent of the efficient price of hospital 
services was to be provided by the Commonwealth from mid-2014, increasing to 50% by 
mid-2018.302 Accordingly, the Commonwealth was to jointly share the increasing costs of 
hospitals and better align Commonwealth/state interests.303 Nevertheless, some hospitals will 
not transition to ABF, but continue to receive block funding.304 In Queensland, the majority 
of hospitals are subject to ABF. 305  
As Queensland was deemed the ‘second most inefficient State provider of healthcare on the 
Australian mainland’ with the expense of hospital services soaring 11% higher than the 
Australian efficient cost – Queensland set upon a strategy to cut costs by decreasing 
administrative and front-line staff as well as services.306 Queensland Health also instructed 
its HHSs to decrease their hospital efficiency cost to three percent to maximise the benefits 
of NHRF.307 During 2013, the Queensland Liberal government blamed the previous federal 
government for cost cutting; in turn, the previous Commonwealth Labor government 
returned the blame to Queensland with the previous Federal Health Minister threatening to 
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‘by-pass the Queensland government and provide extra funding direct to the hospitals and 
frontline services’.308 
Similar to SPP funding, NHRF payments equate to incentive type ‘carrots’.309  While SPP 
are grant-in-aid payments that require no specific action on the part of the state to receive 
funding; NHRF is a subsidy payment or ‘conditional payment’ that requires the states to 
meet health efficiency targets if the states elect to receive further Commonwealth funding.310 
Although, these incentive ‘carrot’ polices should be effective for improving hospital 
efficiency; similar to SPP funding, NHRF is susceptible to the ‘blame game’ between the 
governments, as evidenced during Queensland’s hospital cost cutting in 2013, and therefore 
the legitimacy of improving hospital efficiency may be impaired.311 Further, without a 
counterbalancing disincentive ‘carrot’ policy, the effectiveness of the policy to enhance 
hospital efficiency may be less than optimal.312 National Partnership payments, discussed 
below, are further ‘carrots’ without a disincentive – a similar constraint to the efficiency of 
health reform. 
However, as discussed previously, NHRF payments will cease from July 2017 and 
‘essentially return to a funding model’ the NHR Agreement ‘replaced’.313 The proposed 
funding change has already commenced the ‘blame game’ again, as evidenced in following 
statement in the Queensland 2015-16 Budget, saying that the Commonwealth government:314 
announced changes in the 2014-15 Federal Budget that will reduce federal 
funding for public hospitals nationwide by $57 billion from 2017-18 to 
2024-25 according to Commonwealth Treasury figures. The Queensland 
Department of Health estimates that Queensland’s share of these cuts on a 
population basis is $11.8 billion. It is not possible for the Queensland 
Government to make up a federal funding cut of this magnitude. This means 
that unless these federal funding cuts are reversed, there will be a shortfall in 
funding for Queensland hospitals – and a resultant decline in the quality and 
timeliness of services – from 1 July 2017. 
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Further, this newly proposed funding strategy neither contains a financial incentive or 
disincentive for states, which is not an ideal model for improving hospital efficiency.315  
2 National Partnership Payments  
In addition to specific purpose funding, reward funding was available to public hospitals by 
attaining National Elective Surgery Targets (NEST) and National Emergency Access Targets 
(NEAT).316 Previously, the targets were encapsulated in the Elective Surgery Reduction 
Plan.317 Since 1 January 2012, The National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public 
Hospital Services (National Partnership on IPHS) set the NEST and NEAT targets until 30 
December 2017.318 These National partnership payments were in alignment with the national 
health reform agenda of improving public hospitals through the mechanism of performance 
benchmarking.319 However, the National Partnership on IPHS has no legal force.320 
Akin to SPP and NHRF payments, national partnership payments equated to incentive 
‘carrot’ policy.321 Similar to NHRF, national partnership payments are subsidy incentives;322 
however, the government’s objective for national partnership payments was to improve 
elective surgery and emergency department waiting times;323 whereas, the government’s 
objective with NHRF is to improve hospital efficiency costs.324 Again, the incentive for 
national partnership payments was one-directional; that is, it only involved the governments 
giving the funding if policy goals were attained and not if policy goals were not attained.325 
This means that the policy legitimacy of NEST and NEAT was higher than NEST and 
NEAT policy effectiveness, which has somewhat resulted in a failure to achieve the 
government’s patient waiting time targets (as discussed later in this chapter).326  
A further problem with NEST and NEAT as a health reform strategy was the risk that 
funding hospitals based on performance targets may equate to an ‘incentive for fraud’.327 In 
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New South Wales, as recently as 2005, and in Victoria between approximately 2000 to 2009, 
hospital performance data was manipulated for funding purposes.328 Noreca argued that 
national legislation is required to ensure data manipulation is criminalised.329 In addition to 
data manipulation, a hospital may attach excessive importance to reaching targets and 
minimal effort towards patient safety, as is said to have occurred during 2004 to 2005 with 
Dr Patel at Queensland’s Bundaberg Base Hospital.330 Based on previous manipulation at 
some hospitals, NEST and NEAT target data may be at risk of manipulation for monetary 
gain or patient safety may be compromised to meet targets. However, Maumill et al, 
conducted a study in Western Australia between January 2009 to December 2011 and found 
that NEAT performance targets had ‘no adverse impact on the quality and safety of clinical 
care’.331 A similar study has yet to be undertaken with NEST targets in Australia. Although 
manipulation of NEAT or NEST data has not been identified under the health reform regime, 
numerous reform authorities together supporting transparency and also accountability in the 
health system should have minimised the risk of data manipulation.332 Further, recent 
statistics indicate that ‘[b]etween 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2015, for Queensland... the 
proportion of separations for patients admitted from elective surgery waiting lists for which 
an adverse event was reported was relatively stable’.333 That is, the ‘[p]roportion with an 
adverse event’ for April 2012 to March 2013: 7.0%; for April 2013 to March 2014: 7.2%; 
and for April 2014 to March 2015: 7.3%.334 
However, the Commonwealth government announced the cessation of NEST funding 
payments from July 2015.335 Although reward funding for elective surgery did not solve the 
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waiting list dilemma, nor were the targets met; these targets nevertheless contributed to an 
improvement in the elective surgery waiting times.336 With the targets being abolished, this 
means ‘[s]avings of $201.1 million over three years’ to the Commonwealth, but for the states 
the abolition of NEST means decreased financial support for funding public hospitals – 
which is likely to negatively impact upon surgery waiting times.  
The supporting national health reform bodies are discussed below.337 These bodies have also 
been subject to recent changes.  
J Supporting Reform Authorities Established by the National Health Reform Act 2011 
1 National Health Funding Body and Administrator of the National Health 
Funding Pool 
As detailed above, the latest health reforms aim to create a more unified and transparent 
funding mechanism by the creation of one national funding body – the NHFB with an 
Administrator.338 The Administrator is an independent entity.339 The new funding structure 
commenced on 1 July 2012.340 The fund maintains independent accounts for each state and is 
subject to transparent accounting and auditing by an Administrator.341 Once Commonwealth 
monies are distributed from the fund to state account pools, each state has the responsibility 
of separating such funds from other monies to ensure monies are utilised for the requisite 
health reform purpose.342 The NHFB is a government ‘stick’ type policy to ensure health 
reform funding is transparently managed.343  
However, with the federal government’s cessation of growth funding, it appears the NHFB 
and the Administrator roles will cease from 2017-18.344 This is due to the 2014-15 
Commonwealth budget, ‘taking a number of initiatives to cut red tape and duplication, 
streamline administration and reduce bureaucracy so that resources can be directed back to 
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health’.345 It is not surprising that the government is seeking to minimise the bureaucracy of 
the numerous bodies created by the previous government as a cost minimisation strategy. 
The other bodies created by the previous government are discussed below.  
2 Independent Hospital Pricing Authority  
The Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) was established in December 2011.346 
The IHPA is the determinant of the ‘national efficient cost’ for hospital block funding and 
the national ‘efficient price’ (NEP) for ABF.347 Hospital data is collected from the states 
annually for the IPHA to calculate the NEP.348 In formulating the NEP, the IPHA must 
‘ensure reasonable access’349 to hospitals, protect patient safety,350 and guard the 
‘effectiveness, efficiency and financial sustainability of the public hospital system’.351 To 
ensure the IHPA adheres with the government’s national health reform objective of 
transparency and accountability, the IHPA is managed with the power of a ‘stick’ type 
policy.352 
However, with the proposed loss of activity based funding from July 2017,353 it appears the 
Department of Health will assume the IHPA functions, ‘leaving the agency with just a board 
and chief executive’.354   
3 National Health Performance Authority  
The National Health Performance Authority (NHPA) is also a creature of the National 
Health Reform Act.355 It is the body responsible for monitoring hospital performance 
pursuant to the National Health Performance Framework.356 If the performance of a HHS is 
poor, the NHPA will issue their systems manager with a notice.357 In an attempt to adhere 
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with the health reform patient-focused care and transparency ethos, the NHPA publically 
reports hospital performance via the “MyHospitals” website.358 Publishing hospital statistics 
creates an incentive for HHSs to competitively achieve good statistics.359 However, a by-
product of publishing results is that patients, together with their general practitioner, may 
embark upon hospital ‘shopping’ for the shortest waiting list, as discussed later in the 
qualitative findings of Chapter 6.360 This may disadvantage patients without the skill to 
access and analyse the results, and without the ability to convince their general practitioner 
to obtain a referral to another hospital within their district.361   
The equivalent to the National Health Performance Framework in Queensland is the Hospital 
and Health Service Performance Management Framework.362 The Queensland framework 
details the threshold key performance indicators required to be achieved by HHSs.363 In the 
event of key performance indicators are not attained, a number of actions are 
contemplated.364 This range includes (but is not limited to), ‘[p]reparation of a report by the 
HHS to explain variances in performance’ and ‘[a]greement that additional support may be 
best provided through engagement of an independent review’.365 Such sanctions for breach 
equate to the government utilising a ‘stick’ type approach to ensure hospitals perform in 
accordance with the framework standards – although these ‘stick’ approaches appear to be 
somewhat weak.366 The NHPA will finalise operation on 30 June 2016 and the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare and the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care will assume its duties.367  
4 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
To ensure patient safety is not compromised by the health reform restructure, the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) is tasked with monitoring 
patient outcomes.368 Although the ACSQHC has been in operation since 2006, the ACSQHC 
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status as an independent entity from the Commonwealth only commenced on 1 July 2011.369 
Notably, the ACSQHC was responsible for drafting the Australian Charter on Health Care 
Rights, detailing patient’s rights in the health care regime.370 Queensland has also 
implemented its own charter modelled on the Australian Charter on Health Care Rights.371 
However, as patient charters do not equate to law, such charters have been criticised as 
equating to ‘unenforceable rights’ with ‘undefined standards’.372 
The ACSHQ was also involved in the development of the National Safety and Quality in 
Health Standards (NSQHS).373 The NSQHS requires each HHS to satisfy ten standards, 
including the standard of ‘partnering with consumers’.374  Commencing in January 2013, 
HHSs must attain the ten standards to receive accreditation with ACSQHC.375 Such powerful 
‘stick’ pre-requisite accreditation regulation aims to ensure nationally safe hospital standard 
levels are achieved.376  
It was proposed in the 2014-15 Commonwealth budget that the ACSQHC be merged into a 
Health Productivity and Performance Commission; however, it appears these plans may not 
eventuate.377  
K Australian Health Framework: Summary 
As evidenced above, health reform is fraught with difficulties. Firstly, the initial health 
reform discussions set to quell the ‘blame game’ between the states and the Commonwealth 
by appointing the Commonwealth as the sole funder of hospital services.378 However, the 
Council of Australian Governments has since decided to maintain many funders,379 causing 
each level of government to apportion blame on the other government for inadequate 
resourcing.380 Secondly, the introduction of independent HHSs were to be catalysts for the 
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local management of hospitals.381 However, the level of control exercised by the 
Commonwealth and the states leaves the HHS with minimal autonomy – HHSs are regulated 
by ‘stick policy’ and amount to merely an additional level of bureaucracy in the health 
system.382 Further, restricted HHS autonomy may be further constrained by culturally 
historic state governance influences, especially in Queensland.383 Thirdly, the by-product of 
the introduction of performance benchmarking has been improved treatment waiting time 
(although the targets have not been met).384 With the cessation of this NEST strategy, this 
means a loss of ‘carrot’ incentives for the states, which may potentially cause an increase in 
waiting times again.385 Fourthly, the move to a more patient focused health system 
practically equates to a mere aspirational objective as patients’ health rights are legally 
unenforceable within the health system and equate to a mere policy ‘sermon’.386 Fifthly, 
administratively, there is considerable duplication of health policy between the 
Commonwealth and states, and also multiple Commonwealth regulatory bodies; 
consequently this limits the funds available to hospital front line services387 – although the 
number of regulatory bodies should be decreased to an extent with the Commonwealth 
government’s recent announcements.388 
Finally, effective health systems require strong policy instruments to create good health 
outcomes, and in turn, further strengthen the system.389 The omission of a disincentive 
‘carrot’ policy (such as a penalty for not reaching targets) to counterbalance the incentive 
NHRF and national partnership funding was less than optimal for achieving hospital 
efficiency and patient waiting times.390 The absence of a ‘carrot’ disincentive was likely 
attributable to the constitutional health funding and policy discord.391 That is, the states were 
less likely to sign an intergovernmental agreement apportioning the Commonwealth with 
health policy power if the Commonwealth was able to take state resources in the event health 
targets were not attained. However, the newly proposed Commonwealth government funding 
strategy (abolishing activity based funding and NEST funding) is even less ideal than the 
previous funding structure, as the funding neither includes incentive or disincentive 
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‘carrots’.392 Accordingly, the government’s new strategy may adversely affect health 
outcomes, community trust and ultimately available finances to strengthen the health system 
– especially with the significant projected decline in Commonwealth funding available to 
public hospitals that will flow from the new funding structure.393   
The following section explores the Australian elective surgery framework with a focus on 
Queensland public hospitals, including the effectiveness of its policy and funding structure.     
L Australian Elective Surgery Framework – Focus on Queensland Public Hospitals 
1 Introduction 
Elective surgery is a fundamental process of a health system and attracts considerable public 
attention; therefore, it is arguable that excessive elective surgery waiting times will likely 
destabilise citizens’ trust in the health system, and ultimately the strength of that system.394 
Accordingly, it is imperative governments strive to ensure patients are treated within 
clinically indicated time frames by utilising the optimal policy instruments.395 To examine 
the effectiveness of elective surgery policies, with a focus on Queensland public hospitals, 
this chapter explores the barriers to timely elective surgery; the ‘carrot’ reward funding 
incentives;396 the difficulties of such reward incentives; Queensland’s current elective 
surgery management procedures; patients’ complaint options for a failure to receive timely 
elective surgery and the lack of a legal right to timely elective surgery for patients; and the 
effect of outpatient waiting on elective surgery. However, firstly, the current elective surgery 
definition and how effectively it is operationalised requires examination.  
2 Elective Surgery Defined   
Elective surgery is defined as surgery that may be placed in abeyance in excess of one day.397 
In Queensland, at the present time, government policy classifies elective surgery into three 
urgency categories (category 1, category 2 and category 3 – explained further below). These 
categories only dwell in the realm of policy and not law – there exists no legislative 
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guarantee of receiving surgery within such time frames398 Further, the time frames only 
include time waited on the elective surgery waiting list, not total time waited from placement 
on the outpatient’s waiting list.399  
Of further concern was that Australia’s states had varying definitions of elective surgery 
urgency categories – creating difficulties in the comparison of state performance against 
NEST.400 For example, during 2011-12, Queensland classified 48% of patients waiting for 
cataract extraction elective surgery as a category 2; whereas, for the same procedure in South 
Australia, only 10% of patients were classified within the same urgency category.401 It was 
considered that elective surgery incentives (that is, the ‘carrot’ incentive) and state variations 
in elective surgery definitions may have contributed to the variances in urgency category 
classifications.402 However, since April 2015, an evidence based National Elective Surgery 
Urgency Categorisation guideline has resolved this concern of categorisation 
inconsistency.403 Although NEST has been abolished, the National Elective Surgery Urgency 
Categorisation guideline nevertheless aims to strengthen equity for patients accessing 
surgery, balance the certainty of urgency assignment with clinical opinion, and mitigate 
patient risk related to waiting too long for elective surgery.404   
3 National Elective Surgery Urgency Categorisation Guideline Application in 
Queensland 
The National Elective Surgery Urgency guideline applies in Queensland public hospitals.405 
The guideline stipulates the following: 
a) patients are to be categorised in one of the categories below:406 
o ‘Category 1: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 30 days’407 
o ‘Category 2: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 90 days’408 
o ‘Category 3: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 365 days’409 
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b) tables of common surgery procedures410 with stipulated urgency categories411 for 
consistent categorisation. For example, a ‘[c]raniotomy for removal of a tumour 
(neurological deficit)’ is assigned as a category 1412 and a ‘[t]otal hip 
replacement’ is assigned as a category 3.413 However, these guidelines do not 
extend to all elective surgeries.414 In that situation, a patient should be assigned a 
category based on their ‘clinical situation’ instead of the ‘availability of hospital 
or surgeon resources’.415 
c) a ‘[t]reat in turn principle is to be applied when booking elective surgery patients. 
That is patients are treated in accordance with their urgency category’.416  
In terms of the guideline’s introduction of ‘simplified time based clinical urgency 
categories’417 system, this system is essentially identical to Queensland’s categorisation 
policy prior to the introduction of the guidelines. Therefore, there was no change for 
Queensland in relation to this guideline.  
Although the guideline promotes practice consistency,418 in Queensland, for elective 
surgery procedures not included in the guideline’s commonly utilised elective surgeries 
tables,419 there appears to be scope for subjective categorisation decision making. That is, 
Queensland policy states that, in the assessment of a patient’s clinical situation the ‘patient’s 
medical condition and the patient’s life circumstances, including issues related to activity 
limitations, restrictions in participation in employment and other life situations, carer 
responsibilities and access to carer and other supports’ is taken in consideration.420 However, 
there is oversight of such discretion, that is, the subjective scope of any decision making 
should be somewhat limited as:421 
The decision to assign a category other than the nationally recommended 
urgency category can only be approved by a delegate of the HHS chief 
executive and the reason/s must be documented in the patient’s medical 
record. 
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Further, as a significant number of elective surgery procedures with stipulated categories are 
provided in the guideline, it is not likely that discretionary decision making will form the 
majority of urgency categorisation.422  
Also, the ‘[t]reat in turn’ principle, where patients receive surgery in order, only applies to 
approximately 60 percent of patients for category 1, 2 and 3 elective surgeries in 
Queensland.423 Prima facie, this appears inconsistent with the national guideline’s equitable 
access424 vision, as 40% of patients will not receive their elective surgery in turn within their 
category. Nevertheless, although not treating in order introduces a level of subjectiveness, 
the reasoning of Queensland Health is based on the need to ‘balance clinical need with 
equity of access’425 – which is in accordance with the guideline’s vision to ensure those 
patients with the most clinical need are assigned priority.426  
4 Barriers to Timely Elective Surgery  
To understand the impetus driving the recent elective surgery definition changes, the 
underlying structural factors relevant to the waiting list system require examination 
(however, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine issues regarding waiting list 
management). Nationally, Australia’s Medicare scheme was to abolish consumer’s financial 
hurdle to hospital treatment; however, the presence of waiting lists for elective surgery 
connotes the existence of other hurdles to care.427  Consumers with less financial leverage to 
divert from the public health system to private health are most susceptible to enduring a long 
wait for elective surgery.428  
Also, as society becomes better educated and increases its ability to access health 
information, individual expectations increase and morph into a society of consumerism.429 
Such consumer-centred interests translate to consumers demanding better health care, 
including timely treatment.430 A further significant barrier to treatment access is population 
increase and an inclining ageing population.431 Australia’s life expectancy is ‘among the 
highest in the world’.432 It is estimated that by 2050, there will be an 80% rise in the need for 
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public hospitals – this will exceed population growth.433 In Australia, population increase is 
most prominent in Queensland – increasing faster than all the other states.434  Also, an older 
population means longer hospital stays, especially with Australia’s inadequate nursing home 
availability.435 
Finally, with chronic disease on the rise, especially the proportion of overweight/obese 
individuals, hospital resources are strained.436 In Queensland, the rate of overweight/obese 
individuals increased ‘from 61.2% to 65.4%’ in the years 2007-08 to 2011-12 – higher than 
the national increase.437  Further, advancing medical technology generally leads to new 
medical services – more services place additional strain and cost on the existing system, and 
ultimately decrease service accessibility to treatment including elective surgery.438 The 
previous national approach to improving this elective surgery access conundrum is discussed 
below.  
5 National Health Reform Approach to Elective Surgery Access  
(a) Reward Funding 
The National Health reform approach to improving elective surgery waiting lists was 
principally through performance benchmarking.439 As detailed previously, the National 
Partnership Agreement on IPHS set such benchmarking by NEST.440 The incentive for states 
to attain the NEST was reward funding.441 Such a ‘carrot’ incentive increased the legitimacy 
of the policy to attain elective surgery targets; that is, the subsidy was to ‘work as a kind of 
tranquillizer, ensuring that a policy to which there is great resistance can still be 
implemented’.442 However, ‘subsidies are relatively ineffective and do not in themselves 
bring about the... change in behaviour’; that is, the effectiveness of such polices is weak.443 
Conversely, disincentive ‘carrots’, such as levies, are ‘very effective’.444 Therefore, to ensure 
an effective policy, a disincentive ‘carrot’ was required in conjunction with the ‘carrot’ 
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reward funding incentive.445 This is evidenced by the fact that elective surgery targets were 
not met (although there may be other reasons, such as insufficient funding or capacity).446 
The actual results of elective surgery waiting times since the implementation of the ‘carrot’ 
incentive policy are examined later in this chapter.447 However, firstly, the framework of 
NEST reward funding requires examination for a better understanding of NEST results.   
There were two parts to the National Partnership Agreement on IPHS reward funding:448 
• Part 1 funding was to reward states treating patients ‘within the clinically 
recommended time’.449 In Queensland, the maximum Part 1 reward funding 
available was $5.3 million per annum.450  
• Part 2 funding was to reward states that achieved a ‘reduction in the number of 
patients who were overdue for surgery, particularly patients who had waited the 
longest beyond the clinically recommended time’.451 In Queensland, the 
maximum Part 2 reward funding available was $5.3 million per annum.452 
A summary of NEST reward payments available to the State of Queensland was as 
follows:453  
Table 1: Summary of Available NEST Reward Payments 
Year  Part 1 Maximum Reward 
Funding (million)  
Part 2 Maximum Reward 
Funding (million)  
2012-13 $5.3 $5.3 
2013-14 $5.3 $5.3 
2014-15 $5.3 $5.3 
2015-16 $5.3 $5.3 
2016-17 $5.3 $5.3 
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The requirements to receive reward funding for Part 1 and Part 2 of the NEST are detailed 
below:  
(i) Part 1 Reward Funding Requirements 
Queensland was required to meet the following targets for elective surgery urgency 
categories 1, 2 and 3 to achieve Part 1 reward funding from 2012, as follows:454  
Table 2: Part 1 NEST Reward Funding Targets  
Percentage of patients 
treated within 
recommended time 
Category 1  Category 2 
 
Category 3  
 
2010 baseline 83% 74.8% 88.1% 
2012 target  89% 81% 91% 
2013 target 100% 87% 94% 
2014 target 100% 94% 97% 
2015 target 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
For example, in 2013, Queensland needed to achieve 100% of category 1 patients, 87% of 
category 2 patients and 94% of category 3 patients treated within the clinically recommended 
time to achieve the available reward funding for that year.455  However, if Queensland failed 
to meet the targets, such funding would accumulate into the following assessment year and 
would be redeemable by Queensland, if targets had been reached that year.456 Yet, ‘[a]ny 
reward payments which are not made by the end’ of the National Partnership Agreement on 
IPHS, such payments ‘will not be available’.457 In the event Queensland achieved results less 
than the baseline in category 1, 2 or 3; then reward funding would not be available to the 
State in that assessment year, nor would the funding be redeemable in future assessment 
years.458 Additionally, the State was required to sustain any improved performance to 
‘receive ongoing reward funding’.459 Reward funding did not necessarily equate to an all or 
nothing process. If the State had improved performance but did not attain the target, then the 
State was rewarded on a ‘proportional performance’ basis,460 provided the result was at least 
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50% between the previous year’s result and the current target.461 For example, a target of 
100%, with the previous year’s achievement of 94% meant that at least 97% needed to be 
achieved for ‘proportional performance’462 funding to apply.463 The actual results of NEST 
performance are discussed below.  
(ii) Queensland’s Part 1 Performance Results   
Annually, the COAG Reform Council reported on NEST performance across all state 
jurisdictions.464 The first report was released mid-2013 for the 2012 assessment year (i.e. 1 
January 2012 to 31 December 2012): namely, the National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2012.465  The second report was 
released mid-2014 for the 2013 assessment year (i.e. 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013): 
namely, the National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: 
Performance Report for 2013.466 However, there have not been any further performance 
reports released, nevertheless, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare released a 
report in 2015 detailing the elective surgery waiting times for 2014-15 (i.e. ‘July 2014 to 
June 2015’).467 In Queensland, the State achieved the NEST target for category 1 patients in 
2012 with only a partial achievement for category 2 and 3 patients.468 In 2013, the State 
partly achieved the NEST target for category 1; however, the State failed to achieve the 
category 2 and 3 NEST targets.469 In 2014-15, the State would have failed to achieve targets 
for category 1 and 2 and only partly achieved the target for category 3 – although NEST had 
ceased by July 2014.470 Therefore, the effectiveness of ‘carrot’ incentive funding for Part 1 
NEST did not obtain the optimal goal across every elective surgery category. Details of 
Queensland’s NEST Part 1 performance are as follows:471 
Table 3: Queensland’s NEST Part 1 Performance Results 
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Percentage of patients 
treated within 
recommended time frame 
Category 1  Category 2  Category 3 
 
2012 target 
 
89% 81% 91% 
2012 actual result  
 
89% 77.1% 88.7% 
2012 outcome Target achieved  Target partially 
achieved  
Target partially 
achieved  
2013 target  100% 87% 94% 
2013 actual result  93.7% 77.1% 87.1% 
2013 outcome  Target partially 
achieved  
Target not 
achieved  
Target not achieved  
2014-15 target 100% 94-100% 97-100% 
2014-15 actual result 97.8% 93.9% 97.4% 
2014-15 outcome (note, 
NEST ceased July 2014) 
Target not 
achieved 
Target not 
achieved 
Target partially 
achieved 
 
(iii) Part 2 Reward Funding Requirements 
Queensland was required to meet the following targets for categories 1, 2 and 3 to achieve 
Part 2 reward funding from 2012, as follows:472 
 
Table 4: Part 2 NEST Reward Funding Targets 
Average 
number of 
days 
overdue for 
surgical 
treatment 
2010 baseline  2012 target 2013 target 2014 target 2015 target  
Category 1 18 days  0 days    
Category 2 89 days 67 days 45 days 22 days 0 days 
Category 3 81 days 61 days 41 days 20 days 0 days 
 
 
For example, the 2010 baseline for category 1 patients was 18 days, meaning, on average, 
category 1 patients waited 18 days greater than the clinically indicated waiting time.473 The 
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2012 target was no overdue patients for category 1.474 By 2015, the target was also no 
overdue patients for category 2 and 3 elective surgery patients in Queensland.475 Similar to 
Part 1 funding, Part 2 funding was also awarded on a ‘proportional performance’ basis;476 
however, without a 50% minimum threshold achievement between the target and previous 
year’s performance.477 In addition to the above targets, at least ‘10 percent of patients who 
have waited the longest’ ‘must have their surgery, or appropriate alternative treatment 
options identified’ each assessment year to have received Part 2 funding.478  
(iv) Queensland’s Part 2 Performance Results  
The National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance 
Report for 2012 revealed that Queensland had failed to attain any of the Part 2 targets, 
including failing to deliver treatment to the 10% of overdue waiting for the most significant 
time.479 By 2013, Queensland continued to fail in achieving Part 2 targets and only managed 
to deliver treatment to the 10% of overdue patients in category 1.480 However, there have not 
been any further performance reports released, nevertheless, the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare released a report in 2015 detailing the elective surgery waiting times for 
2014-15 (i.e. ‘July 2014 to June 2015’).481 In 2014-15, the State would have failed to achieve 
targets for Part 2 funding - although NEST funding had ceased by July 2014.482 Therefore, 
the effectiveness of ‘carrot’ funding for Part 2 NEST was less than optimal.483  Queensland’s 
NEST Part 2 results are as follows:484 
 
 
 
Table 5: Queensland’s NEST Part 2 Performance Results 
Average 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014- 2014-15 2012, 2013 
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number of 
days 
overdue 
for 
surgical 
treatment 
target actual 
result 
target actual 
result 
15 
target 
actual 
result 
and 2014-
15 
outcome 
(note, 
NEST 
ceased July 
2014) 
Category 1 0 days 87 days 0 days 19 days 0 days 9.3 days Target not 
achieved  
Category 2 67 days 137 
days 
45 days 126 
days 
22 – 0 
days 
47.3 
days 
Target not 
achieved  
Category 3 61 days 136 
days 
41 days 116 
days 
20 – 0 
days 
33.7 
days 
Target not 
achieved  
 
6 Capital Funding  
To assist states to meet their elective surgery targets, the National Partnership Agreement on 
IPHS required the provision of capital funding by the Commonwealth.485 States were to 
utilise such capital funding to improve elective surgery waiting times,486 for example, by 
constructing surgical facilities or by the ‘purchase of surgical equipment’.487 Such funding 
equated to a grant-in-aid payment, which was another ‘carrot’ type policy.488 However, 
capital funding to the states ceased in June 2014.489 
7 Subacute Bed Funding  
The National Partnership Agreement on IPHS also required the Commonwealth to provide 
funding for subacute beds.490 Funding received by the Commonwealth was to assist states by 
increasing the public hospital capacity; thereby, indirectly assisting timely elective 
surgery.491 Subacute funding was a further ‘carrot’ incentive and was available to 
Queensland as follows:492  
 
 
 
Table 6: Subacute Bed Funding for Queensland 
                                                
 
485 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20, schedule B. 
486 Ibid [B3]. 
487 Ibid [B4]. 
488 See generally, Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195. 
489 Lesley Russell, 2013-14 Budget: Analysis of Health and Ageing Provisions (June 2013) University 
of Sydney, 15-16 
<http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/9226/1/lrhealthbudgetanalysis1314.pdf>. 
490 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20, schedule E. 
491 Ibid [E4]. 
492 Ibid [E31]; See generally, Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195. 
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Year Amount  
2010-11 $46.9 million  
2011-12 $76.1 million 
2012-13 $89.8 million  
2013-14 $125.9 million 
 
However, sub-acute bed funding ceased in June 2014.493 
8 Flexible Funding Pool  
Further, in assisting states to meet their elective surgery targets, the National Partnership 
Agreement on Improving Public Hospitals provided for a flexible funding pool.494 Such 
funding was to be flexibly applied by states to projects that would assist in improving 
elective surgery, for example, staff training.495 Again, this government payment was a further 
grant-in-aid ‘carrot’ policy.496 However, the flexible pool funding ceased in June 2014.497  
9 Queensland’s Current Approach to Improving Elective Surgery   
With the termination of National Partnership Agreements on Improving Public Hospital 
Services above,498 Queensland has not only been left with a significant funding loss for 
elective surgery,499 but also the loss of the reward funding strategy for improving waiting 
times.500 Accordingly, Queensland has devised a new strategy to improve elective surgery, 
although this is still a work in progress for the government.501   
The current approach, since April 2015, has been the ‘introduction of interim elective 
surgery targets’:502 
…with the intention to undertake broad consultation to review the 
appropriateness of these targets in the longer term. The interim elective 
surgery targets require that 98% of Category 1 patients, 95% of Category 2 
patients, and 95% of Category 3 patients receive their elective surgery within 
the clinically indicated time frame.  
The above interim targets for 2015-16 are set at a lower threshold than the 2015 NEST 
targets of 100% of patients to receive surgery within their clinically indicated time frames.503 
                                                
 
493 Russell, above n 489, 15, 16. 
494 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20, schedule F. 
495 Ibid. 
496 See generally, Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195. 
497 Russell, above n 489, 15, 16. 
498 Biggs, above n 27. 
499 Griffiths, above n 28. 
500 Biggs, above n 27. 
501 Queensland Government, Wait Times Strategy Statewide Consultation Handbook (September 
2015) Department of Health, 4, 17 <https://www.health.qld.gov.au/publications/system-
governance/strategic-direction/wait-times-strategy-consultation.pdf>. 
502 Ibid 17. 
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Therefore, the progression towards improvement in waiting times has somewhat decreased. 
A further problem with the new targets is the absence of incentive or disincentive ‘carrots’ to 
achieve the optimal policy goal of improving elective surgery waiting times.504 However, as 
targets are linked to key performance indicators in the Performance Management 
framework,505 there is the use of a ‘stick’ type approach for HHSs if targets are not met.506 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a ‘stick’ type approach is a strong type policy strategy 
for achieving the optimal goal of improving elective surgery.507 However, the framework’s 
‘stick’ approach is weak (as discussed earlier in this chapter) in the event of a breach;508 
therefore, the current interim targets for managing elective surgery waiting times may prove 
insufficient for solving the elective surgery waiting dilemma.  
10 Queensland’s Elective Surgery Policy Instrument   
Queensland Health’s principal elective surgery policy instrument is the Elective Surgery 
Implementation Standard.509 The elective surgery implementation strategy provides the 
administrative framework for managing the elective surgery waiting list, principally as 
follows:  
(a) Elective Surgery District Hierarchy  
The Implementation Standard requires an Accountable Officer to be appointed at each 
hospital by the Chief Executive Officer.510 The Accountable Officer is the individual 
accountable for the hospital’s elective surgery including ensuring policy compliance and 
‘[e]nsuring regular administrative and clinical audits of elective surgery waiting list’. 511 
 
(b) Origin of Elective Surgery Referrals  
Patients are placed on the elective surgery waiting list by ‘a specialist within a Queensland 
public hospital or a specialist working from private consulting rooms’.512 Specifically, 
‘[o]nly specialists with admitting and operating rights for the hospital can request 
registration of a patient on the hospital’s elective surgery waiting list’.513 Accordingly, a 
                                                                                                                                     
 
503 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20, tables A5-7. 
504 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 134. 
505 Queensland Government, above n 501, 16. 
506 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9, 59. 
507 Ibid.  
508See, Queensland Health, above n 362, 14. 
509 Queensland Health, above n 12. 
510 Ibid 22. 
511 Ibid 
512 Ibid 5. 
513 Ibid. 
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patient cannot be placed on an elective surgery waiting list by referral from their general 
practitioner. A referral from a patient’s practitioner will only progress a patient to the 
outpatient waiting list for assessment by a specialist.514   
(c) Start Time of Elective Surgery Wait 
Time on the elective waiting list commences on the date the patient is placed on the waiting 
list for elective surgery.515 Accordingly, time waiting for an outpatient assessment is not 
taken into account as relevant time for the elective surgery waiting time. According to a 
study undertaken by Derrett et al, waiting long durations for elective surgery may cause 
adverse health impacts.516 Therefore, considering the potential adverse effects of extended 
surgery waiting time, the total waiting time, including the outpatient wait, should be included 
as relevant time.517  
Currently, ‘there is no overarching policy on timely access to Queensland Health services 
covering all elements of the patient journey’;518 however, it appears the government may be 
considering an inclusive wait time policy. This is not surprising considering approximately 
62,544 patients requiring surgery are currently waiting too long for an outpatient 
appointment.519 
The outpatient policy situation is discussed later in this chapter.  
(d) Risks of Not Being Ready for Surgery 
A potential risk of minimising the number of patients placed on the elective surgery waiting 
list is classifying patients as not ready for surgery. For example, patients that may be obese 
and who require a decrease in weight before proceeding to surgery will not be placed on the 
elective surgery waiting list. However, the Accountable Officer at the hospital is to ‘[e]nsure 
processes are in place to manage patients who are not ready for surgery’.520 Considering 
there is oversight of the not ready for surgery list, it appears less likely this list will be used 
as a tool to improve elective surgery performance. 
                                                
 
514 Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, above n 16, [5.3.28-30]. 
515 Queensland Health, above n 12, 10. 
516 Sarah Derrett, Charlotte Paul and Jenny M Moss, ‘Waiting for Elective Surgery: Effects on Health 
Related Quality of Life’ (1999) 11 (1) International Journal for Quality in Health Care 57, 57.  
517 Australian Medical Association, above n 31, 8; see generally, Koren Helbig, ‘Five Year Wait for 
Queensland Patients Just to Get on the Surgery Waiting List’, The Courier Mail (online), 4 March 
2011 <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/five-year-wait-for-queensland-patients-just-
to-get-on-the-surgery-waiting-list/story-e6freoof-1226015609908>. 
518 Queensland Government, above n 501, 6. 
519 Queensland Health, Specialist Outpatient: Queensland Reporting Hospitals (January 2016) 
Queensland Health <http://www.performance.health.qld.gov.au/hospitalperformance/op-
main.aspx?hospital=99999>. 
520 Queensland Health, above n 12, 22. 
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(e) Ongoing Monitoring of Waiting List 
It is also the responsibility of the Accountable Officer at the hospital ‘to ensure clinical 
management plans are in place for patients who have waited longer than clinically 
recommended’.521 HHSs need to undertake the following minimum ‘administrative audits of 
the elective surgery waiting list’:522 
Table 7: Monitoring of Queensland’s Outpatients Waiting List 
Elective Surgery Category  Frequency of Audit Number of days waited for 
surgery ‘who do not have a 
booking date for surgery’523 
1 
 
weekly 20 days 
2 
 
monthly 60 days 
3 
 
every six months 300 days 
 
To ensure patients are not lost in the elective surgery system:524 
[e]nterprise reports will be established to alert the elective surgery 
coordinator or equivalent (and other relevant staff) when an urgency 
category 1 patient has waited more than 20 days, an urgency category 2 
patient has waited more than 60 days or an urgency category 3 patient has 
waited more than 300 days. 
In the event a patient has waited in excess of their category as stipulated above, then the 
patient will be contacted to update clinical details, including whether ‘there is any change in 
clinical status, or change in priority’.525  
There is considerable administrative effort to monitor overdue patients for elective surgery 
that perhaps would be better directed to treating patients. Nevertheless, these strategies 
appear important to ensure patients are not forgotten in the system and there is some level of 
monitoring of their surgical wait time frame. However, do patients have any complaint 
options or rights in Queensland in the event they do not receive timely elective surgery? 
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11 Do Patients’ Have Complaint Options for a Failure to Receive Timely Elective 
Surgery? 
Queensland Health policy nominates two avenues for patients to complain; namely, 
returning to their general practitioner526 or contacting the hospital.527 Additionally, there is a 
HHS complaints coordinator that patients are able to complain to about a failure to receive 
timely elective surgery.528 However, these mechanisms are internal (that is, there is a lack of 
independence) and there is no right for patients to ensure timely elective surgery is actually 
received.529 Although patients also have the option to complain to an independent body, that 
is, the Queensland Health Ombudsman; this option still does not give patients a right of 
timely elective surgery enforcement.530  
12 Do Patients Have a Legal Right for a Failure to Receive Timely Elective 
Surgery? 
There is a lacuna of a domestic right to timely elective surgery in Queensland. That is, the 
Constitution, the common law, anti-discrimination legislation and torts legislation do not 
provide any mechanism of redress for a patient waiting too long for timely elective surgery, 
as discussed below:  
Australian Constitution 
The Constitution does not include any provision that would enable a patient to directly or 
indirectly pursue action for a lack of timely elective surgery.  
Common Law 
At common law, a judiciary would be hesitant to order the ‘expenditure of public money’ to 
enforce timely elective surgery.531 It is likely the judiciary would rather acknowledge that 
such resource decisions are a political decision. For example, in Blyth District Hospital 
Incorporated v South Australian Health Commission,532 an appeal by a public hospital and 
patient against the South Australian Health Commission to ‘compel it to perform its public 
duty to provide funds to the hospital to enable it to provide the full range of hospital care and 
                                                
 
526 Queensland Health, above n 96. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Queensland Government, Complaints and Compliments About Health Services (1995-2016) 
Queensland Government <http://www.qld.gov.au/health/contacts/complaints/>. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Note, the Ombudsman has the power to take action against individual providers (ie health 
professionals), but there does not appear to be any enforceable action able to be taken against a public 
hospital generally: see, Office of the Health Ombudsman, Health Consumers (2016) Health 
Ombudsman <http://www.oho.qld.gov.au/health-consumers/the-complaints-process/taking-
immediate-action/>. 
531 Blyth District Hospital Incorporated v South Australian Health Commission (1988) 17 ALD 135, 
142, (King CJ) (‘Blyth’). 
532 Ibid. 
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treatment’533 was not successful, as there is ‘no public duty to fund public hospitals to 
provide a full range of health services’.534 
Conversely, the European Court of Human Rights decisions (which are decisions that the 
United Kingdom is required to follow),535 are not taking into account resource constraints.536 
In, Yvonne Watts Bedford Primary Care Trust Secretary of State,537 a patient suffering with 
arthritis of the hip and associated pain, awaiting surgery on the surgical waiting list in the 
United Kingdom, decided to travel to France for the surgery.538 She sought reimbursement of 
the treatment from the United Kingdom pursuant to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Regulation 1408/71 of the European Economic Community.539 The court ordered 
reimbursement because the surgery delay fell outside ‘an acceptable time having regard to an 
objective medical assessment’ and ‘the clinical needs of the person’.540 The United Kingdom 
was unable to rely on the extent of their surgical waiting list.541 That is, the court based their 
decision on ‘clinical’ needs rather than resourcing constraints.542 
 
In comparison to the European approach, courts in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, 
‘effectively’ consider resourcing issues to be ‘immune from judicial review’.543 Although 
there is no right to receive health care in the United Kingdom or New Zealand, there is a 
recent judicial tendency to ensure public health resourcing decisions are ‘procedurally fair’ 
for patients.544 That is, health care decisions should be made based on clinical need,545 and 
further, patients should receive ‘equal consideration with other patients in the same medical 
position’.546 However, some of these judgements are based on United Kingdom and New 
Zealand human rights legislation (such as the right to life) or the right not to be discriminated 
                                                
 
533 Ibid. 
534 McDonald and Sedgwick, above n 337, 69, 79. 
535 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK); Charles Foster, ‘Simple Rationality? The Law of Healthcare 
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[2006] 1 WLR 2649. 
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against.547 Since there is an absence of federal and/or Queensland domestic human rights 
legislation, the judicial review decisions in the European Union, United Kingdom and New 
Zealand relating to breaches of human rights are not applicable in Queensland.  Although 
there is human rights legislation enacted in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, as 
discussed in chapter 4, the legislation does not create a right to health care treatment; the 
level of human rights protection is less than in the United Kingdom or New Zealand; and, in 
any event, other State/Territory legal instruments do not apply in Queensland.548 However, a 
‘resource allocation decision is reviewable’ from an administrative law perspective, if it 
concerns the ‘integrity of the processes through which decisions are made’.  For example, if 
a policy is considered ‘unreasonable and irrational’.549 The United Kingdom and New 
Zealand decisions relating to discrimination laws may also be influential in domestic anti-
discrimination proceedings if there is a failure by the Queensland health system to provide 
timely elective surgery based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, for example, age, as 
discussed below.550   
 
Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
There may be an indirect right to enforce timely elective surgery available to some 
individuals through anti-discrimination legislation,551 namely, the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Act552 and the Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act;553 Disability 
Discrimination Act;554 Sex Discrimination Act;555 and Age Discrimination Act.556 The 
applicant would need to prove that the reason timely elective surgery was not received was 
due to their race, age, sex, disability or other circumstance listed in the anti-discrimination 
legislation.557 For example, in Pearce v South Australia Health Commission,558 a failure to 
                                                
 
547 For example, Shortland v Northland Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433; Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK); R v Northwest Lancashire Heath Authority, ex parte A [2000] 1 WLR 977;  New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZ); Also see, McDonald and Sedgwick, above n 337, 92. 
548 Terry Carney, ‘Human Rights and Health Law’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy 
Willmott, Health Law in Australia, (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2014) 114. See, Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT) and Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
549 R v Derbyshire Health Authority; Ex parte Fisher [1997] 8 Med LR; Blyth (1988) 17 ALD 135; 
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550550 McDonald and Sedgwick, above n 337, 92. 
551 Grover, above n 37, 4. 
552 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 7, s 101.  
553 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 9. 
554 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 3. 
555 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 3. 
556 Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), ss 15-14.  
557 Skene, above n 36, 73. 
558 Pearce v South Australian Health Commission (1996) 66 SASR 486. 
 68 Chapter 3 
provide fertility surgery because the patient was not married was deemed by the court to be 
discriminatory.559  
 
However, elective surgery waiting lists arguably create a complex situation for determining 
whether there has been discriminatory treatment since a patient’s ‘age and co-morbidities 
(disability)’ may be taken into consideration for deciding a patient’s waiting list priority.560  
According to Manning and Paterson, such considerations are ‘prima facie discrimination’.561 
However, if the respondent is able to prove their decision was a reasonable clinical decision 
in the circumstances, the applicant’s claim would not succeed.562 Therefore if a patient has 
been prioritised based on reasonable clinical judgement and not based on discriminatory 
factors, then a claim for discrimination would not succeed.563 Accordingly, in the context of 
elective surgery, this may mean ‘taking into account’ prima facie ‘discriminatory grounds, 
such as age’ to make ‘individualised assessment of need and ability to benefit’.564  This may 
amount to discriminatory treatment or if the ‘medical literature’ supports ‘taking the 
discriminatory factor’ (for example, age) ‘into account’, then it is likely the prioritisation 
would not be deemed discriminatory.565 Even assuming an applicant did succeed in a claim 
of discrimination for waiting outside their clinically indicated time frame (which would 
likely be difficult to prove), the decision ‘will not necessarily be an order that the service 
must be provided’, the remedy would likely only be compensation.566 
Torts Legislation  
In the event an individual suffered an injury (such as a deterioration in their condition 
causing permanent impairment) due to waiting outside their clinically indicated time frame, 
this would also not enable the enforcement of any right to timely elective surgery. Assuming 
the individual successfully proved that the hospital acted negligently by failing to provide 
timely elective surgery, the best case scenario for the plaintiff’s redress would be 
compensation.567 Such compensation would also require the individual to have significant 
                                                
 
559 McDonald and Sedgwick, above n 337, 92. 
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(1996) 66 SASR 486; also see, McDonald and Sedgwick, above n 337, 69, 93. 
567 See generally, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) and Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). 
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resources (unless their lawyer was prepared to advocate on a no win, no fee basis), and 
fortitude, and would only likely eventuate after lengthy pre-court procedures and possible 
litigation.568   
However, it is more likely that the individual’s redress would fail due to section 36 of 
Queensland’s Civil Liability Act.569 Under the Civil Liability Act, the ‘functions required to 
be exercised’ by the public authority (that is, the hospital) are limited ‘by the financial and 
other resources that are reasonably available’.570  This ‘policy defence’ was enacted as a 
result of the Review of the Law of Negligence inquiry in 2002 seeking to curtail the 
‘unaffordable and unsustainable’ common law of negligence in Australia.571 It is therefore 
not surprising that the effect of section 36 is to minimise the standard of care required of 
public authorities.572 In the judgment of Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland,573 Justice Dalton 
considered that section 36 ‘makes it “extraordinarily difficult for a plaintiff to prove 
breach”’.574 Therefore, if the hospital can prove that the reason for the elective surgery delay 
was due to the ‘financial and other resources’ ‘reasonably available’ to the hospital, the 
individual’s claim would fail.575 Further, according to Bell-James and Barker relying on the 
opinion of Justice Dalton in Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland, section 36 also extends to 
operation decisions of public authorities.576  So even in the situation where a patient suffers 
harm as a result of waiting too long for elective surgery due to an ‘operational decision’ (for 
example, a patient who has been incorrectly categorised within an urgency category) rather 
than a policy decision (for example, a policy causing patients to wait too long for surgery), 
section 36 may also extend to protecting the health system from liability and thereby denying 
the patient damages for harm suffered as a result of the health system’s delay in providing 
surgery.577 That is, it is likely hospitals would be able to easily escape liability. Accordingly, 
in addition to the lack of a legal right to enforce timely elective surgery in Queensland in tort 
law, a patient’s redress for negligent treatment would be unlikely successful.   
In summary, a patient essentially has no right in domestic law to ensure elective surgery is 
received within their clinically indicated time frame.  
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13 Queensland’s Outpatient’s Waiting List    
As detailed above, there are two waiting lists in a patient’s journey to elective surgery – the 
outpatient waiting list and the elective surgery waiting list; not including the wait for their 
initial appointment with their general practitioner (see Figure 4 below).578 As the outpatient 
wait ‘can restrict access to the elective surgery waiting list’ the significance of the outpatient 
waiting list must also be examined.579  In Queensland, the significant waiting time on the 
outpatient list is attracting public attention.580    
                                                
 
578 Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, above n 16; Queensland 
Health, Elective Surgery Service Implementation Standard, above n 16. 
579 Council of Australian Governments, above n 4, 35.  
580See, Tony Moore, ‘Surgery Wait Time Guarantee Defended as 230,000 wait for Appointments in 
Queensland’, Brisbane Times (online), 18 February 2015 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/surgery-wait-time-guarantee-defended-as-230000-
wait-for-appointments-in-queensland-20150218-13iiti.html>. 
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Figure 4: Typical Elective Surgery Waiting List Journey 
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Although Queensland Health publishes outpatient waiting list statistics - there is no other 
external incentive to minimise the outpatient list.  Also, the outpatient list statistics are not as 
clearly detailed as the elective surgery list (for example, the actual number of patients 
waiting too long for surgery is not directly specified on the Queensland Health website for 
the outpatient list).581 The ‘[q]uarterly information for Specialist Outpatient at 1 January 
2016’ indicates that on average only approximately 66% of patients are ‘waiting within 
clinically recommended time’, which means 44% are waiting too long for an outpatient 
appointment.582 Therefore, considering there were 142,146 surgical patients waiting in the 
yearly quarter at 1 January 2016,583 this equates to approximately 62,544 patients waiting 
outside their clinically indicated time frame for an outpatient appointment.584 Even though 
there are significant numbers of individuals not receiving timely appointments on the 
outpatient waiting list, Queensland Health Outpatient’s Services Implementation Standard 
states that this waiting list is managed periodically by internal auditing.585 
Once a patient is referred for an outpatient specialist appointment by their general 
practitioner, Queensland Health classifies the patient’s urgency for a specialist outpatient 
appointment akin to the elective surgery urgency categories; that is, category 1, 2 and 3.586 
While the patient waits on the outpatient list, the Queensland Health Outpatient’s Services 
Implementation Standard clearly places the responsibility of the patient’s ongoing 
monitoring on the patient’s general practitioner.587 The Queensland Health Outpatient’s 
Services Implementation Standard indicates that alternative options may be available to 
patients if their wait has exceeded the clinically indicated time frame, for example, referral to 
a private specialist or another public outpatient clinic.588 Although Queensland Health states 
that patients waiting on the outpatient list are to be advised of their rights, including their 
right of treatment, the right is practically unenforceable.589   
                                                
 
581 See, Australian Medical Association, Public Hospital Report Card 2013: An AMA Analysis of 
Australia’s Public Hospital System (February 2013) AMA <https://ama.com.au/ama-public-hospital-
report-card-2013>; See, Queensland Health, Specialist Outpatient – Queensland Reporting Hospitals 
Queensland Health <http://www.health.qld.gov.au/hospitalperformance/op-
main.aspx?hospital=99999>. 
582 Queensland Health, above n 519. 
583 Note, In addition to the surgical outpatient waiting list (ie the precursor to the elective surgery 
waiting list) there is a non-surgical outpatient waiting list with 70 407 patients waiting for an 
appointment: see, ibid. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, above n 16, [5.4.54]. 
586 Ibid [5.3.28-36]. 
587 Ibid [5.3.10]. 
588 Ibid [5.4.17]. 
589 Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, above n 16, [5.4.17]; see 
generally, Duckett and Willcox, above n 176, 122.  
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There are currently two significant strategies recently introduced by the Queensland 
government to decrease the outpatients waiting times. Firstly, the 2015-15 Queensland 
‘Budget allocated $361.2 million over four years (including $7.3 million in 2015-16) to 
reduce the number of people waiting longer than clinically recommended’ for outpatients.590 
Secondly, the government introduced outpatient waiting list targets; however, these targets 
are not subject to external monitoring.591 The targets for the year 2014-15 and results are 
detailed below:592 
Table 8: Interim Outpatient Waiting Time Targets for Queensland  
‘Percentage of 
specialist outpatients 
waiting within 
clinically 
recommended 
times’593 
Target  
2014-15  
Outcome 
2014-15 
Category 1 48% 
 
61% 
Category 2 33% 
 
44% 
Category 3 90% 
 
66% 
 
However, the targets for 2015-16 do not appear to have been released. Although Queensland 
met the targets for category 1 and 2 above, the targets were set at a considerably low 
threshold. Akin to the elective surgery targets, a further problem with the outpatient targets is 
the absence of incentive or disincentive ‘carrots’ to achieve the optimal policy goal of 
improving waiting times.594 However, as targets are linked to key performance indicators in 
the Performance Management framework595 (similarly to the interim elective surgery 
targets), there is the use of a ‘stick’ type approach for HHSs if targets are not met. Although, 
‘stick’ type policies are considered strong strategies to effect change, the ‘stick’ type 
approach of the Performance Management framework is weak (as discussed earlier in the 
chapter).596 Therefore, there is a risk these new outpatient targets may not solve the 
outpatient waiting list dilemma.  
                                                
 
590 Queensland Government, above n 501, 19. 
591 Queensland Health, Queensland Budget 2015-16: Service Delivery Statements (2015) Queensland 
Health, 12 <http://www.budget.qld.gov.au/budget-papers/documents/bp5-qh-2015-16.pdf>; 
Queensland Government, above n 501, 17. 
592 Queensland Health, above n 562, 12. 
593 Ibid. 
594 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 134. 
595 Queensland Government, above n 501, 18. 
596 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9, 59; see also, Queensland Health, above 
n 362, 14. 
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14 Elective Surgery Framework: Summary 
In summary, it is important that an effective strategy for elective surgery is implemented in 
Queensland, as: 
• elective surgery generally encompasses necessary surgery, not optional surgery 
required within clinically indicated time frames;597  
• there is an increasing demand for such surgery in Queensland, especially with an 
increasing population;598  and 
• there is a lack of a complaint mechanism to enforce a right to timely elective 
surgery, and also a lack of any enforceable domestic right to timely elective 
surgery. 
Although the recently introduced national urgency category guidelines599 will not directly 
solve the elective surgery waiting list dilemma, these guidelines should provide an improved 
level of conformity, objectivity, and therefore fairness in urgency categorisation between 
clinical need with equitable access.600 However, the recent loss of Commonwealth funding 
from the National Partnership Agreement on IPHS, including reward funding,601 is likely to 
negatively impact upon improved elective surgery waiting times, because: 
• there will be a significant loss of funding for Queensland to support the delivery 
of surgery;602 and 
• the incentive ‘carrot’603 targets appeared to have some positive effect on 
improving waiting times (even though NEST goals were not met).604 
Although the Queensland government has now set interim elective surgery targets,605 these 
targets are unlikely to solve the elective surgery dilemma, because: 
• the target threshold levels are a step backwards from the reward funding targets, 
that is, the goals too low; and 
                                                
 
597 See, Council of Australian Governments, above n 4, 35. 
598 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, above n 19, 11; Council of Australian 
Governments Reform Council, above n 53. 
599 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, above n 12. 
600 Ibid 3, 4; Queensland Health, above n 12, 13. 
601 Biggs, above n 27. 
602 Griffiths, above n 28. 
603 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9. 
604 Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2012, above n 23, 18; Council of 
Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public 
Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above n 23, 18; Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare above n 23, 44. 
605 Queensland Government, above n 501, 17. 
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• the ‘stick’606 approach utilised if targets are not met is too weak. 
However, despite the less than optimal policy strategy for solving the elective surgery 
waiting times, the government appears to have an adequate system for ensuring patients are 
not lost in the system. Nevertheless, this measure does not ensure patients receive timely 
elective surgery and some funding for this administrative task may be better directed to 
funding surgery.  
Although strategies for directly solving the elective surgery waiting list are necessary, this is 
only part of solving the problem. That is, the underlying problem of the long wait times for 
outpatients needs to be addressed, as the outpatient list is a precursor to a patient’s wait on 
the elective surgery list. Nevertheless, Queensland is now addressing the outpatient waiting 
list dilemma by increasing funding for outpatient service and setting targets for outpatient 
waiting times. However, these strategies are unlikely to be optimal for solving the 
outpatient’s waiting dilemma, because: 
• the target threshold level goals are set at a considerably low level; 
• the ‘stick’ approach utilised if targets are not met is too weak. 
Therefore, although strategies are being utilised to attempt to solve the patient’s journey 
from outpatients to the elective list, the policies are less than optimal and unlikely to solve 
the waiting list dilemma.   
M Conclusion 
In conclusion, there at least needs to be a strong policy for treating patients within their 
clinically indicated time frames (for both the elective and outpatients lists) to ensure good 
health outcomes and build community trust, which in turn strengthens the health system.607 
However, with the cessation of NEST funding (which had to some extent improved the 
elective surgery waiting times),608 not only has the ‘blame game’609 between the 
Commonwealth and the states recommenced in relation to significant decreased funding for 
elective surgery,610 but the current Commonwealth and Queensland approaches to solving 
the elective surgery dilemma are less than optimal. Firstly, in relation to the Commonwealth, 
the new funding structure neither contains ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ provisions, that is, there is 
neither an incentive nor disincentive to improve elective surgery. Secondly, the Queensland 
government has introduced targets for elective surgery and outpatients that do not include 
                                                
 
606 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9. 
607 See generally, McKee, above n 186, 63-4; Duckett and Willcox, above n 176, 2-4. 
608 Biggs, above n 27. 
609 Duckett and Willcox, above n 176, 49. 
610 Griffiths, above n 28. 
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‘carrot’ incentives, but include only weak ‘stick’ provisions. Accordingly, it appears unlikely 
that the elective surgery waiting time dilemma will be solved with the current 
Commonwealth and Queensland approach.611 Considering the weak policy for timely 
elective surgery, and the lack of any enforceable right to timely elective surgery for patients, 
it is now expedient to assess in the following chapter whether there is an international basis 
for a right to timely elective surgery for patients. 
                                                
 
611 See generally, Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 134. 
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Chapter 4 
IV IS THERE A BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A LEGAL RIGHT TO 
TIMELY ELECTIVE SURGERY? 
A Introduction 
This chapter explores research question 2, that is, is there a basis in international law for a 
right to timely elective surgery? This involves identifying and examining current rights to 
health in international instruments to determine the nature and extent/enforceability of any 
current rights possessed by patients to timely elective surgery at international law. This 
chapter concludes that there is not a basis in international law for an enforceable legal right 
to timely elective surgery.  
B The International Right to Health 
Considering the lacuna of a right to timely elective surgery in Queensland, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, it is now necessary to look to the right to health in international law as 
a possible foundation to support a right to timely elective surgery. International law is 
explored in depth because if there is an absence of a right to timely elective surgery based in 
international law, then it will inform the construction of a right to timely elective surgery. To 
assess whether there is a legal basis in international law for a right to timely elective surgery, 
it is firstly necessary to define in section 1 of this chapter the various expressions of the 
international right to health; and in section 2 whether the scope of the right will be 
sufficiently specific to encapsulate elective surgery, and specifically, timely elective surgery. 
Assuming there could be a derived legal right, the strength of that right will be explored in 
section 3. However, firstly, the current expressions of the varying international instruments 
detailing the right to health are examined below.  
1 Current Expressions of the Right to Health in International Instruments 
It is imperative to define the current expressions of the right to health as a foundation for 
later analysis in section 3 of this chapter. That is, this section forms the basis to answer 
whether all or any of the current scopes of the right to health enable a derived legal right to 
timely elective surgery to be established. Currently, these expressions of the right to health 
are principally entrenched in the Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO);612 
                                                
 
612 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, signed 22 July 2946 (entered into force 7 April 
1948) (‘WHO Constitution’). 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);613 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)614; the Convention of the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD)615; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)616; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)617; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)618, as follows: 
Constitution of the WHO: 
defines the right to health as a ‘fundamental’ ‘right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’– that is, a ‘state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being’.619  
UDHR: 
states that individuals have the ‘right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including’ ’medical care’.620  
ICESCR:  
considers individuals have the right ‘to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’ and requires all parties to the covenant to ‘achieve the full 
realization of this right’ by setting ‘conditions which would assure to all medical services 
and medical attention in the event of sickness’.621 The ICESCR requires each party to the 
Covenant ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ to ‘progressively’ achieve this right to 
health.622 More specifically, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
requires ‘timely access to basic’ ‘health services’ and States to have a ‘sufficient number of 
                                                
 
613 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, 
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948), Article 25. 
614 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 53 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 12.  
615 Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 May 2008), Article 25.  
616 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969), Article 5(e)(iv). 
617 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), Article 12. 
618 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 2 September 1990), Article 24. 
619 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, signed 22 July 2946 (entered into force 7 April 
1948) (WHO Constitution). 
620 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, 
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948), Article 25. 
621 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 53 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 12. 
622 Ibid. 
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hospitals’.623 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ considers that 
the right to health should include ‘both freedoms and entitlements’ – the freedom to the 
‘right to control one’s health and body’, and the entitlement right ‘for people to enjoy the 
highest attainable level of health’.624  
CRPD: 
states that ‘persons with disabilities have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability’625 including ‘access to 
health care or health services’.626 Similar to the ICESR, the CRPD requires progressive 
implementation of the right subject to the resources of each country,627 although the 
‘elimination of discrimination’ based on disability ‘should be implemented immediately’.628 
CERD: 
State Parties are to ‘guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin’629 the right to ‘public health’ including ‘medical care’.630 Again the 
right to health is ultimately subject to the ICESCR’s ‘progressive realisation’ of 
implementation;631 however, refraining from discrimination of people based on ‘race, colour, 
or national or ethnic origin’632 ‘should be implemented immediately’, similar to the CRPD.633 
CEDAW: 
requires countries to ‘eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care’ 
including ‘access to health services’.634 Similar to ICESCR, the CRC’s right to health is 
                                                
 
623 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN CESCR, 22nd session, E/C.12/2000/4 
(General Comment 14) (8 November 2000), [17], [36]. 
624 Attorney General’s Department, Right to Health Australian Government 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/PublicSectorGuidanceSheets/Pages/Righ
ttohealth.aspx>. 
625 Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 May 2008), Article 25. 
626 Ibid article 25(f). 
627 Ibid article 4(2). 
628 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet 33: Frequently 
Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet33en.pdf>. 
629 Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 May 2008), Article 5. 
630 Ibid article 5(d)(iv). 
631 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 53 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 2(1). 
632 Ibid article 2(1). 
633 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 628, 15. 
634 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981), Article 12. 
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subject to a State Parties’ ‘available resources’;635 however, refraining from discrimination of 
people based on gender ‘should be implemented immediately’ in alignment with the CRPD 
and CERD.636 
CRC: 
this states that children have the right to the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ including 
accessibility to ‘health care services’.637 Again, the CRC’s right to health is subject to a State 
Parties’ ‘available resources’, similar to ICESCR;638 yet again, any discrimination against 
children is to be ‘prohibited’ ‘immediately’.639 
It is apparent the above international instruments contain broad and aspirational expressions 
of the right to health. This originates from international interest to protect fundamental 
human rights, including to health, following the events of World War II ‘so that these horrors 
would never occur again’.640 These instruments strive for universal applicability, meaning 
the scope of the right to health entrenched in these international instruments is intended to be 
utilised across various societies.641 The breadth of the international expressions of the right to 
health and their impact upon deriving a possible right to timely elective surgery will be 
discussed later in this chapter. However, the analysis will be limited to discussing the right to 
health derived from the WHO, UHDR, and ICESCR, as the thesis is primarily concerned 
with the all-encompassing right to health of everyone. It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
analyse specific groups of individuals based on their race, gender or age; therefore, the 
CERD, CEDAW and CRC are not subject to further analysis. In any event, the broad ethos 
of the CERD, CEDAW and CRC reflect ICESCR’s right to health. Similarly, this thesis’ 
focus is not humans with disabilities, yet, the CRPD’s right to health is analysed below 
because it demonstrates the general principle that regardless of someone’s capabilities or 
inherent abilities642 everyone is entitled to the right to health in recognition of the ‘inherent 
dignity and worth and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.643 This premise of the CRPD’s right 
                                                
 
635 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 53 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 2(1). 
636 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 628, 15. 
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to health forms a platform for discussing the philosophical right to health in the following 
chapter, as the philosophical right also asserts that justice demands individuals be treated 
equally644 regardless of their basic capabilities.645 The strength of any derived right to timely 
elective surgery from the international right to health instruments needs to be analysed. 
2 Is there a Legal Right to Timely Elective Surgery from the Human Right to 
Health? 
Currently, there does not appear to be any obligation on the Australian government to 
provide timely elective surgery to comply with the international right to health.  Australia’s 
attempt to comply with the human right to health is as equally broad as the scope of the right 
itself. That is, in Australia’s report to the United Nations, it relies on the ‘Medicare 
program’, which ‘provides underlying universal access to the public health system’ and its 
private health system insurance subsidies, to comply with the ICESCR’s right to health.646 
However, free public access to hospital treatment and the provision of private health 
subsidies are broad strategies to comply with the right to health and merely indirect 
strategies for the provision of timely elective surgery. Similarly, Australia’s attempt to 
comply with the CRPD’s right to health generally relies on broad approaches for fulfilling 
the right to health of disabled persons; namely, Australia relies on the Disability 
Discrimination Act (Cth)647 and state and territory governments’ policy strategies,648 for 
example, the Queensland Health Disability Service Plan,649 but again there is no specific 
right for the provision of surgery within clinically indicated wait times. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 3 and later discussed in Chapter 6, these current strategies are proving 
to be insufficient to deliver timely elective surgery, this is compounded by the fact that 
Australia does not appear to consider that there is any direct need to deliver timely elective 
surgery in order to adhere with the international right to health. Nevertheless, could a legal 
                                                
 
644 Martha C Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (The Belknap Press, 2006), 99. 
645 Ibid 285. 
646 Commonwealth of Australia, Common Core Document (June 2006) Attorney-General’s 
Department, [509], [511] 
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649 Department of Health (Qld), Queensland Health Disability Service Plan 2014-16 (June 2014) 
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right to elective surgery, and specifically a right to timely elective surgery, be construed 
from the existing human right to health from the international instruments below? 
(a) World Health Organisation Right to Health 
The World Health Organisation’s definition of the human right to health, as detailed 
previously, is considerably broader than the right to health of the UDHR and ICESCR.650 
Callahan noted the most profound complaint concerning the WHO’s right to health is its 
‘generality, and particularly its association of health and general well-being as a positive 
ideal’651 – for example, ‘by including the notion of “social- well-being” under its rubric, it 
turns the enduring problem of human happiness into one more medical problem’652 – surely 
an impossible task for the field of medicine to achieve. This aspirational definition of the 
WHO’s right to health reflects utopian goals653 agreed to and signed by its State Parties but 
without any corresponding legal obligations to implement this right.654 Considering the 
WHO’s Constitution appears to be a moral agreement only in order to meet the high 
threshold for the world’s state of health (rather than a legally binding agreement), it is likely 
all of the following components would be required to be provided to individuals, including 
but not limited to, the availability of unpolluted drinking water and surrounding atmosphere, 
nutritional food, sanitation, shelter, a ‘level of education and awareness of health hazards’, 
and health care.655 Therefore, as health care is a component of a multitude of health factors, it 
is likely that a right to health care is derived from the right to health.656  Further, as elective 
surgery falls within the auspices of health care, the right to elective surgery is also a 
derivative of the right to health, especially as elective surgery is important to a patient’s 
well-being.657 Although not specifically detailed in the WHO Constitution, the official WHO 
website states that ‘[t]he right to health includes access to timely, acceptable, and affordable 
health care of appropriate quality’.658 Therefore, it is likely timely elective surgery falls 
within the WHO’s ambit. That is, the WHO Constitution would likely support a right to 
                                                
 
650 See generally, Eleftheriadis, above n 536, 273. 
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timely elective surgery; however, this right would not be legally binding. Alternatively, have 
the UDHR, ICESR and CRPD been drafted to support a legally binding right to timely 
elective surgery? 
(b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
THE UDHR’s right to health is broad, although more detailed than the WHO Constitution. 
Similar to the WHO Constitution, the Declaration is not binding; however, it gives rise to a 
moral obligation.659 Yet, some may argue that because the UDHR has been utilised in excess 
of 60 years, it is legally binding under customary international law.660 Unlike the WHO’s 
right to health, as noted previously, the UDHR’s right includes the term ‘medical care’,661 
and therefore the UDHR’s right would likely support a right to elective surgery. However, 
due to the inclusion of the term ‘adequate’,662 the limited scope of the UDHR’s right to 
health may preclude the UDHR supporting a right to timely elective surgery. Usage of the 
ambiguous term, adequate, without further specifications means that the UDHR right to 
health threshold oscillates from country to country depending on their economic capability 
and meaning attributed to an ‘adequate standard of living’.663 In a country such as Australia, 
receiving elective surgery outside clinically indicated time frames may mean that the 
UDHR’s right to health has not been adequately attained, as delayed surgery may lead to a 
deterioration in a person’s physical and mental or social circumstances, affecting not only 
patients, but potentially their families. As the UDHR appears marginally less aspirational 
than the WHO’s right to health, it is possible a right to timely elective surgery may only 
apply to those individuals waiting outside their time frame whose ‘health and well-being’ is 
actually no longer adequate.664 Alternatively, the right may only apply to elective surgery 
itself and not timely elective surgery, as it would depend on how Australia would interpret 
the term ‘adequate’ taking into consideration its available resources. That is, it may be 
adequate that Australia merely provides elective surgery and that Australia does not have an 
obligation to provide the surgery within set time frames.  
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(c) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
In contrast to the Constitution of the WHO and the UDHR, the ICESCR is a Covenant that 
Australia has ratified and accepted its provisions, including the right to health.665 This is in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that ‘[e]very 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith’.666 
Therefore, the ICESCR equates to more than a moral obligation, but still falls beneath the 
status of domestic law, as Australia is not obligated to and has not explicitly incorporated the 
right to health into its domestic legislation.667 From Australia’s perspective, it is arguable that 
it would not have signed ICESR had it contained a right to health with enforceable 
obligations.668   
ICESCR, similar to the UDHR, specifically includes ‘medical services’ ‘in the event of 
sickness’669 within its right to health, therefore, it is likely elective surgery, being a medical 
service and required due to sickness, would fall within the ambit of the ICESR. However, the 
ICESR’s right to health is ‘not to be understood as a right to be healthy’,670 it may be 
curtailed by a country’s recognition of how to progressively671 attain the right to health. The 
rate at which this right is attained will be subject to its ‘available resources’,672 potentially 
suppressing the ICESCR’s vision of ensuring the right attains ‘the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health’ for individuals.673 That is, the ‘precise nature of the facilities, 
goods and services’ available will be contingent upon a nation’s progress.674 However, 
Australia, a developed country, would be required to provide better health services than 
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developing nations.675 Therefore, there is a possibility a right to timely elective surgery may 
be supported by the ICESR’s right to ‘timely’ ‘health care’, but it appears unlikely that 
simply because someone has waited outside their time frame that they would have a right to 
proceed with the surgery.676 This is because the ICESCR’s right to health is not a right for 
individuals to be healthy, perhaps if an individual has suffered an adverse health 
consequence there may be a derived right to timely elective surgeries for those individuals. 
ICESCR’s ambiguous term, ‘available resources’ is made more ambiguous by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights permitting each State a ‘margin of 
discretion in assessing what measures are most suitable to meet its specific circumstances’.677 
Such discretion and ambiguity is likely to provide Australia with a reasonable excuse for 
delivering elective surgery outside clinically indicated time frames, for example, by relying 
on the limited availability of hospital staff, hospital beds, operating theatres, and health 
finance allocation.678 Although ICESCR likely supports a right to timely elective surgery, the 
right could easily be defeated if a country is able to rely on resource constraints.    
(d) The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities   
The ICESCR and the CRPD are both Conventions of the United Nations and ratified by 
Australia, and therefore the CRPD has the same treaty status as the ICESCR.  However, in 
contrast to the ICESCR where the right to health is for everyone,679 the CRPD specifically 
applies to individuals with ‘long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments’ 
that ‘may hinder their full and effective participation in society on equal basis’.680 In essence, 
the CRPD’s aim is to ensure people with disabilities are not discriminated against and enjoy 
the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ equally with everybody.681 It is therefore not 
surprising that the CRPD’s right to health is very similar to ICESCR’s right to health.  
Specifically, the CRPD’s right includes the term ‘health service’, similar to ICESCR’s term 
of ‘medical service’ within its right to health. As a right to elective surgery would equate to a 
‘health service’,682 it would likely fall within the realms of the CRPD. Also, the CRPD’s 
right to health, like the ICESCR, is subject to Australia’s available resources and to 
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progressively reaching683 the right, which somewhat negates its goal for the ‘highest 
attainable standard of health’.684  That is, having a right subject to progressive 
implementation creates an ambiguous basis for interpretation, and hence uncertainty as to 
whether a right to timely elective surgery could be a successfully relied upon, as discussed 
earlier. Kallehauge considered the vagueness of the CRPDS’s right to health to be intentional 
on the basis that had the CRPD been unequivocal, then states would not have agreed to ratify 
the convention.685 The vagueness of the term, ‘progressive realisation’ doesn’t specify 
whether the steps need to be significant, just provided there is movement.686 Similar to the 
ICESCR, a western nation, like Australia, will have more expected of it than of a developing 
nation, but this is unable to be quantified.687 Although Australia’s wealth would be taken into 
account in determining its ‘progressive realisation’; the greatest significance is the 
precedence Australia chooses to attribute to the right itself.688 Australia appears to be making 
some progress with elective surgery as discussed in Chapter 3, which would likely be 
sufficient to prove that ‘progressive realisation’ is being made in the field of elective surgery. 
As ICESCR and CRPD are based on near identical principles, it is likely that even if 
Australia was expected to provide timely elective surgery, a right to timely elective surgery 
for individuals with impairments could be circumvented by Australia relying on an excuse of 
resourcing limitations. 
In summary, it appears a right to elective surgery is likely derived from the international 
instruments discussed above, as elective surgery is necessary surgery; however, the right 
stipulated in the WHO would not be legally binding and arguably also not legally binding in 
the UDHR. Although it appears the WHO’s right to health would support a right to timely 
elective surgery, the right would also not be considered legally binding. Further, the scope of 
the UDHR, ICESCR and CRPD’s rights to health appear unlikely to support a derived right 
to timely elective surgery. Even though Australia is a developed country, it seems unlikely 
that Australia would be accountable to the United Nations for failing to deliver surgery 
within its own clinically set time frames unless there has been an adverse health 
consequence. Even in that scenario, Australia is likely to escape an obligation to deliver 
timely elective surgery based on resourcing allocations.   
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The table below summarises, for each of the international instruments above, whether there 
is likely a legal right at international law to elective surgery and more specifically, timely 
elective surgery: 
Table 9: Summary of whether the WHO, UDHR, ICESCR and the CRPD support a 
legal right at international law to elective surgery and/or timely elective surgery 
 Is there likely a legal right at 
international law to elective 
surgery? 
Is there likely a legal right to 
timely elective surgery at 
international law?  
WHO No legally binding right at 
international law to elective 
surgery. 
 
No legally binding right to 
timely elective surgery. 
 
UDHR No legally binding right at 
international law to elective 
surgery (unless the UDHR’s 
right to health is considered 
customary law). 
 
No legally binding right to 
timely elective surgery (even if 
the UDHR’s right to health was 
considered customary law, there 
is still unlikely to be a right to 
timely elective surgery). 
 
ICESCR Legal right at international law 
to elective surgery. 
 
No legal right to timely elective 
surgery (although this is 
ambiguous). 
 
CRPD Legal right at international law 
to elective surgery. 
 
No legal right to timely elective 
surgery (although this is 
ambiguous). 
 
 
Despite the lacuna of a legal right to timely elective surgery created by the WHO, UDHR, 
ICESCR and CRPD’s right to health, if it was assumed a right to timely elective surgery was 
sufficiently supported by these international instruments, would such a right be enforceable 
by patients waiting outside their clinically indicated time frame? 
3 The Enforceability of a Derived Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
A right to timely elective surgery based on a human right to health is unlikely to equate to an 
enforceable right for patients. The most significant inhibitor to the enforceability of this 
derived right is the omission to include the right to health in domestic law. Currently 
international right to health instruments would be best ‘described as goals to be achieved 
rather than rules to be obeyed’ that do ‘not create obligations for Australia’ as established by 
the High Court judgement of Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority.689 
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However, individuals may complain to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the event of a violation of their right to health.690 That is, if an individual is able to 
establish that there has been a breach of their right to health pursuant to ICESCR because 
they have waited outside their clinical time frame for elective surgery (which would be 
unlikely: see Table 9 above) and the individual has attempted all avenues in Australia to 
remedy the complaint, then the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will 
consider the complaint.691 This complaint strategy may prove to be a lengthy process for 
individuals in need of timely surgery, and therefore may mitigate its effectiveness as a 
complaints option.692 Although Australia would be expected to consider the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ findings and inform this Committee on the steps 
taken to remedy the complaint, there exists no power to enforce that timely elective surgery 
take place.693 Nevertheless, the findings of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights would likely be influential on Australia, especially with publicity associated with the 
findings.694 However, as patients arguably do not have a legal right to timely elective surgery 
pursuant to ICESCR, as discussed previously, this avenue of complaint would not appear to 
be an option.  
In respect to the case study, although elective surgery policy states patients have the right to 
receive treatment within ‘a clinically appropriate period’, this right has not been incorporated 
into domestic law; this instrument also does not create any unenforceable right or remedy.695 
Even though the Commonwealth government has enacted a Human Rights (Parliamentary) 
Scrutiny Act 2011 to ensure Bills introduced into parliament are compatible with some 
international human rights instruments (including ICESCR and CRPD), this Act creates no 
enforceable right to health.696 Further, even though the Australian Capital Territory and the 
State of Victoria have enacted human rights legislation, these human rights provisions do not 
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include socio-economic rights, including the right to health.697 Currently, the Queensland 
Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee is considering whether Queensland should 
introduce a Human Rights Act.698 However, it remains unknown whether a Queensland 
Human Rights Act would include any right to health.699 As no Australian state or territory 
has implemented a right to health, Australia remains ‘a parched landscape so far as purchase 
for a legal right to health is concerned’,700 this extends to a right to health care, and therefore 
a right to timely elective surgery. The following chapter assesses whether there is a 
theoretical basis to support a right to timely elective surgery. However, before selecting and 
evaluating any theoretical right to timely elective surgery, it is necessary to explore the 
lessons learnt from the international right to health. That is, any theoretical right selected 
should include the strengths of the international right to health while minimising its 
weaknesses.  
4 Lessons Learnt from the International Right to Health 
Any philosophical right to health based on the principle of justice would need to attempt to 
limit the weaknesses of the right to health to support a strong right to timely elective surgery. 
That is, a right would need to be drafted into domestic law as an enforceable right with a 
remedy; further, the right should not be easily defeated by resource limiting provisions or 
ambiguity of terminology. Lessons learnt from the unenforceability of the international 
human right to health will inform the discussion for the proposed philosophical right to 
health, discussed in the following chapter.   However, given the general universal acceptance 
of the ethos of a human right to health for all, most recently evidenced by 163 countries 
ratifying the rights of ICESCR, including the right to health,701 it will therefore be important 
for any philosophical right to health to include the universality of the international right 
instruments to increase its prospects of acceptance.    
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In summary, it is imperative that any philosophical right to health should be the basis of an 
enforceable right to timely elective surgery – remedying the flaws of the international right 
to health while retaining its strengths. As discussed previously, an individual without 
adequate health not only adversely affects the life of that individual but also their families 
and ultimately the community and society. Health is a precursor to further human rights.702 
Those who fail to receive health care may ‘lose some or all ability to exercise fully the civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights they possess’.703   
5 Conclusion 
In summary, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is no legal basis for a right to timely 
elective surgery in domestic law. That is, the Constitution, common law, anti-discrimination 
legislation and torts legislation do not provide a basis for a right to timely elective surgery. 
Although there is a right in international law to health and some expressions of that right 
give rise to a legal right to elective surgery, these rights may not support a legal right to 
timely elective surgery. That is, it is unlikely that the right to health at international law (i.e. 
UDHR, ICESCR and CRPD) supports a legal right to timely elective surgery due to:  
• the inherent resource allocation limitations stipulated within their right to health; 
• the considerable discretion as to the implementation of the right; and  
• in any event, Australia has not included the right to health into domestic law.  
Further, the WHO’s right to health is not legally binding, and in any event, the right likely 
does not support a right to timely elective surgery because its latitude of the right to health is 
‘so general’ it is ‘virtually useless as a practical foundation’704 for a legal right. Also, without 
inclusion of the WHO’s right to health into domestic law, any such right would be 
unenforceable. Accordingly, without an enforceable legal right at international law for timely 
elective surgery, the following chapter will now assess whether there is a theoretical 
foundation for a right to timely elective surgery. Of course, the theoretical right will need to 
be narrower in latitude than the international right to health to be an effective basis for a 
legal right to timely elective surgery.     
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Chapter 5 
V A THEORECTICAL BASIS FOR A RIGHT TO TIMELY ELECTIVE 
SURGERY AND THE NATURE AND NORMATIVE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT  
A Introduction 
The previous chapter explored whether there is an international legal basis for a right to 
timely elective surgery. It concluded that the right to health as set out in international 
instruments may not be a legal basis for a right to timely elective surgery. Although there is a 
basis for a right to timely elective surgery as set out in international instruments, this would 
be a moral basis and is weak across the majority of international instruments. Therefore, as 
reflected in research questions 3, 4 and 5, it is now important to explore whether there is a 
foundation for a right to timely elective surgery in contemporary theory. 
To explore research question 3 about whether there is a theoretical basis for a right, this 
chapter uses Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. To explore research question 4 about 
the nature of such a right, Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory is applied. 
To explore research question 5, concerning the normative scope of that right, Amitai 
Etzioni’s responsive communitarian theory is applied. In essence, the capabilities approach 
and Ram-Tiktin’s and Etzioni’s theories of distributive justice are concerned with ‘the fair 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of social cooperation among diverse persons with 
competing needs and claims’.705 In the context of elective surgery, this will equate to 
distributive justice providing the basis for the just allocation of society’s resources towards 
individuals with various significant health conditions waiting for timely elective surgery.  
Part A, B and C: An Overview. An overview of Parts A, B and C of this chapter will assist 
in explaining the structure of the chapter. Part A explores whether there is a theoretical 
basis for a right to timely elective surgery, using Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. 
Nussbaum considers her theory to be supplementary to human rights, accordingly the 
approach does not negate the existence of any right to health care at international law.706 The 
approach nominates an individual’s entitlement to health as a central capability, that is, 
individuals are entitled to a threshold of this capability sufficient to have ‘truly human 
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functioning’.707 Based on this theory, it is argued that patients have a derived right to enforce 
timely elective surgery if they are below the threshold of human dignity or the threshold of 
‘truly human functioning’.708 However, firstly it must be established that this theoretical right 
is grounded in an appropriate theory to optimally support a derived right to timely elective 
surgery as discussed in Part A(1). The background and definition of Nussbaum’s theory is 
discussed in Part A(2), (3) and (4). This background forms the basis for assessing in Part 
A(5), regarding whether there is a right to health by virtue of the theoretical theory, including 
a discussion in Part A(6) as to whether there is a right to be healthy by virtue of the 
capabilities approach. The philosophical justification for the selected theoretical right to 
health is examined in Part A(7) to assist in answering the question in Part A(8) regarding 
whether there is a derived right to healthcare and therefore a right to timely elective surgery 
based on Nussbaum’s theory. Although it is concluded that there is a derived right to timely 
elective surgery based on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, the right is not likely viable in a 
resource constrained society and should be supplemented by another theory of distributive 
justice, namely, a sufficiency theory, as discussed in Part B below.  
Part B explores the nature of the right to timely elective surgery. Specifically, Part B follows 
on from the exploration of the existence of a theoretical right to timely elective surgery in 
Part A, and takes into account society’s resource limitations. However, it is firstly necessary, 
in Part B(1) of this chapter, to establish why the right would be subject to such resource 
constraints. Part B(2) of this chapter determines that the answer to limiting the right derived 
from the capabilities approach, taking into account resource limitations, seems to be 
prioritising patients below the capabilities threshold. The appropriate theory for prioritising 
patients is discussed in Part B(3). Ram-Tiktin’s sufficiency theory is used to explore the 
nature of the right.  
Part C of this chapter explores the scope of the right to timely elective surgery with Amitai 
Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism theory. This theory of distributive justice assesses 
whether the individualistic nature of the derived right to timely elective surgery in Part A of 
this chapter has been sufficiently balanced with the sufficiency theory in Part B of this 
chapter to ensure the right takes into account community interests. Part C of this chapter 
commences with a background discussion about Amitai Etzioni’s theory in Part C(1) and (2). 
Etzioni’s theory is then defined in Part C(3) with an explanation in Part C(4) as to how the 
theory balances individualism with community interests. Part C(5) then assesses the right to 
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timely elective surgery to determine whether the right will balance individual interests with 
community interests, that is, to ensure the right will sustainable in the long term.  
However, firstly it is necessary to determine the theoretical basis underpinning the right to 
timely elective surgery.  
B Part A: A Theoretical Basis for a Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
1 Selecting a Theory to Explore a Theoretical Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
Prior to considering whether there is a philosophical right to timely elective surgery derived 
from the right to health care, it is necessary to identify the theory or theories underpinning 
such a right. In reference to Norman Daniels, ‘[r]ights are not moral fruits that spring up 
from bare earth’; ‘we are justified in claiming a right to health care only if it can only be 
harvested’ from a ‘theory of justice’.709 Basing a right to health on a theory of justice is 
appropriate, as health care is intertwined with issues of the distribution of society’s wealth, 
and for the purpose of this thesis, the concern is how to distribute timely elective surgery 
fairly. As justice equates to fairness, a philosophical theory supporting a right to health is 
best viewed through the lens of justice.710 A secondary reason that a theory of justice is 
appropriate for this thesis is because the research question falls within the ambit of social 
justice. A theory conforming with the principles of social justice seems appropriate as the 
right being examined is to be applied within the context of Queensland public hospitals, that 
is, a public health system, with universal publically funded community access to health care 
that is supporting a commitment to social justice.711    
As this thesis is concerned with social justice, it is firstly necessary to briefly consider the 
most prominent theory of social justice, that is, Rawls’ theory of justice.  This background is 
necessary for establishing that despite the authoritative nature of Rawls’ theory in ‘moral and 
political philosophy’, the theory is of limited application for the purposes of attaining justice 
for timely elective surgery.712 Following a brief assessment of Rawls’ theory, Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach will be the focus of the first part of this chapter. Due to 
the complexity and time involved with examining whether there should be an enforceable 
right to health care, it is not viable to include all theoretical arguments around social justice, 
and it is possible a different theory of justice would yield a different outcome. Nussbaum’s 
theory has been selected because the approach is grounded in social justice. Further, 
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Nussbaum’s theory has been selected because it levers from the strengths of Rawls’ theory, 
while remedying its weaknesses to achieve an optimum justice. Rawls’ theory, its 
limitations, and why Nussbaum’s theory is more relevant to the question of whether there 
should be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery are discussed below.  
2 Background and Limitations of Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice 
The background of Rawl’s theory of justice derives by ‘unanimous agreement’ on principles 
of justice from the state of the ‘original position’.713 This position is ‘an imagined state in 
primordial equality, when the parties involved have no knowledge of their personal 
identities, or their respective vested interests, within the group as a whole’. 714 The two 
principles emerging from the original position are:  
(i) The ‘priority of liberty’: everyone has equal entitlement to ‘basic liberty’.715 
(ii) ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both’:716   
a) ‘attached to positions and offices open to all’;717 and 
b) ‘they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society’, also known as, the ‘Difference Principle’.718 
		
Part (i) and (ii) (a) of Rawls’ theory, above, relate to fairness procedures and are not in 
dispute for the purposes of the thesis. However, part (ii) (b) of Rawls’ theory above, namely 
the Difference Principle is in dispute.719 A prominent advocate against Rawls’ difference 
principle,720 Amartya Sen (who devised the original capabilities approach with Nussbaum, as 
discussed later) criticised the difference principle because Rawls assessed individuals’ 
opportunities721 ‘through the means they possess, without taking into account the wide 
variations they have in being able to convert primary goods into good living’.722 That is, 
Rawls’ measure of equity for resource distribution is based on ‘primary goods’.723 Primary 
goods being ‘liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect’.724 
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These primary goods are to be equally distributed to individuals.725 Because of the 
discrepancies between individuals ‘being able to convert primary goods into good living’,726 
the difference principle should be based on individual’s capabilities rather than primary 
goods.727 For example, A and B are distributed identical funds to attend a medical facility to 
receive treatment. The amount of money required for A to restore their health status may be 
minimal, however B may have a pre-existing complication that requires more medical 
treatment and additional funds. That is, person B’s opportunities to have adequate health are 
less than A’s opportunities to be adequately healthy with identical funds.728 Therefore, 
distributing equal resources to individuals will not usually equate to equal outcomes, and 
hence such a theory may not lead to socially just outcomes.729 Sen argued that people’s 
capabilities, that is, ‘what a person’s “comprehensive opportunities” are’, are fairer than 
resource measurement because you can actually differentiate:730 
(i) ‘Whether a person is actually able to do things’ that person ‘would value doing’, 
that is, you are able to assess a person’s ‘actual opportunities’; and 
(ii) Whether ‘the means’ are available for the person to ‘pursue’ what he/she ‘would 
like to do’.731 
That is, a capabilities approach, unlike the primary goods approach, allows you to 
assess people’s real opportunities.732 The capabilities approach also remedies a further 
limitation of Rawls’ theory, namely Rawls’ ‘deliberate design’733 of including only normal 
individuals734 for the original position. Rawls considered the selection of normal individuals 
as necessary to ‘achieve a clear and uncluttered view’ of justice.735 However, ‘[i]f people are 
making a cooperative arrangement for mutual advantage’ they will not be interested in ‘those 
who will demand usual or expensive attention’ ‘depressing the level of society’s well-
being’.736 Therefore, individuals with physical and mental impairments and their interests are 
excluded from Rawls’ theory.737 Yet Rawls has conceded that this dilemma could be 
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resolved ‘after basic political principles are already chosen’.738 But is this a ‘satisfactory 
account of human justice’?739 Justice ‘requires recognising the equal citizenship of people 
with impairments’,740 especially as there is now ‘greater social inclusion of people with 
impairments’741 in our society, as seen in the CRPD discussed earlier and domestic anti-
discrimination legislation and policy. The capabilities approach, unlike Rawls’ theory, has a 
‘moralized compassion for those who have less than they need to lead decent and dignified 
lives’. Thus, in the example above, if we now say person B had a severe disability, then the 
capabilities approach would inherently require person B to be raised to adequate health, even 
though this may require significantly more resources than say a person with no disabilities, 
such as person A above. In order to understand the strength of the concept of capabilities 
further, it is necessary to briefly explore the origins of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.  
3 Origins of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
Sen and Nussbaum are the leading philosophical pioneers of the capabilities approach.742 The 
concept of capabilities arose as a result of the Human Development Project as an alternative 
economic theory and fairer measure of development than Gross National Product.743 
However, since that time the capabilities approach has evolved, and Sen and Nussbuam have 
developed the concept of capabilities in different ways. While Sen has kept the idea of 
capabilities as an assessment for individuals’ ‘quality of life’744, Nussbaum has developed 
the capabilities approach into a limited theory of justice.745 Nussbaum’s approach is a type of 
supplement to Rawls’ theory.746 The theory, as advocated by Nussbaum, has a ‘philosophical 
underpinning for an account of core human entitlements that should be respected and 
implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for 
human dignity requires’.747 Even though the theory was originally concerned with 
developing countries, the concept of capabilities applies even in developed nations, as there 
are health care injustices.748 Nussbaum considered every nation to be developing because of 
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a failure to achieve a minimum threshold of justice –749 these nations provide insufficient 
opportunities to their citizens and human dignity.750 Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities 
approach has been selected rather than Sen’s version because Nussbaum has developed the 
approach into a theory of justice, albeit a partial theory.751   
Sen argued that although capabilities are a valuable alternative to Rawls’ primary goods, 
capabilities ‘can hardly serve as the sole informational basis for the other considerations 
related to’ fairness procedures such as part (i) and (ii)(a) of Rawls’ theory discussed 
earlier.752 Similarly, the intent of Nussbaum’s capabilities is not to present a complete theory 
of social justice.753 Nussbaum argued that the capabilities approach is merely an ‘account of 
minimum social entitlements, and it is compatible with different views about how to handle 
issues of justice and distribution that would arise once all citizens are above the threshold 
level’.754 In any event, a complete theory of justice is not required for every situation.755 That 
is, although Nussbaum’s theory is only partial, it will be sufficient to answer the question 
regarding whether there should be a right to timely elective surgery, as we are not 
considering imputing a right to those above the minimum basic threshold of capabilities.756 
However, prior to considering whether Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is able to support a 
right to timely elective surgery, it is firstly necessary to define Nussbaum’s capabilities 
theory.   
4 Defining Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
Similar to Sen, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach asks, ‘What is each person able to do and 
to be?’757 That is, what are each person’s real opportunities?758 Unlike Rawls premise that 
individuals are similarly equal,759 Nussbaum takes a more realistic approach by 
acknowledging that human beings require varying amounts of resources760 to be able to 
function (for example, to attain adequate health).761 Yet, similar to Rawls, Nussbaum’s 
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approach respects individual choices762 and therefore, their dignity.763 This concept of human 
dignity includes accommodating those individuals with differing opinions in a society with a 
myriad of beliefs.764 In this respect, the capabilities approach aligns with the concept of 
political liberalism.765   
That is, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach does not force an individual to accept an 
opportunity, instead their power of self-determination is to be respected.766   Nussbaum’s 
goal is an ‘overlapping consensus’,767 meaning in a pluralistic society there are core values of 
justice768 that people will agree with despite their differences, this idea is similar to Rawls.769 
Nussbaum attempted to achieve an overlapping consensus by restricting from the capabilities 
approach ‘anything that would be demeaning to a person who is not a member of a notional 
average or dominant group’.770 An overlapping consensus should provide stability, as people 
will perceive ‘that the political conception respects them’.771 However, unlike Rawls, where 
a ‘well-ordered society... would be characterised by an overlapping consensus on a family of 
reasonable political conceptions of justice that would contend politically’, Nussbaum 
considered her capabilities approach:772 
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could be incorporated into a constitution, and so could be the conception that 
well-orders a liberal society by serving as the public basis for adjudicating at 
least some of the most important competing claims. 
How are capabilities defined within this liberally construed framework? Capabilities are:773 
not just abilities residing inside a person but also the freedoms or 
opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, 
social, and economic environment. 
Nussbaum distilled capabilities into three categories, namely, basic capabilities, internal 
capabilities and combined capabilities.774 Basic capabilities are defined as an individual’s 
inherent ability.775 Unlike basic capabilities, internal capabilities are normally augmented by 
a type of functioning,776 for example an individual’s health status.777 Lastly, combined 
capabilities are comprised of an individual’s internal capabilities and the ‘political, social, 
and economic’ environment.778 Nussbaum considered that combined capabilities should also 
mean internal capabilities have been achieved.779 For example, in Queensland, individuals 
have the capability to receive free elective surgery at public hospitals (namely a social 
capability), however the State does not always produce good health outcomes (namely an 
internal capability) for patients when elective surgery is not delivered on time. Although the 
State may have good intentions of providing free hospital treatment, when internal 
capabilities are not produced (ie proper health outcomes) then the State has consequently 
also failed to produce combined capabilities.780 At this point, it is important to note that 
although a state may provide the funding and resources to support a person attaining their 
internal capabilities, the state should nevertheless respect an individual’s ability to elect 
whether they wish to acquire functioning. This of course adheres to the broader framework 
of Nussbaum’s political liberalism goal and also aligns with the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights ethos that people have the right to determine their own 
health.781 However, will Nussbaum’s politically liberal capabilities approach be sufficient to 
support a right to health and ultimately, a derived right to timely elective surgery where 
individuals are able to select their health outcome? But firstly, it must be established whether 
the capabilities approach will in fact support an underlying right to health.   
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5 Is there a right to health by virtue of the capabilities approach? 
The capabilities approach expressly supports a positive entitlement to health by supporting 
health as a fundamental capability. Nussbaum, considered ‘securing a right to someone 
requires more than the absence of negative state action’782 to be effective.   
Ten central capabilities. Nussbaum nominated the following central capabilities or positive 
type entitlements necessary for individuals to have dignity.783 These capabilities are the 
entitlements to:784 
1. Life: having the opportunity to ‘live a life of normal length’. 
2. Bodily health: having the opportunity ‘to have good health’. 
3. Bodily integrity: having the ability to ‘secure against... assault’ and ‘[b]eing able 
to move freely’. 
4. Senses, imagination and thought: having the ability to ‘reason’ that is ‘informed’ 
by ‘education’; and having the freedom to ‘use one’s mind’. 
5. Emotions: having the ability to ‘have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves’.  
6. Practical reason: having the opportunity to ‘form a conception of the good’, as 
well as ‘engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life’.  
7. Affiliation: ‘[b]eing able to live with and towards others, to recognise and show 
concern for’ others. In addition, being ‘treated as a dignified being whose worth 
is equal to that of others’.   
8. Other species: having the ability ‘to live with concern’ for nature. 
9. Play: having the opportunity to ‘enjoy recreational activities’. 
10. ‘Control over one’s environment’: having the ability to ‘participate effectively in 
political choices’, and ‘being able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods)’.  
The above central capabilities applying to the context of health include the entitlement to 
health and the entitlement to life785 (note, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the 
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contentious and broad meaning of health;786 for the purpose of this chapter the focus of 
health will be elective surgery).  
In contrast to Sen, Nussbaum listed these fundamental capabilities as specific entitlements. 
Although Sen was not opposed to listing capabilities, he disagreed with philosophers 
creating such lists in the absence of public consultation.787 Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s 
creation of the above capability entitlements was intended for later discussion788 by 
individuals, the political and legal system.789 Nussbaum defended her choice to create this 
theoretical list of central capabilities on the basis that:790 
Social justice has always been a profoundly normative concept, and its role 
is typically critical; we work out an account of what is just, and we then use 
it to find reality deficient in various ways. 
Therefore, in order to progress the capabilities approach and ensure it is beneficial for 
political discussion791 it is necessary to construct a general792 theoretical list of what is 
good,793 which can later be detailed by the community.794 In any event, Nussbaum argued 
that listing capabilities is somewhat akin to listing human rights, as both capabilities and 
human rights have ‘similar roles, providing both a basis for cross-cultural comparison and 
the philosophical underpinning for basic constitutional principles’.795 However, unlike 
human rights instruments highlighting:796 
the idea of an urgent claim based upon justice. To say that people have a 
right to something is to say that they have an urgent entitlement to it. The 
idea of capability all on its own does not yet express the idea of an urgent 
entitlement based on justice. However, the capabilities approach makes this 
idea of a fundamental entitlement clear, by arguing that the central human 
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capabilities are not simply desirable social goals, but urgent entitlements 
grounded in justice. 
Although Nussbaum did not specify the point at which a capability entitlement becomes a 
right, it would be reasonable to assume that once this entitlement797 is accepted into domestic 
law, such a capability would be considered a legal right.  Although, this may be unnecessary 
if the argument is accepted that a moral right itself is sufficient to create a right.  
Even though the capabilities approach as a theory utilises the term entitlements as opposed to 
rights, it remains superior to human rights as ‘[p]eople differ about what the basis of a rights 
claim is’ in human rights instruments, for example, ‘rationality, sentience, and mere life have 
all had their defenders’ for the ‘basis of a rights claim’;798 whereas, the capabilities approach 
has a stated philosophical basis and states ‘clearly what the motivating concerns are and 
what the goal is’.799 Although an overarching philosophical basis for the international right to 
health has not been specified by the international bodies; the basis of the capabilities 
approach’s philosophical reasoning, including its instigating interest for human dignity, has 
been specified and will be discussed later in this chapter. Further, the capabilities approach 
clearly states its ultimate goal, that is, the attainment of justice.800   
In summary, the capabilities approach supports an entitlement to timely elective surgery as a 
basis for the right to health and indirectly also supports the entitlement to health through a 
right to life. Although Nussbaum has sought to progress the capabilities approach in a 
direction different from Sen, it is nevertheless a valid progression as its theoretical list of 
capabilities serves only to evoke discussion within society before any such capability is 
implemented. Therefore, Nussbaum’s theorised entitlement to health is curtailed by reality, 
as the right is subject to the outcome of society’s discussion and continual reassessment of 
the right.801 However, assuming society did embrace Nussbaum’s capability of health as a 
right, would this mean that society could claim an aspirational right to be healthy?  
6 Is there a right to be healthy by virtue of the capabilities approach? 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach does not strive for individuals to be healthy, it merely 
seeks to raise individuals to a threshold level of health capability. However, this capability is 
not to prevent individual’s ability to choose, that is, the capabilities approach will not force 
individuals to have good health.802 For example, a person has the right to choose whether 
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they wish to receive elective surgery within their clinically indicated time frame. That is, 
Nussbaum considered that ‘[t]here is a huge moral difference between policy that promotes 
health and one that promotes health capabilities – the latter, not the former, honours the 
person’s lifestyle choices’.803 This reasoning is consistent with the idea of political 
liberalism, as previously discussed.804 However, does this choice to have the right to good 
health equate to a right to be healthy? Similar to the UDHR, Nussbaum’s right to health does 
not equate to a right to be healthy. Nussbaum’s right to health is limited by a threshold.805 In 
alignment with the ethos of respecting individuals’ dignity, Nussbaum considered that 
individuals need to be raised to a set threshold for all of the ten capabilities including the 
entitlement to health and the entitlement to life so that ‘..claims of injustice can be made only 
by those beneath the sufficiency threshold’.806 This idea of limiting the right to health to a 
right of sufficient health instead of an aspirational right to be healthy is discussed in further 
detail later in this chapter. However, before exploring whether there is a right to timely 
elective surgery and how a sufficient threshold of health capability could be applied in this 
context, it is firstly necessary to explore the philosophical basis of the capabilities approach 
to understand the justification for limiting the right.   
7 Philosophical Justification for the Right to Health  
The overarching philosophical goal of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is ‘a society in 
which individuals are treated as each worthy of regard and in which each has been put in a 
position to live really humanly’.807 This living humanly idea or human dignity is the 
underpinning of the capabilities approach and is influenced primarily by Aristotle and also 
by the Stoics. Aristotle believed ‘that satisfaction achieved without choice is unworthy of the 
dignity of human beings’.808 Stoics further emphasised this idea of human dignity by 
teaching that ‘every single human being, just by virtue of being human, has dignity and is 
worthy of reverence’.809 In essence, the capability approach is based on the following 
concepts: 
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(i) ‘...that there are certain functions that are particularly central in human life, in the 
sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the 
presence or absence of human life’. For example, health.810  
(ii) ‘Second, and this is what Marx found in Aristotle, that there is something that it is 
to do these functions in a truly human way, not merely an animal way. We judge, 
frequently enough, that a life has been so impoverished that it is not worthy of the 
dignity of the human being, that it is a life in which one goes on living, but more 
or less like an animal, not being able to develop and exercise... human powers’.811  
Further, the capabilities approach, as identified earlier, seeks the social inclusion of 
everyone, including those less fortunate. By treating individuals as equals, you will be 
ultimately respecting the human dignity of everyone.812 But how did Nussbaum propose that 
her theory would ensure individuals with disabilities are ultimately treated with dignity, that 
is, how is Rawls’ inherent limitation sought to be remedied? Before answering this question, 
it is important to note background philosophical reasoning, namely, Aristotles’ view that saw 
a human being as a social creature.813 Similarly, Nussbaum saw her capabilities approach as 
being ‘moralised and socialized, from the very start’. Nussbaum said that ‘[a]lthough the 
approach does not employ a hypothetical initial situation’ like Rawls’ ‘procedural approach’, 
in Nussbaum’s ‘outcome-orientated approach’ she considered individuals ‘cooperating out of 
a wide range of motives’.814 These motives would include ‘a moralized compassion for those 
who have less than they need to lead decent and dignified lives’.815 This ‘moralized 
compassion’ in Australian society is evidenced in its ratification of the CRPD. In summary, 
Nussbaum considered that justice requires everyone to receive human dignity and be treated 
equally.   
The basic social minimum: an ample threshold. Nussbaum considered attaining a basic 
social minimum threshold of each capability for everyone as necessary to ensure human 
dignity.816 This is achieved with the concept of a capability threshold, beneath this threshold 
there will be an absence of proper functioning, so the aim should be to ensure individuals are 
raised above this threshold.817 But in order to achieve such justice, society should ensure that 
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in raising individuals to the threshold level, the impaired must also be raised to this 
threshold.818   
Nussbaum’s threshold level is set equally for everybody. It does not fall to a lower level for 
the impaired, nor does Nussbaum employ an alternative set of capabilities for the 
impaired.819 This reasoning is consistent with the CRPD. However, if an individual’s 
condition is near the clinical meaning of death, that is, there is an absence of any purposeful 
life, for example an individual in a non-reversible vegetative state, then Nussbaum argued 
that this group is excluded from meeting the threshold, because there is no ability to engage 
in reasoning or comprehension.820 So aside from those in persistent vegetative type states or 
close to death, there is one threshold for everyone. Nussbaum considered an alternative list 
or threshold for those outside the realms of normal to be potentially risky, because it 
provides an escape from delivering capabilities that may be problematic or costly to 
achieve.821    
In summary, to ensure everyone has the central capabilities, for example, adequate health, 
Nussbaum sets the same threshold of adequate health for everyone. That is, person A (no 
impairment) has the same right to the capability threshold of adequate health as person B 
(with impairment). The aim is to ensure both person A and person B are treated equally by 
ensuring both have adequate health despite the extra resources that may be needed to ensure 
person B has adequate health. Now that it has been established that Nussbaum’s theory is 
based on equality and human dignity with the outcome of justice requiring health capabilities 
for everyone; could it be said that such justice also extends to a derived right to timely 
elective surgery for everyone? 
8 Does the Capabilities Approach Provide a Basis for the Existence of a Derived 
Right to Health Care and Therefore to Timely Elective Surgery? 
In deciding whether there is a right to timely elective surgery, a derivative right to health 
care from the right to health must firstly be established. In Ram-Tiktin’s view, the 
capabilities approach supports a right to health care because of governments’ obligations to 
individuals to ensure they have the capabilities to function 822 Specifically, in Nussbaum’s 
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opinion, ‘goods that can be expected to be of value in any life plan that citizens chose to 
pursue’ encompasses health care.823   
However, will the capabilities necessary for health functioning824 include timely elective 
surgery? As timely elective surgery is considered a necessity to restore health, it is believed 
that the capabilities approach would support a right to such surgery.825 This right would not 
be an absolute right, as it would only apply to those individuals who need to be raised above 
the capabilities threshold, as discussed previously. However, a non-absolute right may still 
outstrip the health system’s resources, especially with everyone expected to attain the same 
minimum threshold, and this right may need to be prioritised. While Nussbaum asserted that 
the government has a duty to ensure all individuals are above the minimum threshold826 to 
ensure justice is achieved, there is no guidance on how to prioritise capabilities below this 
threshold.827 In a system of limited resources where the minimum threshold is unable to be 
attained for everyone, then Nussbaum stated that we need to attempt raising individuals near 
the capability threshold immediately, even though it may not be possible to instantly raise 
those individuals above the threshold.828 Implementing a prioritisation strategy in a resource 
limited system is consistent with Nussbaum’s view that even though capabilities cannot be 
achieved for everyone, individuals will still be being raised in the direction of the 
threshold.829 How a system of prioritisation should occur will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  However, firstly it is necessary to consider whether the derived right to timely 
elective surgery based on Nussbaum’s approach takes into account the universally accepted 
ethos of the right to health in international instruments while minimising that right’s flaws. 
9 Will the Derived Right to Timely Elective Surgery Remedy the Flaws of the Right 
to Health in International Instruments While Retaining its Ethos?  
Nussbaum’s approach rectifies the flaws of the international right by omitting an ambiguous 
resource limiting clause while maintaining the strengths of the international right to health, 
namely, framing the right within a politically liberal framework and ensuring a high level of 
health without striving for a near impossible goal of healthy individuals (unlike the WHO 
Constitution’s right to health).  Nussbaum’s theory also retains the universally accepted 
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concept that the entitlement to health should extend to everyone to ensure their human 
dignity is respected regardless of an individual’s basic capabilities.   
10 Part A: Summary  
In summary, this section of the chapter has established that: 
• Nussbaum’s capabilities approach provides a robust theory-based foundation for 
the existence of an entitlement to health; 
• there is a derived right to timely elective surgery through this entitlement to 
health; 
• individuals are entitled to basic capabilities to allow them to properly live life,830 
including having good health. Governments have a duty to ensure individuals 
have a minimum threshold of this capability.831 Therefore, resources should be 
directed to ensure all individuals have a minimum level of health capabilities.   
• resources should be directed to raising individuals to a threshold of health 
capability unless they chose not to receive such assistance; 
• an entitlement to timely elective surgery derived from Nussbaum’s approach 
remedies the flaws of the right to health in international instruments, while 
retaining its general universally accepted ethos. 
However, it was also found that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach omits any formula to 
prioritise individuals below the threshold in a society where resources are limited.832 This is 
problematic because a right to timely elective surgery is a right subject to resource 
constraints (the reasoning for this will be further explored in Part B below). To consider this 
practical dilemma, this thesis explores another theory of distributive justice.   
C Part B: The Nature of the Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
1 Why the Right to Timely Elective Surgery is Subject to Resource Constraints 
It appears to be a universally accepted view that health care (and therefore elective surgery) 
needs to exist within society’s resource constraints. This view is principally acknowledged 
by the international community. Tobin considered that international law accepts the need to 
‘prioritise the allocation of scarce resources’.833 For example, ICESCR and the CRPD both 
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subject the right to health to progressive implementation.834 But, why do these health 
resource constraints exist in society? This is because, economically, such resources are 
costly and scarce.835 In addition, these costs are further strained by increasing demands on 
health care with an increasingly ageing population, the ongoing strain of chronic illnesses, 
raising expenses of medical technologies, and issues with health staff availability and 
allocation.836 Given health resources are scarce, it is therefore not surprising that there are 
waiting lists for elective surgery in Australia. These waiting lists have been described as an 
important necessity in the system, enabling the distribution of scarce resources to those 
individuals clinically requiring treatment.837 
2 The Extent to Which the Theoretical Right to Timely Elective Surgery Balances 
Resources  
In Part A above, it was determined that the right distilled based on the capabilities approach 
is not an absolute right, that is, not every patient can utilise the right unless they are below 
the capabilities threshold. A patient merely waiting too long for elective surgery and not 
being below the capabilities threshold must continue to wait.  Therefore, to some extent, the 
right is already curtailed and indirectly takes into account limited resources. However, this is 
unlikely to be a sufficient strategy to balance the right with resources given that patients 
waiting too long for surgery are already outside a clinically recommended time limit and 
waiting for necessary surgery.  Further, by the time patients have reached the elective 
surgery waiting list they have already been waiting on the outpatient waiting list, sometimes 
for considerable periods of time, as discussed in Chapter 3 and to be discussed in Chapter 6 
of the thesis. The right to timely elective surgery should be holistic by including the 
outpatients waiting time, or alternatively there should be an additional right for timely 
outpatient waiting. In any event, it is not difficult to envisage that a significant number of 
patients would likely be below the capabilities threshold by the time they reach the final 
stage of the public health waiting system, that is, the elective waiting list.  
Accordingly, there is a ‘tragic choice’ to be made between individuals’ health capability 
entitlement and society’s limited resources. Considering Nussbaum believed there was a 
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failure to achieve justice if individuals were below the threshold of capabilities, does 
Nussbaum nevertheless provide any guidance for resolving this ‘tragic choice’?838 Although 
Nussbuam provided limited guidance for resolving conflicts between capabilities and 
resource constraints, Nussbaum accepted that capability entitlements involve resources, so 
the capabilities threshold should be determined in view of this limitation.839 Nussbaum said 
in relation to the capabilities threshold that:840  
[s]etting the threshold precisely is a matter for each nation, and within 
certain limits, it is reasonable for nations to do this differently, in keeping 
with their history and traditions. 
Society could narrowly define the capabilities threshold so as to minimise eligible claimants 
to the right. This would be consistent with Nussbaum’s view that the threshold should not be 
set at a fancifully high mark.841 Yet, in Nussbaum’s view, in setting the threshold, it should 
not be set at an inadequate level.842 In reality, the latitude to curtail the definition of 
capabilities would be limited; the threshold would still need to be set so that patients are able 
to have proper human functioning.843   
Further, in reference to Stein, the capabilities threshold would need to be calibrated at a 
profoundly inadequate level to avoid the problem of insatiable entitlements.844  An insatiable 
entitlement:845  
requires spending for the benefit of an individual long past the point where 
additional spending will do much good, and under circumstances where the 
individual’s claim cannot ever be fully satisfied. 
That is, not every individual can reach the capability threshold, as even unrestricted funding 
for some individuals will never be sufficient to raise them above the threshold.846 Stein said 
this was the dilemma of insatiable entitlements’.847 Stein noted that Nussbaum’s view is 
                                                
 
838 Martha C Nussbaum, ‘The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (2000) 
29 The Journal of Legal Studies 1005, 1023; Martha Nussbaum, ‘Tragedy and Human Capabilities: A 
Response to Vivian Walsh’ (2003) 15 Review of Political Economy 413, 416. 
839 Nussbaum, above n 838, 1035; see also, Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Human Capabilities, Female 
Human Beings’ in Martha C Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds), Women, Culture and 
Development: A Study of Human Capabilities (Clarendon Press, 1995) 61, 87.  
840 Nussbaum, above n 1, 41. 
841 Nussbaum, above n 1, 42. 
842 Nussbaum, above n 644, 402. 
843 Ibid 70. 
844 Mark S Stein, ‘Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique’ (2009) 50 Boston College Law Review 489, 503. 
845 Ibid 500. 
846 Ibid 499. 
847 Ibid. 
  
Chapter 5 111 
when it is not viable for an individual to reach the capability threshold, then the aim should 
be to raise them as near to the threshold, however, Stein also noted that:848 
Nussbaum rarely acknowledges that it is impossible for all people to attain 
the threshold. Accordingly, she almost always phrases the social obligation 
as one to raise people to or above the threshold, without specifying what is to 
be done for those who cannot rise that far. 
However, in Nussbaum’s defence, the lack of prioritisation for those below the threshold is 
based on the premise that individuals are to be treated equally, not on a system of 
worthiness.849  
Stein argued Nussbaum’s capabilities threshold is deliberately not dependent on resource 
availability, otherwise the theory would be considered a ‘resourcist theory’ rather than a 
capabilities theory.850 Accordingly, it is not surprising that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
is strongly swayed towards justice without adequately balancing resources. Further 
modification of the right is needed to balance the resources required to support the right, as 
Nussbaum ‘is insensitive to the cost of meeting entitlements once the thresholds have been 
set’.851 That is, there needs to be a type of prioritisation below the capabilities threshold. 
Nussbaum did not provide any formula to deal with these issues below the threshold. That is, 
Nussbaum did not nominate how to resolve dilemmas below the capabilities threshold.852 In 
the event all individuals cannot be raised above the threshold then Nussbaum said:853 
it becomes a purely practical question what to do next, not a question of 
justice. The question of justice is already answered: justice has not been fully 
done here. 
It is generally accepted that a right to health care needs to be balanced with resources as 
discussed previously, accordingly a right to timely elective surgery based on Nussbaum’s 
theory needs be curtailed to take into account resource limitations. In circumstances when 
not all patients are able to receive timely elective surgery due to resource limitations, then an 
alternative theory will need to be applied for conflict below the capabilities threshold. 
Although Nussbaum considered such a situation to merely be a practical dilemma, it is 
important to ensure that any prioritisation of patients is fair. Nussbaum has likely not 
addressed this issue because of an idealistic belief that everyone should be raised towards the 
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threshold to ensure justice.  Nevertheless, in a society constrained by resource limitations, 
ideal justice is not possible; therefore, an appropriate theory that fairly prioritises patients 
waiting too long for elective surgery appears to be a necessity. The selected theory is based 
on the theory of non-egalitarian sufficientarianism.   
3 Solving the Resource Right Balance with a Non-Egalitarian Sufficiency Theory  
(a) Background to the Non-Egalitarian Sufficiency Theory 
Prior to assessing how a non-egalitarian sufficiency theory may solve the below- threshold 
dilemma of the capabilities approach, it is firstly necessary to categorise Nussbaum’s current 
approach to the below threshold dilemmas. This is necessary to establish the extent to which 
the selected non-egalitarian sufficiency theory will align with the ethos of the capabilities 
approach. Firstly, is Nussbaum’s approach for below threshold dilemmas already a type of 
sufficiency approach? And if so, does Nussbaum’s approach better align with egalitarian 
sufficientarianism or the selected theory of non-egalitarian sufficientarianism?   
Before assessing whether the capabilities approach aligns with sufficientarianism, it is firstly 
necessary to define the doctrine of sufficiency.854 According to Yitzhak Benbaji, this 
doctrine states ‘that what is important from the point of view of morality is that each person 
should have enough’.855 In this respect, the capabilities threshold appears to be akin to 
sufficientarianism, that is, that it is enough for proper human functioning,856 it is not 
necessary for all individuals to have very high capabilities beyond what is needed. 
As it appears the capabilities threshold is akin to sufficientarianism, is the capabilities 
approach for below-threshold dilemmas egalitarian or non-egalitarian sufficientarianism? To 
truly adhere with sufficientarianism, Nussbaum’s dilemma would need to align with a non-
egalitarian approach, as sufficientarianism has been described as an opponent to 
egalitarianism.857 Specifically, sufficientarianism rejects egalitarianism because:858  
if a person has enough resources to provide for the satisfaction of his 
interests, his resources are entirely adequate; their adequacy does not depend 
in addition upon the magnitude of the resources that other people possess. 
For example:859 
                                                
 
854 Yitzhak Benbaji, ‘Sufficiency or Priority?’ (2006) 14 European Journal of Philosophy 327, 327. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
857 Yitzhak Benbaji, ‘The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defence’ (2005) 17 Utilitas 310, 310. 
858 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Equality and Respect’ (1997) 64 Social Research 3, 7. 
859 Ram-Tiktin, above n 56, 340. 
  
Chapter 5 113 
[t]he fact that person A has better capabilities than B... is not morally 
troubling as long as person B has the basic ability. 
Does Nussbaum’s theory align with this non-egalitarian sufficientarianism theory? 
Interestingly, Stein categorised Nussbaum’s approach to below conflict dilemmas as 
egalitarian sufficientarianism860 as Nussbaum seeks to raise everyone to equal capability 
levels. Similarly, Ram-Tiktin viewed Nussbaum’s theory as seeking to attain equal 
capabilities861 for those individuals below the capabilities threshold.  However, Ram-Tiktin 
has expressed some uncertainty as to whether Nussbaum seeks such equality or merely 
sufficiency. Specifically, Ram-Tiktin said, that ‘[t]here is some ambiguity in Nussbaum’s 
writing, since, on the one hand, she wishes to achieve equality of capabilities, but on the 
other, refers to a good enough human life threshold’;862 although Ram-Tiktin does consider 
this issue in detail. Similarly, Nussbaum does not provide a direct answer to this problem, 
rather Nussbaum has stated that ‘there are some capabilities with respect to having them in 
unequal measure is not having them adequately at all’ (for example, ‘the right to vote’) there 
are other capabilities that merely require ‘adequacy’ (for example, the right to housing). So 
how does Nussbaum determine which capabilities require equality and which capabilities 
merely require adequacy? Nussbaum nominated a two-part test, that is, for every 
capability:863 
1. ‘[i]s human dignity being violated if people are being given unequal amounts or 
levels of the capacity in questions’?; and 
2. ‘look across the capabilities and ask how inequality in a given capability will 
affect some other capability’. 
In relation to question one above, how does Nussbaum propose to determine if human 
dignity has been violated? Nussbaum said:864 
[w]e have a good intuitive sense of what looks like a violation of human 
dignity, and people from different backgrounds can often agree about this. 
Courts interpreting constitutional provisions that use the notion of human 
dignity find that they are not operating in a vacuum, but have a pretty good 
set of intuitions and insights to go on. 
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In relation to question two above, how does Nussbaum propose to determine if inequity 
affects another capability? Nussbaum said:865 
[i]f we see that the capability we are considering is sufficiently closely 
linked to the one which has to be equalized, that might give us an additional 
set of reasons to equalize this one.  
Nussbaum did not address whether a right to timely elective surgery should aim to have 
equal capabilities for everyone866 or merely an adequacy of capabilities. Nussbaum said that 
she ‘is just inclined to approach the cases one by one and see if I can deal with the issue in 
that way’.867 However, applying Nussbaum’s two step test above, it is difficult to imagine a 
breach of human dignity if individuals do not possess health in equal measure, especially 
given the inherent variable nature of health. That is, individual’s health is dependent upon a 
myriad of factors, not just health care.868 It is also difficult to imagine that by not equalising 
the health of individuals that this would negatively impact other capabilities. Provided 
individuals have adequate health to be able to live really humanly,869 then individuals having 
health in unequal measures is not necessary to ensure justice. Therefore, Nussbaum’s theory 
may favour a non-egalitarian sufficiency approach based on the above test, rather than the 
egalitarian approach described by Stein.   
Accordingly, Nussbaum’s approach to the capabilities threshold broadly aligns with the 
selected non-egalitarian sufficientarianism theory. Of course, the significant difference 
between Nussbaum and the selected sufficiency theory discussed below is that Nussbaum 
seeks to raise everyone to the threshold (or everyone to a level of adequate capabilities), 
whereas the sufficiency theory selected utilises a system of prioritisation to a threshold of 
adequacy. A system of prioritisation is necessary in a society restricted by resources, as it is 
unlikely there would be sufficient resources to concurrently raise everyone towards the 
threshold.   
Therefore, a theory that fairly prioritises patients below the capabilities threshold is likely a 
necessary. Efrat Ram-Tiktin integrated a theory of sufficiency derived from Roger Crisp and 
modified the theory similarly to Yitzhak Benbaji’s view and applied this theory to 
Nussbaum’s approach. However, firstly, a brief explanation of Ram-Tiktin’s background is 
provided below to establish the context of her approach.  
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(b) Ram-Tiktin’s Non-Egalitarian Sufficiency Theory to Prioritise Those Below the 
Capabilities Threshold 
Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory provides that those below the capabilities 
threshold who are considered ‘worse off’ and would receive the greater ‘benefit size’ from 
receiving health care should receive the priority.870 Ram-Tiktin’s theory is based on a 
modified version of Crisp’s absolute sufficientarianism approach. Crisp’s theory 
establishes:871 
1. ‘Absolute priority is to be given to non-trivial benefits for those below the 
threshold’;  
2. ‘Below the threshold, benefiting people matters more the worse off those people 
are, the more of those people there are, and the greater benefits in question’; 
3. ‘Above the threshold, no priority is to be assigned’; 
4. ‘Benefiting people matters more the more of those people there are, and the 
greater the benefits in question’. 
The first difficulty with Crisp’s theory is that priority is only given to those below the 
threshold.872 Ram-Tiktin and Benbaji consider those at risk of falling below this threshold 
should also be taken into account.873 That is, suppose an individual is above the threshold, 
but at risk of falling below the threshold, Ram-Tiktin considers justice requires these 
individuals to also be prioritised;874 whereas Crisp’s theory does not provide priority to those 
individuals higher than the threshold.875 Suppose an individual (X) is ‘only slightly better 
off’ than another individual (Y) who is just below the threshold, then Benbaji considers that 
‘to treat this minor shift in X’s level of well-being as having this kind of significance seems 
to be arbitrary’.876 Similarly, Ram-Tiktin considers that an individual in ‘concrete jeopardy 
of falling beneath the threshold’ have ‘claims of justice’ to health care even though that 
individual is technically above the sufficiency threshold.877 Theoretically, extending the 
prioritisation to those also at risk of falling below the threshold seems logical and just. 
However, Ram-Tiktin is indirectly raising the capabilities threshold. This would mean more 
individuals would have a right to be prioritised. Their view is not consistent with 
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Nussbaum’s theory where justice only applies to those below the capabilities set threshold.  
Further, at some point a person’s right must discontinue, especially in a society constrained 
by resources.  
The second difficulty with Crisp’s theory identified by Ram-Tiktin and Benbaji is the idea 
that ‘[b]enefiting people matters more the more of those people there are’.  Instead, Benbaji 
considered that the ‘size of the benefit matters more than the numbers of the recipients’. In 
fact, Ram-Tiktin specifically noted that:878 
[a]ccording to the sufficiency of capabilities account, our moral commitment 
is the variable of ‘benefit size’ and not ‘number of beneficiaries’. The moral 
motivation that forms the basis of the theory is to compensate for lack or 
dysfunction of capabilities and not to get as many people as possible to the 
threshold level... The claim-right for health care is stronger the more 
capabilities one lacks/or the greater deviation one has from the norm values 
of some capability, as long as the potential benefit to her is not trivial. 
By ensuring the emphasis remains on capabilities rather than the quantity of individuals, the 
approach adheres with Nussbaum’s general ethos. In this respect, Crisp’s theory should be 
modified for application in the elective surgery context. 
Therefore, an appropriate theory to align with the ethos of the capabilities approach while 
taking into account resource limitations would be a modified version of Crisp’s theory. The 
modified theory that emerges is that:879 
1. ‘Absolute priority is to be given to... those below the threshold’;  
2. ‘Below the threshold, benefiting people matters more the worse off those people 
are... and the greater benefits in question’. 
Additionally, there is no priority to those higher than the threshold, as discussed above, this 
is in contrast to Ram-Tiktin’s and Benbaji’s view in relation to those at risk of falling below 
the sufficiency threshold.880 That is, only those individuals who have been waiting outside 
their clinically indicated time frame for elective surgery (and patients waiting too long on the 
outpatient waiting list) who have fallen below the threshold of capabilities should be entitled 
to a right to receive their surgery and be prioritised. The individuals that are ‘worse off’ will 
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receive higher priority for their surgery, that is, one should ask: what is the gravity of an 
individual’s capability inadequacy?881 Further, the:882 
size of the benefit must also be taken into account and priority given to those 
who will gain significantly from treatment. Significant improvement is any 
improvement that enables an individual to restore her positive freedom and 
live a dignified life. 
Consider the following examples. X is 25 years of age; she requires gall bladder surgery. She 
endures frequent pain and this has impacted upon her work efficiency.  If she receives the 
surgery shortly, she should have no ongoing pain or discomfort.  While, Y is 65 years of age, 
she requires bowel cancer surgery. If Y receives the surgery, she should have good prospects 
of surviving and is otherwise in good health.   However, if Y does not receive the surgery 
shortly, there is a significant risk the cancer may spread and ultimately death may ensue. 
Both X and Y have waited outside their clinically indicated time frame for elective surgery. 
Who should receive the priority? Based on Ram-Tiktin’s theory, Y should receive the 
priority because she is ‘worse off’ compared to X and would receive greater ‘benefit size’ 
from the surgery compared to X.883 Other theorists884 may argue that given Y’s age, X should 
receive the benefit. Ram-Tiktin disputed the idea that an individual’s social contribution 
should be a factor as to whether they receive medical treatment, because if a:885 
just society is obligated to ensure no person has to live a miserable life, then 
all those below the sufficiency threshold are entitled to medical care, 
regardless of their productivity or life plans. 
Similarly, Nussbaum did not indicate that individuals should be assigned lesser worth 
because of minimal societal contribution. Every individual is treated equally in Nussbaum’s 
theory.886  Further, current Queensland Health policy does not expressly state that patients 
should be prioritised based on their societal contribution.  Queensland Health prioritises 
patients into three urgency categories based on the severity of their conditions not on their 
age or their employment status.887 However, if a patient’s condition does not fall within 
national urgency guidelines, then there is unequal treatment of patients based on a number of 
factors, including their employment status, and this may indirectly result in age 
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discrimination. However, given the extensive list of conditions already categorised by 
national guidelines, it is unlikely that a patient’s societal contribution would form part of the 
majority of categorisations. 
However, even with Ram-Tiktin’s theory there may be unintended unequal treatment of 
individuals. For example, assume X’s facts are the same as above, but now Y instead of 
bowel cancer merely needs gall bladder surgery. Who would have priority? The answer is X. 
Why? Because although both are ‘worse off’, the extent of the benefit would be greater for X 
as X has a better chance of living longer.888  However, this situation is an unintentional 
consequence of applying a theory where individuals should receive timely elective surgery 
below the capabilities threshold regardless of their societal contribution. Therefore, the 
theory is still consistent with Nussbaum’s ethos despite this unintended consequence in 
situations where individuals have identical illnesses (or rather loss of capabilities) but 
different ages.   
In summary, prioritisation below the threshold based on the selected non-egalitarian 
sufficiency theory is illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 5: Selected Non-Egalitarian Sufficiency Approach  
 
The above non-egalitarian sufficiency theory neither gives absolute priority to treating the 
worse off patients nor absolute priority to treating patients who will benefit the most from 
elective surgery.  Similarly, Daniels and Sabin, favour a ‘middle range’ so that the ‘sickest 
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patients’ receive ‘some, but not complete priority’.889 Daniels and Sabin provide the 
following experiences from Sweden and Oregon to illustrate why a balance is needed 
between treating the worst off patients with maximising the number of benefits received by 
patients:890  
In the mid 1990s, the Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission (1995) asserted 
that a first principle of distribution should be to help the most vulnerable and 
seriously ill.  Giving such priority to the sickest patients, however often means 
sacrificing the greater health benefits medicine might deliver to less seriously ill 
patients.  Some seriously ill patients may be so ill that they do not respond well to 
treatments….. 
Daniels and Sabin consider ‘giving strict priority to the sickest is unjustifiable when it means 
sacrificing substantially greater benefits for others’.891 However, an absolute utilitarian 
approach which prioritises patients to maximise the benefits received is also problematic.892  
‘When Oregon first began to set priorities among services received by Medicaid patients in 
the beginning of the 1990s’ the state ‘gave no priority to the sickest patients’.893  Daniels and 
Sabin consider this absolute utilitarian strategy to breach the ‘strong moral concern many 
people feel for the most vulnerable’.894  
The selected non-egalitarian sufficiency theory falls within Daniels and Sabin’s preferred 
‘middle range’ for prioritising patients because the theory does not absolutely give ‘priority 
to the sickest patients’.895 In any event, the ‘middle range is what most health care systems 
end up incorporating into their resource allocation decisions’.896  
A discussion of how the selected non-egalitarian sufficiency theory would apply to timely 
elective surgery is discussed below.  
(c) Applying Ram-Tiktin’s Non-Egalitarian Sufficiency Theory to a Right to Timely 
Elective Surgery  
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Ram-Tiktin’s theory was shown to entail that those individuals below the sufficiency 
threshold897 should not receive an absolute right to receive health care, but should be 
prioritised. As established earlier, within the perimeters of resource availability898 the 
government should provide a positive legislative right to health care to those individuals 
below the sufficiency threshold.899 Specifically, there should be a right for individuals 
waiting too long for elective surgery (and for those who have waited too long on the 
outpatient waiting list too) who are: 
• outside their clinically indicated time frame; and 
• have lost ‘basic human functional capabilities’.900 
For those individuals below this ‘basic human functional capabilities’901 threshold – those 
patients should be prioritised in accordance with Ram-Tiktin’s approach. That is, priority 
should be assigned to those patients who are: 
•  ‘worse off’;902 and 
•  to those would receive greater ‘benefit size’903 from the surgery.904   
4 Part B: Summary 
In summary, although a right to timely elective surgery derived from Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach in Part A of this chapter, takes into account limited resources (albeit 
indirectly) by only focusing on those individuals below the capability threshold; this absolute 
below threshold right is unlikely to be sustainable in a resource constrained public health 
system. However, Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficientarianism in Part B of this chapter 
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remedies this problem with a fair system of prioritisation for ordering individuals below the 
threshold while retaining the general ethos of Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. The 
practicalities of how Ram-Tiktin’s prioritisation could be implemented is outside the scope 
of this thesis, however, it is envisaged that existing Queensland policy may be able to form 
the basis of the prioritisation, with modifications. Although Part B has balanced the right to 
timely elective surgery with available resources; has Part B sufficiently curtailed the right 
from the capabilities approach in Part A to balance individualism with community interests? 
Part C assesses this dilemma below.                                         
               
D Part C: The Scope of the Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
1 Selecting a Theory to Assess the Scope of the Right to Timely Elective Surgery 
Part A of this chapter established there is a derived right to timely elective surgery based on 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Part B of this chapter then distilled the nature of that right 
with Ram-Tiktin’s sufficiency theory. The aim of Part C of this chapter is to assess the scope 
of the right to timely elective surgery to determine whether this prima facie individualistic 
right adequately takes into consideration community interests.   
Patients are currently waiting too long for outpatient and elective surgery in Queensland 
public hospitals, as discussed in Chapter 3, and have no right to receive timely surgery – that 
is, the system is swayed significantly towards community interests (ie conservation of 
resources) without sufficient account of individual interests (ie no individual right or 
mechanism to ensure timely surgery). In recalibrating the ratio between communitarianism 
(community interests) and liberalism (individual interests) for timely elective surgery, it is 
important to ensure that the ratio has not been swung too far in reverse.905 Etzioni noted that 
when policies are swayed too far one way it often causes a profound reaction the other 
way.906 To avoid such a reaction,907 a policy would likely be more stable if it balanced 
community and individual interests from the outset, especially as communities and 
parliaments in a democracy inherently balance such interests.908 In the context of timely 
elective surgery, if the right is swayed too far towards liberalism and fails to balance 
communitarianism interests, the right will likely be unstable and therefore susceptible to be 
swung back too far towards its status quo.909  Accordingly, if the right fails to adequately 
                                                
 
905 See generally, Etzioni, above n 58, 243. 
906 Ibid. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Ibid 247. 
909 See generally, ibid. 
 122 Chapter 5 
balance communitarianism and liberalism, it would likely not be a sustainable right, and 
hence implementing the right would be a futile exercise.  
Etzioni’s theory. The theory selected to assess the scope of the right is Amarti Etzioni’s 
responsive communitarian approach. Specifically, the focus of Etzioni’s responsive 
communitarian approach for Part C of this chapter is the balance he seeks between 
communitarianism and liberalism.910 Etzioni’s approach does not treat communitarianism 
and liberalism as opponents, but looks for ways these two interests can optimally work 
together.911 The general ethos of the selected theory is similar to Lawrence Gostin’s health 
approach, even though Gostin did not directly accept responsive communitarianism, he 
nevertheless, in Etzioni’s opinion, ‘builds on new (responsive) communitarian thinking’.912 
However, Etzioni incorporated the balancing of communitarianism and liberalism into a 
theory. This responsive communitarian theory is defined later in this chapter.  
2 Origins of Responsive Communitarianism  
The 1980s in America marked a decade of the individual913 causing the rise of individualism 
to gain too much momentum resulting in the undermining of the community.914 Etzioni said 
individuals are keen to stipulate their entitlements; however, are reluctant to return favours to 
the community.915 For example:916 
A study has shown that young Americans expect to be tried before a jury of 
their peers but are rather reluctant to serve on one. This paradox highlights a 
major aspect of contemporary American civic culture: a strong sense of 
entitlement. 
In the context of health care ‘most Americans (81 percent) considered health care a right 
(versus 16 percent who said it was a privilege)’.917 That is, ‘[u]ntil one asks, as there are no 
free lunches, who will pay for unlimited health care...?’918 Therefore, any right created will 
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involve a corresponding obligation on others.919 According to Etzioni, this ‘reciprocity’ is the 
core of responsive communitarianism’s perception of social justice.920 
Reacting to the imbalance of social justice (that is, the strong swing towards individualism), 
the responsive communitarianism was established921 by Etzioni seeking a focus again on 
individual’s obligations to other members of the community922 and ensuring these 
obligations are balanced with individual rights. That is, the aim of the approach is:923 
for a synthesis that invests rights in both person and society, and views 
individuals and their unition as both commanding primary status. 
Etzioni’s responsive communitarianism is further detailed below, including a discussion of 
the theories Etzioni’s approach seeks to balance, namely liberalism and communitarianism. 
Even though Etzioni’s approach originated in reaction to American politics, the fundamental 
principles of responsive communitarianism balancing communitarianism and liberalism is a 
universal concept and is able to be applied in the Australian context. These fundamental 
principles are explained below.  
3 The fundamental principles of Etzioni’s Responsive Communitarianism Approach 
As discussed above, Etzioni’s aim is to balance the theory of communitarianism and the 
theory of liberalism with a third theory – responsive communitarianism.  However, before 
defining the principles of responsive communitarianism it is firstly necessary to define the 
theories it seeks to balance, namely, communitarianism and liberalism. Although there is a 
spectrum of communitarianism and liberalism theories, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine the various scopes of these theories, except the division between classical and 
contemporary liberalism, as the views are quite different. The broad ethos of the 
communitarianism and liberalism (classical and contemporary) are discussed below.  
(a) Communitarianism 
Firstly, communitarianism ‘is a social philosophy that maintains that societal formulations of 
the good are both needed and legitimate’.924 The focus of communitarianism is the 
community, not individual rights.925 Accordingly, Etzioni’s difficulty with 
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communitarianism is the inclination to assign individual rights lesser worth than the 
community.926 That is, communitarians view community as superior to the individual.   
(b) Liberalism  
Secondly, liberalism is ‘a philosophical position that holds each individual should formulate 
the good’.927 Unlike communitarianism; liberalism’s focus is the individual. Although details 
of particular versions of liberalism will not be discussed, it is important to note that 
liberalism is divided into two main streams – contemporary liberalism and classical 
liberalism. In Etzioni’s view, classical liberalism is not significantly different from 
responsive communitarianism, as this classical view, to some extent, takes community 
interests into consideration.928  However, contemporary liberalism focuses too much on the 
rights of individuals and not sufficiently on the interests of the community.929 Examples of 
contemporary liberals are John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum envisaged every 
individual ‘as an end’,930 similarly, Rawls ‘emphasises the primacy of the individual’.931 
Although the addition of an ‘overlapping consensus’932 in Rawls and Nussbaum’s theories 
somewhat acknowledge community, nevertheless contemporary liberalism continues to omit 
to treat individual and community interests equally.933 Although classical liberalism has a 
greater interest in community than contemporary liberalism, it nevertheless has a primary 
focus on the individual.  
(c) Responsive Communitarianism: Balancing Communitarianism and Liberalism  
Thirdly, Etzioni’s theory of responsive communitarianism aims for a balance between934 the 
two theories above, namely communitarianism and liberalism.   Unlike communitarianism 
and liberalism, responsive communitarianism views individuals and the community 
equally.935 Prior to balancing communitarianism with liberalism, there are two fundamental 
principles to understand: 
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(i) Communitarianism is ‘not a derivate of or dependent’ on liberalism.936  Similarly, 
liberalism is ‘not a derivate of or dependent’ on communitarianism.937  
(ii) Communitarianism and liberalism ‘are joined in a perpetually strained bond’.938 
There are two ‘forces’ within this bond – one force pulls towards 
communitarianism ‘that seek to diminish the rights of individuals in the name of 
collective needs’ (centripetal forces) and the other force pulls towards liberalism 
‘to destroy the community in the name of individual rights’ (centrifugal 
forces).939 
That is, the centripetal force seeks to take individual ‘resources’ (for example, via taxes) for 
the community.940 While the centrifugal force seeks greater focus on the individual941 (for 
example, individual rights).942 Etzioni also referred to centripetal forces and centrifugal 
forces as the ‘concept of I & We’.943 ‘I’ signifying the individual and ‘We’ signifying the 
community.944 There is an inherent conflict between945 centripetal and centrifugal forces. The 
mechanics of these forces is not absolutely ‘zero-sum’946 rather the centripetal force and the 
centrifugal force exist in an ‘inverting symbiosis’ relationship whereby the ‘two forces are 
mutually enhancing up to a point’.947 However, if one of these forces gains too much 
strength, these forces then work antagonistically.948 There is therefore an optimal balance 
mark949 between these forces, where community interest and individual interest are 
significant and the antagonising force is minimised.950 
This point of balance will be different for each society depending on that society’s history 
and culture and will change as time progresses.951 History has proven that societies are 
constantly modifying the forces of communitarianism interests and liberalism interests.952 
Provided individual rights do not acquire supremacy over community interests (or 
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alternatively community interests do not acquire supremacy over individual rights) then 
communitarianism and liberalism will be balanced.953 In the event either communitarianism 
or liberalism acquires supremacy, then efforts must be made to strengthen the weaker force 
to a position of equilibrium with the stronger force.954  
Due to the tense relationship955 between the forces of communitarianism and liberalism, it is 
not surprising that both forces will conflict at times and moving these forces into an 
equilibrium is subjective and fluid in nature; especially as there is objective criteria to 
ascertain the ideal method to apportion society’s resources. According to Etzioni, tension 
between communitarianism and liberalism should not be interpreted as being an impassable 
hurdle.956 Part C(5) below explores how to most effectively reconcile tensions957 between 
individual rights (liberalism) with community interests (communitarianism) to ensure a 
balance between the individual and society is achieved.958 If the right is balanced,959 the right 
is more likely to be a sustainable right.960 
4 Balancing Individual Rights with Community Interests 
Etzioni employs a number of strategies to balance communitarianism with liberalism. These 
strategies have largely been derived from Etzioni’s examination of public health and safety 
issues. When considering introducing a new policy, the following questions need to be 
considered for optimally balancing communitarianism and liberalism: 
(a) Is the situation able to be avoided without a right? 
Circumventing a conflict between communitarianism and liberalism is Etzioni’s preferred 
strategy.961 In the context of heath, avoiding a right may involve rationing other government 
services. Etzioni believes that if rationing is needed in the health sector, then it ‘seems 
unethical to ration resources used to sustain life without first considering curtailing other 
expenditures’ such as ‘non-health items’;962 ‘administrative tasks’; or, ‘unnecessary medical 
procedures’.963  
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Another approach to avoiding a right could be increasing funds to the relevant government 
sector. However, Etzioni cautioned that for the health sector – beyond a point, more 
resources invested in the medical system may defeat the very goal of improved individual 
health.964 Etzioni noted that ‘[u]necessary surgery, in part, appears to be correlated with the 
number of surgeons and hospitals’.965 That is, non-required surgeries pose an unnecessary 
adverse risk to patients, but these surgeries also cause economic loss966 and minimise other 
community services.967 
(b) Is it in the public interest968 to support the right? 
If a right is unable to be avoided, then it needs to be considered whether there is a significant 
public interest969 to support or dismiss the right. Although the following example, provided 
by Etzioni in relation to considering whether it was ‘worth it’970 for the community to 
support the utilisation of prenatal genetic testing (namely, amniocentesis) relates to 
American society in the 1970s, the general principles concerning the public interest test in 
the example are still relevant. Etzioni considered in relation to amniocentesis that:971 
there is... a relevant and far from trivial public interest. The consequences of 
not using amniocentesis are easily calculated’, that is, too many Down 
syndrome ‘children will be born’ with consequential ‘costs to society’ 
including costs of ‘care’. ‘Aside from monies, scarce medical resources are 
used up’.   
Accordingly, Etzioni concluded that it was ‘worth it’972 for the community to support 
amniocentesis for individuals according to the public interest test, otherwise society would 
incur considerable costs. However, it is difficult to envisage how most members of society 
would directly gain from supporting amniocentesis.973 How did Etzioni reconcile this issue? 
Etzioni said that:974 
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[c]ontributions to the common good often offer no immediate payout or 
benefit, making it difficult to predict who will receive such benefits in the 
long run. Yet members of communities that support the common good invest 
in it not because it will necessary or even likely benefit them or their 
children, but because they consider it a good that ought to be nurtured. 
Similarly, the UDHR recognises that, ‘[e]veryone has duties to the community’.975  
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether a policy would provide direct gain to all members of 
society or only to some members, the question that needs to be answered is whether it is in 
the public interest to support the introduction of a policy.  
 (c) Whether there will need to be ‘limited adjustment’976 to the right  
If a right is in the public interest, the next question is whether there will need to be ‘limited 
adjustment’ to the right, that is, the right should not create an unnecessary and costly 
disruption to society.977 Specifically, Etzioni stated there must be a necessity for the right.978 
Otherwise, the community would ‘be run through the wringer, shaken and re-arranged at 
great cost’.979 
In relation to health care, there is a risk of significant financial consequences980 as we may 
be:981 
driven by an irrational question for immortality or silver bullets that we are, 
in effect, paying ever more for meaningless services, for health care that 
extend life without any considerations of its quality. 
This problem of ‘meaningless services’ is akin to Ram-Tiktin’s stance against benefiting 
individuals where the benefit would be trivial, as discussed in Part B of this chapter. To avert 
the provision of ‘meaningless services’, Etzioni said that we should objectively distinguish 
those individuals with ‘lives of no discernible quality’ such as those in a permanent 
vegetative state or providing expensive medical treatment for individuals nearing the 
conclusion of their life from those individuals with lives of poor quality.982 That is, treatment 
should not be given to patients that medical practitioners deem ‘futile and inhumane’.983 
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Similarly, as discussed in Part A of this chapter, Nussbaum did not consider treatment should 
be administered for those in persistent vegetative states or at the end of their life. However, it 
is worth noting that this does not mean that these individuals would not be able to receive 
elective surgery at all, only that there is no right to timely elective surgery.  
Slippery slope. However, once this type of rationing occurs, there is a risk of the ‘slippery 
slope, whereby once we stop giving services to some, we will soon stop giving them to 
elderly but functioning people, the disabled, minorities, and others’.984 Etzioni said to avoid a 
slippery slope of discriminatory health care, we should clearly decipher beneficial treatment 
from non-beneficial treatment985 and similar to Ram-Tiktin, we should ensure treatment is 
given to those patients who are able to benefit from medical treatment.986 
In essence, when a right conflicts with communitarian and liberalism interests, Etzioni looks 
for a middle ground to minimise disruption to the community.987 In terms of health care, this 
would likely mean that instead of having an absolute right that causes unnecessary and costly 
disruption to society, the right may need to be curtailed to a middle ground to mitigate 
consequences of that right on society.988 For example, rather than a right reaching all 
individuals regardless of their ‘ability to benefit from the right’, the right should only apply 
to those who would benefit the most from the right.989  
However, even if there is minimal impact990 to society by introducing a right, measures still 
need to be ‘taken to reduce deleterious off-shoots’ from the right.991 In the context of public 
health, Etzioni provided the following example in relation to a policy for ‘testing and 
contact-tracing’ of individuals with AIDS to ‘protect the public’s health’.992 Etzioni said 
there is a risk that if an individual’s privacy is breached by such testing, this may negatively 
impact upon that individual’s employment and medical insurance.993 To minimise these 
negative effects, Etzioni advised that ‘any introduction of such a program should be 
accompanied by a thorough review of control of access to lists of names of those tested’ 
amongst other measures.994 In terms of health care, introducing a right to a particular sector 
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of health may pose an indirect and unintended risk to other patients in other health sectors 
because of the re-direction of resources towards the sector where the right applies. Or the 
right may indirectly and unintentionally negatively impact upon those individuals who the 
right applies to, for example, patient safety may be compromised by introducing a right that 
requires timely treatment. Accordingly, measures would need to augment the right to 
mitigate these adverse consequences.  
However, if there is still an imbalance between communitarianism and liberalism, then, is 
there a further method of resolving the conflict?  
(d) Will there be a way to legitimise ‘a procedure or institution’995 for resolving 
issues of conflict? 
In the event a balance is unable to be attained between communitarianism and liberalism, 
then the tension may need to be resolved by an unbiased mechanism without prejudice 
towards either communitarianism or liberalism.996  
5 What Does Amitai Etzioni’s Responsive Communitarianism Theory Suggest 
About the Scope of a Right to Timely Elective Surgery? 
(a) Is the right to timely elective surgery able to be avoided? 
Instead of a right to timely elective surgery, preventative measures could work to decrease 
the volume of patients, and hence decrease the waiting time for other patients. However, 
preventative measures are unlikely to avert the need for a right.  For example, Australia has 
taken a proactive strategy in preventing poor health,997  which includes the Federal 
government engaging in ‘preventative measures to improve the health of all Australians’.998 
Further, the Queensland government has a range of preventative campaigns, such as tobacco 
and alcohol campaigns.999  Educating the community to live healthily is not a new 
government initiative.  Despite these measures, many patients are still waiting too long for 
elective surgery. That is, these campaigns have not averted the need for a right to timely 
elective surgery. At best, these measures are only a supportive mechanism and may result in 
decreasing demand for elective surgery.1000 However, prevention campaigns have 
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limitations, because health ‘requires a two-pronged approach: prevention and treatment’.1001 
There are numerous elective surgery procedures that are not preventable, for example, 
removal of a cancerous brain tumour or surgery for scoliosis are unlikely to be preventable 
conditions – educating these patients will not prevent their need for surgery. Therefore, 
although averting a right would be Etzioni’s preferred option, it does not appear to be a 
viable option in the context of timely elective surgery. 
In terms of another approach to avoid a right to timely elective surgery, there seem to be two 
options in this regard. Firstly, unnecessary government services could be rationed and/or 
secondly, more funding could be directed towards elective surgery.  However, these 
alternative approaches have already been utilised by the government.  During 2012-13, 
thousands of Queensland government jobs, including some Queensland Health jobs, were cut 
by the government.1002 On the other hand, direct funding for elective surgery increased with 
the introduction of NEST, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Despite the cost cutting 
for jobs that the government assessed as unnecessary, and despite the increased resources 
provided for elective surgery – these measures have not resolved the elective surgery waiting 
dilemma.  Although merely because a more efficient use of resources and increased resource 
allocation has not solved the elective surgery problem to date, this may not mean that such 
strategies cannot be effective.1003 However, an enforceable right to timely elective surgery 
may be effective in requiring the health system to implement and sustain efficiencies; and 
since health system efficiency and allocation of resources to date has not resolved the 
elective surgery dilemma, this supports the need for a creation of a right.  
 
(b) Is it in the public interest to support a right to timely elective surgery?  
As a right is likely unable to be avoided in achieving timely elective surgery, the right must 
now be assessed with mechanisms to ensure a balanced communitarian/liberalism will be 
achieved. The first question that needs to be resolved in assessing the 
communitarian/liberalism balance is whether it is in the public interest to implement the 
right. In assessing whether a right to timely elective surgery is in the public interest, it 
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necessary to determine the strength of the benefits of the right to individuals, then ultimately, 
society. However, the benefits of the right to society cannot be assessed without firstly 
understanding the consequences to individuals and society if the right is not implemented 
(that is, the consequences of the status quo). The key consequence of waiting too long for 
elective surgery is the likelihood of individuals experiencing poor health. The following 
chapter details the qualitative findings of the consequences of such poor health for 
individuals waiting too long for surgery; however, in the meantime, a brief overview of the 
consequences of individuals waiting too long is detailed as follows. That is, individuals may 
experience unemployment or decreased employment productivity, ongoing physical pain or 
increasing physical pain, an impaired psychological state, or even the indirect consequence 
of medication dependence, social impairment, and risk of death or permanent harm. 
The above consequences of waiting too long for individuals do not occur in a vacuum, these 
individual consequences also impact upon society.1004 The societal cost of individuals not 
receiving timely elective surgery may include decreased economic productivity, including 
loss of society’s resources towards payment of unemployment benefits;1005 unnecessary 
medical, psychological care and pharmaceutical costs;1006 negative social effects on family 
units;1007and risk of long-term ongoing medical care, and other loss of resources if harm 
results from delayed surgery.1008 Further, as previously detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, a 
health system yielding poor outcomes for patients creates a level of public mistrust that 
inhibits the system from increasing its resources1009 from the public, which will have a 
negative effect on the health system in the longer term.1010   
However, if a right to timely elective selective surgery was implemented, individuals, and 
therefore society, should be able to avoid, or at least experience less of the adverse 
consequences listed above. The core benefit individuals would receive from a right would be 
the ability to choose to attain a level of health in a timely manner to enable their life to be 
lived in a worthwhile manner,1011 that is, to allow those individuals to ‘exercise positive 
freedom in society’,1012 for example, being sufficiently healthy to participate in employment, 
and hence, productively contribute to the economy. In accordance with Nussbaum’s 
reasoning, the consequence of not having a capability of health is tantamount to failing to 
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respect individuals’ human dignity from a libertarianism viewpoint.1013 Even though the 
communitarian approach also generally acknowledges the value of having human dignity,1014 
this is not sufficient to ensure a balance has been achieved between communitarianism and 
liberalism. It must be established that the right to timely elective surgery is not considered a 
mere frivolous public interest.1015 The selected right to timely elective surgery is not 
frivolous to the public interest because:  
• the right is prioritised to those ‘worse off’ and according to the ‘size of the 
benefit’ from the right.1016 That is, the right would be directed in priority to those 
most likely significantly straining society’s resources (ie because they are the 
individuals whose health capability is significantly impacted from waiting too 
long) and also have the greatest ability to be responsive to attaining the threshold 
capability of health to ‘exercise positive freedom in society’.1017  
• the right would not apply to those individuals who would only receive a trivial 
benefit from the right (for example, those in a permanent vegetative state),1018 
therefore, the right would not utilise limited resources for a negligible societal 
benefit. Of course, to minimise the risk of a slippery slope there would need to be 
‘clear lines of demarcation’, as discussed earlier.1019  
• the number of individuals waiting outside the clinically recommended time frame 
for elective surgery in Queensland is not insignificant. For example, for the 
month of October 2015, there were 296 individuals ‘ready for surgery’ but 
waiting outside the time frame1020 (albeit, the right would only apply to those at or 
below the capability threshold).  
• the right reflects a just society that recognises the community benefit of equitable 
access, that is individuals having access to reasonable medical treatment even if 
they do not have the funds to pay for the surgery privately. This public good is 
reflected in society’s commitment to a public health system. 
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• the right would promote government accountability and transparency for those 
individuals affected by waiting in excess of clinically indicated time frames.  
Although it appears a right to timely elective surgery would be in the public’s interest to 
support, there are a considerable portion of individuals who are not reliant on the public 
health system, for example, many individuals who elect to receive private hospital 
treatment.1021 How will a right be of public interest for these individuals who receive no 
direct benefit from the right? As discussed earlier, Etzioni said, ‘[c]ontributions to the 
common good often offer no immediate payout or benefit’.1022 Provided the right equates to a 
‘good that ought to be nurtured’ it is irrelevant that not every individual will directly benefit 
from the right.1023 Given the non-trivial economic and social benefits of the right to the 
community, the number of individuals waiting outside their clinically indicated time frame, 
and the ability of the right to restore human dignity to those individuals, it appears likely 
society would consider a right to timely elective surgery to be a right in the public interest.   
(c) Will there be limited adjustment to a right to timely elective surgery?  
Although a right to timely elective surgery would likely fall within the public interest, 
whether there will be limited adjustment to the right needs to be assessed.  As detailed 
previously, Etzioni considered that a right should not cause an unnecessary disruption or cost 
to society.1024 That is, the right should not needlessly impact upon communitarian interests. 
Given the right to timely elective surgery merely reflects the goal of current Queensland 
Health policy1025 and the National Elective Surgery Targets1026 (as detailed in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis) namely, that patients be treated within their clinically indicated time frames (and 
is in fact less stringent than the current policies because of the minimal capability threshold 
in Part A and prioritisation formula in Part B of this chapter), it is difficult to foresee that the 
introduction of a right would cause society to be ‘run through the wringer’.1027  Also, there is 
‘a real, readily verifiable, sizable social problem or need’ for the right as detailed in the 
                                                
 
1021 ‘In 2011-12 there were 9.7 million adult Australians with private health insurance (57.1% of all 
people 18 years and over)... Of all people with private health insurance, most (79.1%) had both 
hospital and ancillary cover, while 12.3% had hospital cover only’: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Australian Health Survey: Health Service Usage and Health Related Actions 2011-12 - Private Health 
Insurance (26 March 2013) Australian Bureau of Statistics 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/E334D0A98272E4DCCA257B39000F2DCF?ope
ndocument>. 
1022 Etzioni, above n 956, 114. 
1023 Ibid. 
1024Etzioni, above n 977, 44. 
1025 Queensland Health, Elective Surgery Services, above n 398; Queensland Health, Elective Surgery 
Service Implementation Standard, above n 16. 
1026 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20. 
1027 Etzioni, above n 977, 44. 
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section above.1028 Further, the cost of the right would be contained because of the ‘minimal 
intrusion’ of the right to society. That is, the scope of the right is curtailed by the following 
perimeters:  
• the threshold to be eligible for the right is not absolute for everyone waiting 
outside their clinically indicated time frame for elective surgery, that is, 
individuals must be below the capability threshold before the right will apply. 
• even if an individual is below the capability threshold, the individual will not 
necessarily receive their elective surgery as a first priority above all others. The 
individual would be prioritised in accordance to the extent they are below the 
capability threshold and their ability to benefit from the surgery. 
Further, the right is not seeking insatiable entitlements, that is, the right distinguishes 
between those individuals with inadequate quality of life from those with absence of any real 
quality.1029 Specifically, the right does not apply to those individuals in a permanent 
vegetative state or similar. However, this does not mean that these individuals would not be 
able to receive elective surgery at all, only that there is no right of priority, as discussed 
earlier. Previously, the concern of Etzioni was that a slippery slope may emerge once a right 
starts excluding some members of society. Part B of this chapter illustrated how the right to 
timely elective surgery does not seek to intentionally discriminate between individuals 
waiting for elective surgery, for example, the elderly and the young are prioritised with the 
same objective criteria. Further there is only one capability threshold for every individual, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, as Nussbaum warned that more than one threshold is 
essentially risky as it provides a potential escape from meeting the set level.1030 Accordingly, 
terms such as capability would need to be appropriately defined so as not to enable such 
slippage.  
Finally, Etzioni, in considering whether the right requires limited adjustment, assessed 
whether the right would result in any ‘deleterious offshoots’.1031 Potential indirect 
repercussions from a right to timely elective surgery may include:  
• Re-direction of resources from other hospital departments to elective surgery. For 
example, there may be less focus on the outpatient waiting list. As discussed 
previously, the outpatient wait is the pre-curser to the elective surgery waiting 
                                                
 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Etzioni, above n 962, 92. 
1030 Nussbaum, above n 644, 190. 
1031 Etzioni, above n 977, 47. 
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list.1032 If the outpatient list is delayed to fund the elective surgery list, then the 
effectiveness of the right will be limited because the elective surgery wait is 
dependent on the outpatient wait. If fewer patients are able to be placed on the 
elective list because of the outpatient wait, then the true value of the right will be 
suppressed.  Alternatively, there is a risk the outpatient list may be intentionally 
further delayed to meet the elective surgery right. That is, outpatients may be held 
at bay to contain the number of patients waiting for elective surgery, and in turn, 
the number the patients entitled to enforce a right to timely surgery will be 
minimal.1033 As discussed in Part B of this chapter, perhaps a holistic right 
extending to the outpatient list or an additional right to timely outpatient waiting 
would avert this problem.  
• A risk to patient safety as a result of medical practitioners undertaking more 
and/or quicker surgeries to meet the clinically recommended time frames so as to 
avoid patients enforcing a right to timely elective surgery.1034 However, as there 
hasn’t been any significant increase to patient safety statistics as a result of 
elective surgery performance targets as measured from April 2012 and March 
2015,1035 it therefore seems that the introduction of a right would not cause a real 
risk to patient safety.  Nevertheless, patient safety would need to be monitored if 
the right was introduced.  
• Patients with less significant loss of the capability of health may continuously be 
ignored for existing and new patients with greater loss of capability. This may 
equate to these patients waiting indefinitely outside their time frame for those 
higher priority patients. Obviously, this is not an ideal situation, because even 
though these patients with less severe loss of capabilities should be prioritised 
below those with greater loss of capabilities, if these patients wait indefinitely 
they may risk an unnecessary deterioration in their health, and consequently 
cause additional cost to society. In relation to patients waiting too long because 
their capability is only minimally impaired, which may result in a possible 
indefinite wait, for these patients it may be necessary to have a policy to ensure 
these long wait patients are not permanently lost in the system, similar to 
                                                
 
1032 Council of Australian Governments, above n 4, 35. 
1033 See generally, Norcere, above n 327, 222. 
1034 See generally, ibid 222, 224; Geoffrey Davies, Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of 
Inquiry Report (2005) Health Quality and Complaints Commission, 1 
<http://www.hqcc.qld.gov.au/About-Us/Documents/Report%20-
%20Queensland%20Public%20Hospitals%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%20-%20Davies%20-
%20November%202005.pdf>. 
1035 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Cth), above n 23, 48, 49.  
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Queensland Health’s treat in turn policy, albeit the percentage of ‘treat-in-turn’ 
patients would likely need to be less than the current minimum 60% target.1036  
Given the possible adverse consequences1037 from the right to timely elective surgery upon 
individuals and consequently society, it is important that measures are implemented to 
mitigate, or preferably, avoid the above risks. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to envisage that 
appropriate measures should be able to be implemented given somewhat similar measures 
were implemented with the introduction of the NEST program, which also involved 
providing timely elective surgery, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.1038  
 
(d) Will there be a way to resolve issues of conflict? 
Finally, it is possible the right to timely elective surgery may encounter disputes between 
communitarianism and liberalism interests, despite the above attempts to balance these 
interests, especially when resources may be too limited to adhere with individuals’ rights to 
timely surgery. Namely, individuals entitled to a right to timely elective surgery may be 
unfairly denied the right or their level of prioritisation for receiving the surgery may be 
deemed less urgent than required. Then a ‘procedure or institution’ considered ‘legitimate’ 
should be engaged to resolve the dilemma.1039 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
determine the most appropriate mechanism to resolve these issues. However, the study’s 
qualitative findings detailed in the following chapter indicate the support of participants for 
an impartial expert tribunal for implementing a right. An expert tribunal would be able to 
take into account a patient’s need for surgery, but also resourcing choices so that societal 
interests are fairly protected.1040    
6 Part C: Summary 
In summary, the scope of the right to timely elective surgery adequately balances 
communitarian and liberalism interests in accordance with Etzioni’s theory.  Although 
circumventing the need to balance these interests by avoiding the right would be the 
preferred option;1041 in view of the numerous government attempts to solve the waiting list 
dilemma and considering that the dilemma has yet to be solved, such alternative approaches 
                                                
 
1036 Queensland Health, above n 12, 13. 
1037 Etzioni, above n 977, 47. 
1038 See generally, Council of Australian Governments, National Health and Hospitals Network 
Agreement (20 April 2010). 
1039 Etzioni, above n 956, 118. 
1040 Eleftheriadis, above n 536, 283. 
1041 See generally, Etzioni, above n 956, 116. 
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do not appear to be the answer.1042 As a right is unable to be avoided, this right (a liberalism 
interest) is prima facie in conflict with society (a communitarian interest). However, the 
conflict is balanced because: 
• the right is in the public interest. The right would have non-trivial economic and 
social benefits for individuals and society, and is directed to those who are worse 
off and have the potential to benefit the most.1043 In essence, the right focuses on 
those who are more likely not contributing to society and also are more likely to 
have the greatest chance of being able to positively contribute society; and 
• the right requires minimal adjustment.1044 The right should not create an 
unnecessary burden on society, as the right only applies to those who have fallen 
below Nussbaum’s capabilities threshold. There should not be a risk of insatiable 
entitlements occurring, because according to Ram-Tiktin, the right would only 
apply to non-trivial benefits. Although there are unintended negative effects that 
may result if a right is implemented, such as a risk to patient safety, these risks 
should be able to be managed through supporting policies, similar to the 
supportive accountability and transparency measures introduced with the NEST 
program.  
Also, provided there is a mechanism (such as an expert tribunal) to resolve any conflicts 
arising with the right, the scope of the right should be balanced in accordance with Etzioni’s 
theory.1045 Of course, this balance point may not stagnant; it may need to be adjusted over 
time to take into account changing community views.1046 This current balance point has been 
set in view of today’s society – a society that supports both public and private health. 
E Conclusion 
In conclusion, Part A of this chapter distilled that there is a right to timely elective surgery 
based on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. However, this is an absolute right for all those 
who have fallen below the capabilities threshold. In a society limited by resources, this 
legislative type right is unlikely sustainable. In Part B of this chapter, Ram-Tiktin’s approach 
curtailed the nature of the right to elective surgery so that those below the capabilities 
                                                
 
1042 See, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 997; Ironside, above n 1002; Australian 
Medical Association (Qld), above n 1002; Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, 
National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 
2012, above n 23, 19; Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership 
Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above n 23, 18, 19. 
1043 See generally, Hurst and Siciliani, above n 40, annexure 1. 
1044Etzioni, above n 977, 44. 
1045 Etzioni, above n 956, 118. 
1046 Etzioni, above n 58, 246. 
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threshold are fairly prioritised in a resource limited society. Finally, using Etzioni’s 
distributive approach, Part C of this chapter assessed whether the two distributive theories 
utilised in Part A and B sufficiently balanced community and individual interests. Based on 
Etzioni’s approach it was concluded that there is a sufficient balance between community 
interests and individual interests, and hence the right should likely be a sustainable right in 
our society.   
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Chapter 6 
VI QUALITATIVE STUDY OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS   
A Introduction 
The previous chapters explored the normative questions of whether there is or should be a 
right to timely elective surgery. The normative arguments appear to support a right to timely 
elective surgery. Prior to the normative discussion in Chapter 5, Chapter 3 explored whether 
there is a need for timely elective surgery based on the current health system structure and 
waiting list statistics. According to the statistical data explored in Chapter 3, it appears 
apparent that there is a need for timely elective surgery. That is, Chapter 3 supports a need 
for timely elective surgery and Chapter 5 supports a right to timely elective surgery. 
Although there appears to be a need for timely elective surgery and there are arguments to 
support the development of a right to timely elective surgery, this chapter explores research 
question 6, that is, as primary carers for patients requiring elective surgery and as one of the 
Queensland Health nominated avenues of complaints for patients waiting for elective 
surgery, what insights can be obtained from seeking the views of general practitioners about: 
(i) The need (from their own practical experience) for the provision of timely access 
to elective surgery. Although the GPs’ interviews involved discussion about their 
patients’ experiences, these views were not directly obtained from patients, as 
previously discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis; 
(ii) Whether there should be (from a normative perspective) an enforceable right to 
timely elective surgery; 
(iii) The scope of an enforceable right to timely elective surgery. 
As discussed in Part A below, the majority of GPs interviewed in the study supported a need 
for timely elective surgery for less urgent elective surgery categories. This is consistent with 
the recent elective surgery waiting time statistics for 2014-15, detailing that the average 
number of days patients were waiting outside of their clinically indicated elective surgery 
time frames for the less urgent categories were 47.3 days for category 2 and 33.7 days for 
category 3; however, the patients in the most urgent category, that is, category 1 were still 
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waiting 9.3 days outside their time frame.1047 Nevertheless, the literature indicates that time 
waiting in excess of the clinically indicted time frame for the less urgent categories of 2 and 
3 was considerably longer than category 1. In addition to these waiting times, patients must 
first wait on the outpatient waiting list, which may also involve a lengthy wait. However, the 
majority of those interviewed expressed hesitation about an enforceable right to timely 
elective surgery based on practical difficulties associated with such a right. The GPs’ views, 
set out in Part B below, suggest there may be a number of practical difficulties in creating an 
enforceable right to timely elective surgery, predominately including resource constraints. 
However, practical difficulties identified by GPs in this study may be able to be mitigated, at 
least in part, by the normative reasoning provided in Chapter 5 and will be further reconciled 
in the following chapter.   
Chapter 7 explores whether Queensland should have a legislative regime with enforceable 
rights to timely elective surgery. This involves assessing how a right to timely elective 
surgery would be implemented in Queensland. From a practical perspective, the views of 
GPs who participated in this research also inform this theoretical discussion, as explored in 
Part C below. Akin to the practical issues GPs identified with a right to timely elective 
surgery, there are also hurdles with alternative strategies (such as a wait time guarantee) for a 
right that may be utilised to improve elective surgery waiting times, as discussed in Part D 
below. However, assuming there should be a right to timely elective surgery, then the 
selected implementation strategy discussed in Chapter 7, namely an expert tribunal, gained 
significant support from those GPs interviewed in this research.   
Before assessing the empirical findings against the theoretical arguments in Chapter 7, it is 
necessary to firstly discuss the qualitative data. Part A, B, C and D below discuss these 
qualitative findings. As previously noted in Chapter 2, the views of participating GPs were 
collected using semi-structured interviews and a ranking question. A total of ten GPs 
participated in the interviews. As detailed earlier, these interviews continued beyond the 
minimum threshold of saturation. The interview questions were informed from the research 
questions and findings from the earlier chapters of the thesis. For example, since Chapter 3 
of the thesis concluded that there is an absence of a legal right to timely elective surgery, it 
was important to explore with the GPs interviewed the effectiveness of other compliant 
mechanisms available to patients.  Also, in view of the findings from Chapter 4 that a non-
absolute right appeared to be the most appropriate right for timely elective surgery, it was 
necessary to explore with the GPs interviewed their views concerning a limited type right for 
patients. The perspectives obtained from the GPs augment the discussions in Chapters 3, 4 
                                                
 
1047 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 44. 
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and 5 to establish in Chapter 7 whether Queensland should have a legislative regime with 
enforceable rights to timely elective surgery, including the scope of such a right and how it 
might be implemented. The qualitative findings are discussed in Part A, B, C and D below. 
Part A explores whether there is a perceived need for timely elective surgery; Part B explores 
whether there should there be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery; Part C explores 
how a right to timely elective surgery would be implemented; and Part D explores the 
scenario where if there is not an enforceable right, then what were the GPs’ views about the 
respective strengths of the alternative strategies for ensuring patients receive timely elective 
surgery. 
1 Part A 
(a) Is there a perceived need for timely elective surgery? 
Part A explores whether there is a need for timely elective surgery. That is, this part 
establishes GPs’ feelings towards the waiting time of their patients on the elective surgery 
list, including the strategies available to effectively manage wait times.  
(b) Part A Themes 
In considering whether there is a need for timely elective surgery, there were six major 
themes identified from the data. The first theme from the data related to GPs’ feelings about 
patients waiting too long for elective surgery. The second theme related to the factors 
contributing to the variability of patients’ waiting times. The third theme related to the 
consequences suffered by patients waiting too long for surgery. The fourth theme related to 
the variable and ad hoc nature of GPs’ strategies for managing patients on an elective 
surgery waiting list. The fifth theme related to the limited effectiveness of patients’ strategies 
for managing their elective waiting time. The sixth theme related to the limited government 
strategies available for managing patients on an elective surgery waiting list. 
The above themes for Part A, whether there is a right to timely elective surgery, are 
discussed below.  
(c) GPs’ perceptions about whether patients wait too long for elective surgery  
GPs’ perceptions about the waiting times of patients within a public health system, 
including the level of predictability of these waiting times, are discussed below. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, waiting times of patients are divided 
into three urgency categories namely: 
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• ‘Category 1: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 30 days’1048 
• ‘Category 2: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 90 days’1049 
• ‘Category 3: Procedures that are clinically indicated within 365 days’1050 
(i) Elective surgery patients are waiting too long for less urgent elective surgery categories: 
‘What is not life-threatening is what takes ages to get in’ 
Although the perceptions of GPs interviewed in this research about the waiting list varied, 
the common denominator of all the participants was that the GPs were not satisfied with all 
their patients’ waiting times. Across the spectrum of responses, GP1 conveyed the strongest 
negative feelings about the waiting times. GP1 said ‘I don’t feel happy’ and found:  
it is really frustrating when you’ve got people who can’t afford the level of 
cover, that can’t afford private cover, and you know that they need an 
operation fairly quickly and that they’ll be waiting ages. 
However, GP1’s view was a minority opinion, the other participants limited their concerns 
towards the less urgent elective surgical categories. This is consistent with the literature, as 
on average patients are waiting the following time frames longer than their clinically 
indicated time frames – 9.3 days for category 1, 47.3 days for category 2, and 33.7 days for 
category 3.1051 It is therefore not surprising that the majority of GPs concerns related to the 
less urgent categories.  
GP2 said a patient would receive timely surgery if that patient had a ‘strong case’. In GP2’s 
experience, patients waiting too long for surgery were ‘[m]inimal, very minimal’. However, 
considering that most of GP2’s patients fell within category two and not the least urgent 
category of category three, it is therefore not surprising that GP2 had a minimal number of 
patients waiting too long. GP3 considered that ‘category 1, 2 or 3 are seen and dealt with 
fairly urgently’ but very non-urgent categories (such as ‘gall stones’ or ‘hernia repairs’) 
‘they’re always kept on, going a step backwards’. Interestingly, GP3 indicated hospitals may 
not even categorise very non urgent categories due to the long wait. However, GP3 didn’t 
feel ‘too much frustration in terms of waiting time’ even though only ‘sixty to seventy 
percent of the times’ the waiting length ‘works out well’ and for a patient with ‘a non-urgent 
condition, it could be way, way more than a year’ of waiting. The GP seemed to reconcile 
this by accepting that ‘those who do not need urgent surgery’ would be ‘happy to wait’ and 
‘some of them don’t mind paying’ if they consider ‘they need something done’. Of course, 
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Queensland Health’s policy stipulates that persons with non-urgent conditions should receive 
their surgery within one year or less.1052 Therefore, a patient waiting greater than a year for a 
non-urgent condition is waiting outside the time frame. Similar to GP3, GP4 said ‘it depends 
upon the diagnosis and the general condition of the patient’ for conditions that are ‘not life 
threatening... they will be longer’ but a patient who is ‘acutely sick or needs urgent 
treatment, then seen very well, very quickly’. But even GP4’s category 2 patients were 
waiting ‘three to four months or more’. That is, GP4’s patients may be waiting a month or 
more over the category 2 stipulated time frame of three months. GP5 also generally felt 
‘there’s a bit of a long wait there’ but for category 1 the hospitals ‘usually see them’ and also 
said, ‘we feel happy’ if the patient was assigned a category 2. However, ‘category 2 patients 
have to be waiting at least three to four months’; that is, patients are waiting in excess of the 
stipulated time frame of three months. GP6 said ‘If you’re really sick it’s alright, it’s just the 
in between stuff’, ‘things that can usually wait’. Similarly, GP8 said ‘category three is too 
long, sometimes extending into years’ and ‘sometimes they get forgotten in the system’ 
whereas, ‘category one is urgent so they are seen on a priority’. GP9 also believed category 3 
takes a ‘long time’ while category 1 patients are seen on time, and category 2 may take 
longer than the stipulated time frame. That is, according to GP9, ‘what is not life-threatening 
is what takes ages to get in’. GP9 explained the waiting times to patients as follows:  
Category one is cancer within a month, category 2 could be a few months, 
category three I tell them give up hope, [be]cause that really doesn’t come 
through for a long time. 
GP10 also indicated long waiting times for category 3 patients. GP10 said orthopaedic 
procedures, that is category 3 surgeries, take ‘at least a year or may more’.  
(ii) The elective surgery waiting list is dependent on the outpatient waiting list 
As described by GP1, the outpatient list and elective list are ‘intrinsically linked’ - the 
‘process of getting to elective surgery is getting through the outpatients’. GP1 thought 
‘probably the elective is worst’ rather than the outpatients’ waiting times and GP2 
considered the ‘outpatients to be better’ because it’s a quick procedure, that is, it is a medical 
appointment not a surgical operation. GP6 thought the elective was worse because: 
Things get cancelled because they get emergencies so somebody’s been on 
the list for six months and then they’re off again and then you have to start 
all over again. 
                                                
 
1052 Queensland Health, above n 12, 7. 
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Conversely three GPs considered the outpatient waiting list to be worse than the elective 
waiting list. GP3 viewed the outpatient list as ‘a bit frustrating’ and said: 
it’s difficult to comment on the way some patients are seen fairly quickly, 
some are not seen for a while, and they are put on the waiting list and again 
if they’re not to be seen for up to twelve months, they don’t want to keep 
them on the waiting list for a duty of care, so it gets a bit annoying there. 
GP3 argued that the outpatient list was worse because ‘there are more patients being referred 
to the outpatient’. GP9 had a similar experience and said it’s the outpatient appointment that 
‘these guys are really, really struggling with’, the wait is ‘really long’ and thought the wait 
‘isn’t that bad a story’ for the elective list because the specialist is ‘responsible’ after they 
have examined the patient. GP10 also said that the ‘waiting times are much more when it 
comes to the outpatient list’, ‘then from there it’s not a major delay’. 
Conversely, GP5 said the wait on the outpatient list was ‘similar’ to the elective list. GP8 
also said the outpatient and elective lists were ‘actually the same’. The mixture of responses 
may be attributable to the ad hoc nature of the outpatient waiting list and the low level of 
predictability of a patient’s wait on the outpatient list. Accordingly, not only is the elective 
surgery waiting list dependent on a number of ad hoc factors, it is also dependent on the 
variable nature of the early component of the waiting journey – the outpatient list. 
The literature indicates that the outpatient waiting list is worse than the elective surgery 
waiting list. As of January 2016, 406 patients had been ‘waiting longer than clinically 
recommended’ for elective surgery.1053 Whereas, during 2015, ‘100,000 people were waiting 
longer than clinically recommended for specialist outpatient appointments’ and as of October 
2015, that was ‘down to 82,000’.1054 Interestingly, Queensland Health does not publish 
monthly updates (unlike the elective surgery waiting list) for the number of patients waiting 
outside their clinically indicated time frame for outpatients – the length of this waiting list is 
somewhat concealed.1055   
(iii) Waiting too long for elective surgery is part of a publically funded health system: ‘we’re 
probably not going to have a perfect system’ 
                                                
 
1053 Queensland Health, Elective Surgery: Queensland Reporting Hospitals (January 2016) 
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Despite the general consensus amongst those interviewed that patients are not receiving 
timely elective surgery across all categories, there was nevertheless an acceptance by five 
GPs that waiting times are part of a public system and therefore there will inevitably be some 
patients not receiving timely surgery. GP1 acknowledged that ‘there are funding restrictions’ 
and ‘we’re probably not going to have a perfect system’ and GP2 understood that with 
waiting times ‘we don’t live in an ideal world’. GP10 said, ‘I have worked at the public 
hospital before, so I know what the constraints are’. While GP3 seemed to find it acceptable 
that patients waiting in less urgent categories may need to fund their own treatment outside 
the public system. GP6 said, ‘I don’t feel too bad’ about the waiting times ‘it’s tax payer’s 
money, they can’t be seen tomorrow’ and in any event, ‘privately they have long waits’ too. 
These GPs’ perceptions substantiate the inherent tension between patients and the resource 
constraints of a publically funded health system. As discussed in Chapter 5, it is generally 
accepted that health systems (including Queensland’s public hospital system) are subject to 
resource limitations.1056  
(iv) The length of a patient’s waiting time is not predicable: ‘You have to be God.  It is 
difficult, it is very difficult’ to predict  
However, for patients unable to afford private surgical treatment, those patients, according to 
four of the participants interviewed, are not informed of the length of their waiting time. That 
is, there appears to be a lack of transparency about the waiting times, and therefore 
difficulties predicting patients’ waiting times. This is consistent with the fact there is an 
absence of any policy requiring that waiting times be transparent. GP5 said in relation to the 
transparency of the waiting list, ‘I don’t think it’s transparent at all’. GP6 repeated GP5’s 
sentiment saying ‘I don’t think it’s transparent at all’ and similarly, GP9 said, the waiting list 
is ‘[n]ot transparent at all’. According to GP3, because GPs are ‘not made aware’ of any 
changes to the waiting list and the patients also are ‘unaware’, therefore the patient and the 
GP are ‘in the same boat’. Conversely, GP8 considered the waiting list to be ‘very 
transparent’.  But it appeared GP8’s comment applied only in the situation where patients 
call the hospital, the waiting list is not generally transparent to the GP. Accordingly, GP8 
requests ‘patients to call the hospital after certain weeks’. Considering the delivery of 
elective surgery involves the allocation of public funds and because it is poor patient care not 
to communicate with patients about the duration of their wait – there may therefore be a need 
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to improve the transparency of the elective surgery waiting list duration for patients, 
especially as:1057 
[e]ffective communication about surgical procedures, and processes for 
appointments, waiting lists, admission and discharge, can reduce anxiety and 
better prepare patients for hospitalisation and rehabilitation.  
Given a general lack of transparency of the waiting list, it is not surprising five of the GPs 
indicated they struggle with predicting their patients’ waiting time. In fact, GP1 indicated 
that trying to predict a patient’s waiting time results in feelings of ‘some discomfort’ and 
‘some anxiety’. Similarly, GP4 indicated that predicting the waiting time of patients caused 
the GP to feel ‘[n]ot very comfortable’. While GP3 ‘would prefer not to’ predict the waiting 
times of patients, GP9 told category 3 patients to ‘give up hope’. GP10 declared, ‘You have 
to be God. It is difficult, it is very difficult’. GP6 confirmed this majority view by 
summarising the unpredictable nature of the elective surgery waiting list:  
The elective surgery waiting list always seems variable and sometimes 
people get in more quickly than you expected and other times it seems to 
take an enormously long time, and there doesn’t seem to be a clear pattern in 
relation to that. 
It is therefore not surprising that given the non-transparent nature of the waiting lists and the 
uncertainty predicting patients’ waiting times, that there was a mixture of responses from 
GPs as to whether the waiting list was nevertheless improving.  Three GPs, namely, GP6, 
GP7 and GP9, considered the waiting times to be improving. GP6 believed that there were 
‘more attempts in the last decade to shorten waiting lists’. GP7 said the ‘last three years, 
things have improved a lot’ but believed ‘more can be done’ towards the waiting times of 
patients. GP9 said ‘some people used to get lost’ in the system ‘which is not happening so 
much now’. Conversely, two GPs, including GP5, thought the waiting times were ‘not 
getting better’. Similarly, GP8 believed ‘we’ve got even longer waiting periods’ as a result 
of ‘thousands of employees from Queensland Health’ being ‘shown the door’. However, 
GP1 viewed the waiting lists as changeable by saying ‘it really does vary from year to year’. 
Although GP8 considered the waiting time to be improving, the GP did concede that the 
‘waiting list always seems variable’.  
                                                
 
1057Victoria Government, Patient-Centred Surgery: Strategic Directions for Surgical Services in 
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According to statistics, the waiting times have improved, that is, in 2013, 93.7% of patients 
were treated within their clinically indicated time frame, and this improved to 97.8% in 
2014-15; in 2013, 77% of patients were treated within their clinically indicated time frame, 
and this improved to 93.9% in 2014-15; and in 2013, 87.1% of patients were treated within 
their clinically indicated time frame and this improved to 97.4% in 2014-15.1058 In terms of 
the variability, it is possible that the relatively recent introduction of national urgency 
guidelines may ‘enhance the overall elective surgery waiting list management’,1059 and hence 
decrease the level of waiting time variably indicated by some GPs.  
(v) Theme One: Summary  
In summary, the majority of participants’ satisfaction with the waiting list seems to be 
directed towards more urgent conditions. The literature, as discussed, substantiates that the 
number of days patients are waiting longer than their clinically indicated time frame is less 
for category 1 patients than category 2 and 3 patients.1060  However, patients categorised with 
less urgent conditions still require surgery, these patients may experience pain, discomfort 
and social consequences if they wait too long, as discussed later in this chapter. GPs that 
were interviewed also perceived a general lack of transparency of the waiting times for 
patients and difficulties predicting patients’ length of time waiting for surgery. This is not 
surprising, considering there is no policy requiring the waiting list to be transparent. In terms 
of improvements in the elective surgery waiting times, responses from the GPs interviewed 
were mixed. However, as discussed, statistics indicate a general improvement in the elective 
surgery waiting times of patients1061 and the outpatient list; however, the wait for the 
outpatient list is still significant.1062 Also, GPs expressed concern predicting a patient’s wait 
time, because there are numerous ad hoc factors influencing a patient’s waiting time. These 
variables are discussed below.   
(d) The factors contributing to the variability of patients’ waiting times 
A range of factors were identified by the participants that may affect patients’ length of time 
waiting for elective surgery. The variables include the severity of patients’ conditions, as 
discussed above; the patient’s location; the surgical speciality; the hospital; the current 
bureaucracy; the patient’s GP and the outpatient list.   Considering the extent of the variables 
                                                
 
1058 Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above n 23, 18; Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 44. 
1059 Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council, above n 12, 5. 
1060 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 44. 
1061 Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above n 23, 18; Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 44. 
1062 ABC News, above n 1054. 
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and the lack of predictability of all of these variables, the system is ad hoc. These variables 
are discussed in the following sub-themes.  
(i) The residential location of a patient may affect the length of their elective surgery waiting 
time 
A patient’s residential location (that is, the length of waiting lists for hospitals within their 
area) may impact upon a patient’s waiting time according to GP2. GP2 said that if they send 
‘an adult’ to another hospital outside the local Health and Hospital District, GP2 thought ‘it 
will have a bit of an effect unless there’s nothing available in’ the local Health and Hospital 
District. Unless you are a resident within the selected hospital and health district, you may 
not be automatically accepted onto their waiting list. Accordingly, a patient is potentially 
restricted to their local hospital area and the success or not of those hospitals’ waiting times. 
This is substantiated by Queensland Health policy, which states that a HHS is only required 
to accept ‘elective surgery registrations outside of their geographic catchment where... the 
service is not available in the patient’s usual place of residence’.1063   
(ii) Elective surgery waiting times vary between surgical specialities  
According to five GPs, the waiting time for surgical specialities is not consistent between 
departments. GP1 said ‘some cases departments are very busy’ and the wait times are ‘just 
ridiculous’ while ‘some surgical specialities are fine’. GP4 described some specialities as ‘a 
bit difficult’ and provided an example of a surgical speciality that is difficult because it is the 
only local hospital with that particular speciality. Again, GP8 indicated the variability ‘from 
department to department’ is attributable to resources, some specialities have shown an 
‘improvement as the number of doctors has gone up’ while some specialities have 
deteriorated as the ‘departments have been closed in’ a ‘certain hospital’. GP9 said it 
depends on the ‘hospital and speciality’ that is, it ‘depends on how many specialities they’ve 
got, so if they’ve got enough specialities, your waiting time is less’. GP10 attributed the 
differences between specialities to be ‘based on what the bulk load is for a certain thing’. 
Interestingly, GP8 said that the waiting times not only differed between departments but may 
also depend on the individual specialist. Obviously, this creates a further inconsistency for 
patients. For example, if a patient’s condition is ‘urgent we speak directly to the specialist 
and they try to get them a higher category’ but ‘a lot depends on who’s on the other side’ as 
to the outcome of that discussion.  
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Queensland statistics substantiate the GPs’ perceptions that the waiting times vary between 
specialities, as the table below demonstrates for the 2014-15 year:1064 
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Table 10: Elective Surgery Waiting Times for Each Speciality in Queensland  
Speciality ‘Days waited at the 50th percentile’ 
 
‘Cardio-thoracic surgery’ 10 days 
‘Vascular Surgery’ 13 days 
‘Neurosurgery’ 15 days 
‘Plastic Surgery’ 22 days 
‘Urology’ 23 days 
‘Other’ 23 days 
‘General Surgery’ 26 days 
‘Orthopaedic’ 34 days 
‘Ear, nose and throat surgery’ 35 days 
‘Gynaecology’ 36 days 
‘Ophthalmology’ 50 days 
 
Statistics also substantiate that elective surgery waiting times vary between hospitals. For 
example, the percentage of patients receiving ear, nose and throat surgery within their 
clinically indicated time frame in January 2016 at the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital 
was 86.2%, whereas the percentage was 100% for the Ipswich Hospital.1065  
(iii) The elective waiting list is dependent upon bureaucracy and politics  
Because there appears to be a public perception that waiting lists need to be managed 
effectively, governments seem to be continuously changing their strategies to manage the 
waiting lists.1066 Similarly, GP1 and GP8 considered the waiting list somewhat dependent on 
political issues. At the time of the interview, the GPs were referring to policies of the 
previous conservative Queensland Government that was in power between March 2012 and 
January 2015. GP1 said the waiting list ‘depends on who’s driving it’: 
at the moment, we’ve got a fairly demoralised public health system, so it, I 
mean, I can understand why staff don’t, you know, just get going, and 
shorten the wait list, and work twice as hard, while front staff, admin staff 
don’t process things at twice the speed, because they’re all quite 
demoralised. They just don’t know when, if their job’s going to be there 
tomorrow, so I think it’s also a reflection, at the moment it’s not too much, 
but that probably doesn’t reflect the current situation, I think that’s previous 
investments. But, I think at times they do get a bit feed up and their morale 
                                                
 
1065 Queensland Health, Elective Surgery: Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital (January 2016) 
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fluctuates with the sufficiency of the funds by the people themselves, and 
certainly you hear a lot of stories from hospitals about how the morale is 
going. 
Similarly, GP8 said the government ‘need to increase the number of staff cause thousands of 
employees from Queensland Health were shown the door they were just sacked’, which is 
‘why we’ve got even longer waiting periods’. The new government has announced that 
‘[t]here will be no job cuts’ in the health sector; however, the government has also not 
indicated that there will be staff increases either.1067 That is, the government is essentially 
maintaining the status quo of staffing resources, however, with an increasing population; this 
is unlikely to be effective for managing the elective surgery waiting list long term.  
Further, three GPs indicated possible game playing within the surgical waiting lists.  GP1 
provided ‘anecdotal evidence’ that in circumstances where public hospitals utilise private 
hospitals to treat public patients it results in the ‘public list getting slowed down’ deliberately 
so more patients ‘wash over into the private list’ where surgeons ‘get paid a lot more money 
for public’ patients. However, current Queensland Health policy states it has a number of 
safeguards ‘for monitoring and managing actual, or perceived, conflicts of interest in relation 
to the flow of publically waitlisted patients to private providers’.1068 GP9 also indicated that 
‘doctors’ were ‘fleecing the public system’ with ‘outsourcing to the private doctors’1069 and 
as a result, the GP believed the system of ‘[p]rivate doctors working in public hospitals’ had 
been ‘scrapped’. GP9’s view was somewhat substantiated by an audit undertaken into private 
doctors in the public system that found that ‘since the Goss Labor government introduced’ 
the strategy ‘in 1992’ that was ‘meant to be cost-neutral, had cost the public system hundreds 
of millions of dollars’.1070 In accordance with the strategy, doctors were ‘paid a base salary, 
as well as an allowance’.1071 Then the ‘State was meant to reclaim fees from insurers and 
Medicare for the use of the public facilities’.1072 However the audit findings were that ‘more 
than 93 per cent’ of doctors ‘did not generate enough revenue to cover their allowance’.1073 
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And further, ‘more than 1200 doctors who received the allowance billed for private work 
they did not do, and received about $100,000 each’.1074 
GP10 indicated a different method of possible game playing with the time patients are 
waiting for elective surgery. GP10 referred to previous experience working in a different 
Queensland practice location where the hospital would advise GPs to ‘log on to the hospital 
website and there’s a waiting list’ to assist in estimating their patients’ wait time. But GP10 
said that ‘[i]n the real world, it’s much, much more than what they state on the website’ and 
believed that this is because waiting list ‘statistics can be done any which way’. It may be 
inferred from the literature that statistics do not reflect the actual waiting list situation, for 
example, the time a patient waits for outpatients is not included in their elective surgery 
waiting time.1075  
Another strategy of possible game playing involves refusing to place some patients on the 
waiting list. GP3 and GP5 indicated that hospitals do not appear to categorise some non-
urgent conditions. In the event some patients are not categorised, it seems difficult to 
envisage how these patients would be subject to their category 3 waiting list statistics. This 
may be another mechanism to improve their waiting list statistics or a way of encouraging 
patients to be transferred to another hospital’s waiting list.  For example, GP3 indicated that 
‘very non-urgent’ are not categorised because the hospitals say ‘an appointment is not made 
up to twelve months for them, they don’t want to book them in and they want the patients to 
come back to the GP and be referred to some other hospital’. Similarly, GP5 said hospitals 
‘don’t prioritise knee replacements usually unless you keep writing to them’. HHSs should 
adhere to the goals of Queensland Health policy and take ‘decisive action’ and transfer the 
patient to another hospital or facility ‘where a shorter waiting time for elective surgery is 
available’1076 rather than refusing to categorise the patient. By refusing to place patients on 
waiting lists for very non-urgent conditions, this is arguably a method of game playing to 
improve the waiting list statistics.  
(iv) Administrative waiting list management issues may affect a patients waiting time  
Before a patient is placed on the elective surgery waiting list, the patient must firstly be 
referred by their GP to the outpatient department. Five GPs indicated particular difficulties 
and unnecessary time delays in the waiting list referral system for outpatient appointments. 
There is currently a central referral system for GPs known as the Central Referral Hub that 
‘provides a single point of entry for all new referrals to specialist and allied health 
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outpatients’.1077 According to the interview data, the Central Referral Hub doesn’t have 
unanimous support, nor are all GPs even using the system. In GP1’s opinion, the Central 
Referral Hub is ‘not working very well’ at the moment but ‘in the long run it will probably 
get better’. GP1 admitted to not using the Central Referral Hub and believed it was ‘better 
using your own knowledge of where the wait lists are to target the referral’. It seems the 
basis for GP1’s concern was that the Central Referral Hub would: 
just be defunded in about three or four months’ time and it will be a different 
model, which always happens, inevitably happens, so we don’t have much 
faith in it. 
Obviously the effectiveness of a GP using their own knowledge to bypass the Central 
Referral Hub is potentially contributing to the ad hoc system that may unfairly advantage or 
disadvantage their patients depending on the level of the GP’s accuracy in predicating the 
waiting time of hospitals, including the accuracy of patient feedback. As GP3 said, ‘I think 
that knowledge comes from which hospital has the shortest waiting list and you’re depending 
on the patient’s feedback, that definitely helps’. Supporting GP1’s opinion that the Central 
Referral Hub is problematic is the example provided by GP5. GP5 had a patient who 
required spinal surgery who had a risk of their condition becoming compromised and there 
was a delay caused because of the inefficiency of the referral system. GP5 said:  
I did a referral to the Central Hub and they knocked it back, saying go 
through the [local hospital] and then you [go] through the [local hospital], 
they put it back saying go to the [major hospital in another HHS district] and 
then you do a referral letter again to the [major hospital in another HHS 
district] and you emphasise that she’s got a big disc sitting in this region and 
could potentially compromise, she is like a sitting time bomb. 
Although, the particular example provided by GP5 did not result in permanent injury to the 
patient, there was nevertheless a risk the patient was exposed to unnecessary harm by the 
referral delay. Similarly, in GP6’s experience there was ‘often a bit of back and forth’ with 
the Central Referral Hub. GP6 said the Central Referral Hub was ‘mostly helpful’ because 
‘things don’t get lost in departments, you can tend to chase it up a bit more and someone can 
tell you where it is in the process sometimes’, however, GP6 said the referral system still 
involved ‘a fair bit of phone calling’ and the effectiveness of those calls:  
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depends a bit on who you contact, sometimes you get a dream, sometimes 
you get a cross person on the phone, it depends. 
In addition to Central Referral Hub issues, there are also the following issues with 
GPs who refer to the hospitals. GP2 and GP5 indicated administrative issues with the 
referral systems at the hospital causing unnecessary time delay for their patients.  
GP2 spoke of a hospital in another Hospital and Health Service District from the 
GPs’ practice where there is:  
[n]ot an easy sort of access to talk to the doctors or even if we do a single 
mistake in the referral letters, tick one box, they just send it back. That 
means that one month of the patient is lost, send a referral letter today after 
one month, they say you didn’t tick this box. 
This is broadly consistent with outpatients’ policy that states that ‘[r]eferrals that do not 
contain sufficient information to accurately categorise the level of clinical urgency cannot be 
accepted and will be returned to the referring practitioner for further detail’.1078 However, 
this administrative delay will cause an increase to the patient’s waiting time.  Also, this 
situation demonstrates that a patients’ referral is also GP dependent, specifically in this 
example, the patient is dependent on the GP providing the correct information in the referral 
form, so that they will not endure an unnecessary delay.  
Hospital administration outpatient referral problems were further identified by GP10,   who 
said:  
when we send the patients in for referrals, we used to get a response back 
stating that we’ve received your referral letter within five to seven days, 
telling us what category the patient is going to be put on. Now we get a letter 
stating that your letter has been received and it’s going to be accessed by the 
consultant before they are put into a category, so by the time they are even 
put into a category, a couple of weeks pass. 
Interestingly, GP10’s practical experience was different from outpatient policy, which states, 
‘[h]ospitals will implement procedures to ensure referrals accepted by Outpatient Services 
are categorised according to their degree of clinical urgency within five (5) working days of 
receipt’.1079 Therefore, according to GP10’s experience, not only must patients wait on the 
outpatient and elective surgery waiting lists, there is actually a wait (longer than stipulated in 
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policy) between a patient seeing their GP and being placed on the outpatient list. This of 
course adds to a patient’s overall waiting list duration that is not publically available.  
 
 
 
(v) A patient’s waiting time may be ‘GP dependent’ 
GP perceptions indicate that, to some extent, a patient’s waiting time may also be dependent 
upon their GP. GP7 said, ‘[t]he elective list is a lot of times, it depends on the GP’s 
involvement’. Although there was a minority opinion amongst participants that a GP’s 
relationship with hospital staff, as well as a GP’s reputation and experience, play a role in the 
length of a patient’s waiting time, more participants were of the view that a GP’s level of 
advocacy for a patient may influence a patient’s waiting time. GP1 said the outcome of 
calling the hospital to follow up a patient on a waiting list ‘depends’ on ‘your own 
reputation’. If ‘you’ve got a reasonable reputation they’ll listen to you’. Similarly, GP2 
admitted that a GP’s reputation does have an impact on a patient’s waiting time: 
it comes to content, what I’ve done, if I’ve done the basic investigations, 
I’ve done the ultrasounds, everything, I’ve done CT scans and stuff, if 
everything is done. And yes, it does, I think, the credibility has an effect.   
While GP5 didn’t ‘think’ a GP’s reputation has any effect on the waiting times of patients. 
And GP4 did not know whether a GP’s reputation had any effect on patients’ waiting times.   
GP1 also said that calling the hospital also ‘depends on personal relationships’ with staff at 
the hospital: 
for GPs they don’t know, it might be GP’s making very good clinical 
judgments, but if they don’t have that personal relationship and they’re not 
known to the hospital, they’re new to the area, then the outcome of that call 
may not be as effective. 
Whereas, GP2 denied that knowing staff at the hospital had any effect on a patient’s waiting 
time. Similarly, GP3 did not consider knowing staff at the hospital had any effect. GP3 said 
‘we do not know who we are talking to’ and ‘it’s difficult to build that rapport over the 
phone’. GP5 was more direct by saying they have ‘[n]o personal relationships’ other than 
with ‘[s]ome’ ‘Emergency specialists’ in another Health and Hospital District. GP5 has not 
worked at the local hospital and therefore said, ‘how would I know them personally?’. GP4 
did not know whether a GP’s personal relationships had any effect on patients waiting times. 
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The outcome of GPs telephoning the hospital to manage a patients’ waiting list is discussed 
later in Part A.   
Some of the participants suggested a GP who is prepared to be an advocate for their patient 
and has a good level of experience may positively impact upon a patient’s waiting time. 
According to GP1: 
we probably have more time with patients, we can be a better advocate for 
the patient I suspect than in other suburbs, I suspect most suburbs that don’t 
have a strong advocacy, GPs’ letters of referral are probably a lot shorter as 
well. 
Moreover, GP1 said, in drafting a letter to the hospital, whether the letter is effective 
depends on ‘how the GP sells it’, ‘so it’s quite dependent on having a strong general 
practitioner advocate’. Overall, GP1 considered the system to be ‘a bit ad hoc. I don’t think 
that is a good thing’. GP2 seemed to provide a similar description to GP1 regarding the ad 
hoc nature of a GP’s involvement. If a patient had a ‘strong case’ and a ‘strong patient 
advocate’ then the hospital ‘will look after a case’. GP2 said ‘I think it all starts from this 
room. Once the start is good, the end’ is ‘good’. In addition, GP2 said the ‘referral letter 
content is a lot to do’ with its effectiveness that ‘takes my time, but that’s fine’. GP8 again 
said that the waiting times of patients is ‘a lot GP dependent’ with GP7 saying the waiting 
time of patients:  
depends on the GP’s referral, how you basically interact with your specialist 
colleagues at the hospital and what is your impression about the urgency of 
the case. 
GP7 also said it ‘[d]epends on how much experience you have’ and ‘your own perception of 
how bad things are’. 
As discussed later in Part D, one GP recommended that patients have only one GP to better 
manage their waiting time. However, this is assuming every GP will be a good patient 
advocate, which may not necessarily be accurate.  
(vi) Summary: Factors Contributing to the Variability of Patients’ Waiting Times  
In summary, GP’s perceptions indicate many variables influencing a patient’s waiting time. 
These variables indicate an ad hoc system with potential queries about its fairness. Also GPs’ 
perceptions indicate a general lack of transparency about the waiting times for patients and 
difficulties predicting patients’ length of time waiting for surgery. These views are not 
surprising considering there is no Queensland Health policy requiring transparency and 
predictability of patients’ waiting times. The majority of participants’ satisfaction with the 
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waiting list seems to be directed towards more urgent categories. However, patients 
categorised with less urgent conditions still require surgery, these patients may experience 
pain, discomfort and social consequences, and perhaps more so, as these patients have to 
wait for a significant period of time on the waiting list, usually without knowing the length 
of time of their wait. Discussed below are examples provided by the participants of the 
adverse consequences of patient’s waiting too long on the waiting list.   
(e) Consequences suffered by patients waiting too long for surgery 
The examples provided by GPs of consequences suffered by patients waiting for elective 
surgery indicate that there were strong feelings amongst participants towards supporting a 
need for timely elective surgery (for patients who are below the threshold of health 
capabilities).  
(i) Patients waiting too long for elective surgery may suffer physical harm, ongoing pain, 
social and/or economic adverse consequences   
The examples provided by the participants mainly concerned patients in the less urgent 
categories. This is not surprising considering the majority of GPs’ patients waiting outside 
the stipulated time frame seemed to be for less urgent conditions.  The responses provided by 
the participants indicate a range of effects for patients waiting too long for surgery. These 
effects may impact upon patients physically, psychologically, socially and/or financially. 
Interestingly, only one GP interviewed provided an example where a patient’s excessive 
waiting time for surgery resulted in physical harm. GP1 described a category 2 patient as 
having a: 
quite painful back situation, and with a degree of nerve impingement, and 
well, she had to wait, you know, about eight to twelve months to get to 
surgery. By the time she got the surgery, her leg, you know, she lost power 
to the leg. 
Conversely GP7 said: 
I really don’t recollect any case where because the surgery has been overdue, 
delayed, as causing grievous difference in the outcome, what I mean by that 
is a serious impairment in that case. 
Even though a patient may not suffer physical harm, there are other possible adverse impacts 
upon patients, including the prolonged experience of pain. GP5 had a patient on a ‘category 
2 for colonoscopy’ (clinically indicated to be seen within 90 days), the patient ‘called the 
hospital and they told him eight months’. The patient has been experiencing ‘pain actually, 
so I’ve been following him almost every week’. Similarly, GP6 had a patient requiring 
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‘breast reduction and because that’s considered cosmetic, she’s been waiting about five 
years, she has neck pain and shoulder pain’.  
However, the consequences of waiting too long may evolve into more complexities than the 
experience of pain. That is, patients may also become drug dependent, suffer employment 
loss and social problems. GP2 described a category 3 patient ‘who needed a back operation, 
and has to wait for more than two to three years’: 
so these patients deal with the chronic pain, obviously we have to give them 
pain management. The pain management clinic is not easily accessible as 
well, so we have to manage everything and it is hard, for a long waiting, plus 
the pain management, plus we normally have to look after the dependence 
on the drugs as well. 
GP2 further said the patient ‘lost his job because of that and putting more pressure on you or 
me who’s paying tax for those purposes’. So because of the delay in surgery, the patient is 
‘on the money from Centrelink’. Similarly, GP9 said: 
Many people have to start giving up their jobs [be]cause they can’t work, so 
when I fill in the first Centrelink form I use that as another opportunity to 
write another referral that now the patient is about to give up his job, now 
you have a perfect[ly] normal, fit person who wants to work to go on 
Centrelink and that sometimes brings about a favourable response. But the 
point is, we should not be waiting for someone to go onto Centrelink. 
In GP9’s example below, not only is the patient about to lose employment because of the 
excessive amount of time waiting for surgery, but there are other consequences for this 
patient – pain, social effects, and taking potentially addictive analgesia. GP9’s patient, who 
had endometriosis, was: 
on morphine, no-one should be on morphine – it’s a very fixable thing and 
she’s landed up in emergency, but obviously emergency cannot fix 
endometriosis, so they can just give her more morphine and send her back. 
Relationship with husband is now on the brink of collapsing because it’s 
painful sex, no relationship, husband cannot understand why she is all over 
the place, so the relationship is breaking down, she’s about to give up her 
job, a perfectly nice, happy person is on morphine [be]cause I have nothing 
else to give her. 
In GP9’s experience, ‘that kind of pain, any amount of months is bad and we have told them 
specifically how bad the situation is, but she’s still waiting’.  
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Waiting too long may also affect patients psychologically. GP5 described patients as being: 
frustrated and depressed, they also get the idea they’re not looked after well, 
the State isn’t doing much for them, makes them depressed; obviously the 
quality of life goes down. 
GP9 also said the wait ‘impacts on their work’, further indicating that some conditions, 
although a less urgent category, may endure more difficulties than other conditions 
‘especially where the symptoms are more symptomatic than pain – osteoarthritis or knee 
replacement, they’re the ones that usually suffer more’. GP10 indicated that a patient’s social 
situation and age could cause greater difficulties for a patient, therefore waiting longer than 
the stipulated time frame for these patients could cause more profound difficulties, not only 
for the patient but also their carer. GP10 said:  
When we are talking about the general population, which is mostly a 
geriatrics population, which is sixty-five or above or even in the sixties, a lot 
of them are living on a pension of some sort, or are old couples living 
together; now if one of them is not well, or one of them is not mobile, the 
other one has to do more, which becomes a bit difficult for them.   
Although the examples above relate to generally less urgent categories, GP3 did provide an 
example of a category 1 patient’s experience of waiting longer than the recommended time 
frame: 
I had a patient with a cancer of the bladder and everything was in place at 
the [major hospital in another HHS district] and still the first appointment 
was still around two months away. But then once he was seen, everything 
went very smoothly from there onwards, he was treated and he’s well now, 
but that first two months for anyone who’s been diagnosed with cancer, it 
could be very frustrating, because I’m two months away from my first 
appointment, what happens if I die and all those things, those things can 
happen.   
Therefore, the GPs’ feeling is that delay may not only be psychologically distressing but 
there may also be a potential risk of physical harm resulting in a similar situation to GP1’s 
example earlier. GP8, while discussing patients waiting too long in less urgent categories, 
also indicated patients experience psychological distress from waiting too long. Additionally, 
GP8 believed the patient’s family also suffered.  Further, there is a risk the patient’s physical 
condition will deteriorate. That is, GP8 said patients’: 
anxiety symptoms increase. There’s too much of stress both for the patient 
and the family, a lot of times their conditions keep getting worse. 
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The waiting times of these category 3 patients is not always insignificant. That is, this group 
of patients may potentially be waiting years in excess of their stipulated waiting time of 
twelve months, and therefore, these patients are potentially suffering for a considerable 
period of time. As the examples suggest, there may be indirect age discrimination, as 
conditions more likely to be suffered by the elderly (for example, knee replacements, 
cataracts and prostate surgery) seem to be the conditions that are subject to long waiting 
times. Examples of these less urgent condition waiting times are provided below.  
GP9 said: 
I have knee replacements that have been waiting for two or three years, two 
to three years waiting is not uncommon. 
GP5 said: 
for a total knee replacement, would be nothing less than one and a half years 
[of waiting]. 
GP7 said: 
At one point I had to call the hospital and I was told there would be a wait of 
at least five years to see this patient, especially with the cataract surgery and 
others.  
 
GP8 said:  
I’ve got a lot of elderly men who are waiting [for] prostate surgery, they’ve 
got problems, they have seen the specialists, but they are on wait, and 
they’ve been on a wait for nearly a year or two. 
The literature supports GPs’ perceptions that a delay in surgery may have negative effects, 
including a:1080 
deterioration in the condition for which treatment is awaited, including death 
as an extreme outcome; the loss of utility from delay (especially if treatment 
can relieve significant pain or disability);... accumulation of any loss of 
income from work; and accumulation of income support payments (such as 
sickness benefits). 
(ii) Summary: Consequences suffered by patients waiting too long for elective surgery 
                                                
 
1080 Hurst and Siciliani, above n 40, 4. 
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GPs’ perceptions are that patients may be suffering waiting too long and for sometimes 
excessive periods of time, across all categories of elective surgery. An argument can be 
made that there is a need for patients to receive timely elective surgery. However, are the 
patients’ conditions adequately able to be managed by GPs, the patients themselves, and/or 
the hospitals during the patients’ waiting time? And for patients requiring elective surgery 
earlier, are there effective means to ensure a positive outcome for these patients? Firstly, the 
effectiveness of GP’s strategies to manage the waiting time of their patients is discussed in 
the sub-theme below.  
(f) The variable and ad hoc nature of GPs’ strategies for managing patients on an 
elective surgery waiting list 
The GPs interviewed employ a number of strategies to manage their patients’ waiting time 
including managing their patient and managing the available strategies through the hospital 
system. The participating GPs believed that effective strategies for managing the hospital 
system to improve a patient’s waiting time encompassed writing a good referral letter, 
writing to a specialist to circumvent the outpatient wait, writing a good appeal letter, 
telephoning the hospital, referring patients to another hospital, and/or referring patients 
before they may be ready for surgery (that is, when the GP suspected a condition would 
likely require surgery in the future). However, firstly, the strategies employed by the GPs 
interviewed in this research to directly manage their patients are discussed below.  
(i) GPs assist to manage patients’ waiting time, however, this does not change their waiting 
time unless the patient is able to afford private treatment 
Three of the GPs interviewed indicated they had a role in managing their patients’ 
psychological perception and acceptance of the long waiting times. GP1 ensured the ‘patient 
understands there may be a wait’. While GP10 more directly told patients, ‘we need to be 
patient’. GP2’s strategy was to provide reassurance to patients by ensuring they were seen 
‘regularly so that they are in touch, they feel comfortable, they feel looked after and they feel 
psychologically better as well’.   
In addition to managing patients’ psychological state while waiting, four GPs also said the 
patient’s physical condition needed to be managed as well. GP2 would contact the hospital 
for advice if necessary. GP2 said, ‘if I’m unable to manage the patient, at some time I will 
call, I will ask them, this what I have and they do obviously tell me what to do’. GP5 
provided ‘supportive management’ for these ‘chronic conditions’. GP9 said that while 
patients: 
keep persevering with pain, we keep giving them opioid medication, so 
trying to keep them functional and the pain clinic is not very keen to take 
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them, because there is an obvious cause, the pain will go, so there is no sense 
in sending them there. 
Similarly, GP10 said ‘[y]ou try and deal with their pain and other issues in the best manner 
that you can’, which included: 
good analgesia, physiotherapy and other alternative therapy – acupuncture - 
whatever the patient might be happy with, so that their lifestyle is still the 
same. 
Although strategies to manage their patients with reassurance or with treatment may mitigate 
patients’ distress or suffering, it obviously does not solve the patient’s problem, that is, the 
patients are not provided with earlier surgery because of these strategies.  
According to three GPs, management of their patients on the elective list included advising 
patients to visit their GP for review during their waiting time. GP1, said patients ‘need to 
report back to me if something changes’. GP2, said ‘keep looking for complications’ and 
‘come back and see me’ in the event ‘you’ve got a problem’. GP3 advised patients to ‘come 
back’ if their condition was ‘getting worse’. Conversely, GP8 had a proactive approach, 
rather than waiting for complications, GP8 asked ‘patients to come back at a certain interval 
if they don’t have an appointment it’s more our protocol to follow all the cases up’. 
Although, checking for complications may avoid a situation where a patient significantly 
deteriorates and the waiting time is not altered, simply checking for complications will not 
generally alter a patient’s long waiting time. In any event, the strategy is reliant on the 
patient returning for an appointment with the GP or identifying the presence of a 
complication.  
Prima facie, a solution to timely elective surgery is to avoid the public system and elect to 
have surgery privately. Eight GPs recommend private surgery to patients.  GP1 believed in 
‘encouraging them to consider [the] private option if it’s going to be a long wait’. GP2 also 
said ‘I tell the patients you should have private health cover. It is a benefit’. GP4 similarly 
advised patients that they may want to select private health ‘because that is quicker and they 
can choose who they want to see and when they want to’. Conversely, GP10 only 
encouraged patients to utilise private health if they already had private health insurance 
cover. In GP10’s opinion: 
I do make the point of saying you are paying a premium, why do you still 
want to go to the public system, it makes sense to them as well. 
GP3 further said, ‘people who can afford to have private health insurance should have it, 
because for elective surgery, private hospital insurance is better than the public system’. 
However, the reality may be as GP5 said, ‘you’ve got to refer them through the public 
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system, you don’t have an option’ because ‘most of the patients, quite a few of them to an 
extent, don’t have private health’. Similar to GP10, GP3 would only recommend private 
health if the patient had insurance cover. Yet, even if the patient did have private health 
cover ‘the cost would be massive out of pocket’ expenses to utilise the private system, 
therefore you are unable to say ‘ok get treatment with private health’. Conversely to GP10, 
in GP9’s experience, patients ‘may really want to go’ privately even though ‘they may not 
have private health’. GP9 said ‘[w]e have rates of all the different specialists, we send [them] 
to the cheapest one’. However, it seems that patients mainly select private specialists for 
only a limited number of conditions in this situation. It does not appear patients select private 
specialists without health cover regularly across all specialities.  
Therefore, although private health cover may avert the problem of the lengthy waiting list, a 
patient’s ability to utilise this option is limited by their ability to fund the treatment. Another 
option some GPs provide to patients is to present at the emergency department, although four 
GPs did not indicate this as a solution. GP5 said, ‘there are times when you just tell them that 
head up to the’ emergency department ‘maybe that helps you out’. However, GP5 conceded 
that this strategy ‘wouldn’t speed up anything, I would only send a patient to’ the emergency 
department ‘if he requires to be there’. While GP4 seemed to be unsure of the effectiveness 
of utilising the emergency department, saying that if a patient was in ‘severe pain’ we give 
‘them the option’ of attending the emergency department, but say ‘I don’t know’ if ‘that will 
help’.   
Conversely, in GP5’s opinion sending patients to the emergency department may sometimes 
be effective. GP5 would send patients to emergency if ‘they’re really not getting anywhere 
and it’s something that’s semi-acute that needs a bit more sorting out’, however:  
[i]t makes everybody cross in Casualty. They hate the semi-urgent things, 
they don’t mind the urgent things, but they hate the semi-urgent things.  
Sometimes it will have an effect, they’ll get into an outpatients or they’ll be 
admitted or something will happen, it’s not really good management, it 
shouldn’t really be the sort of things that go through Casualty. 
In GP1’s opinion, patients with urgent conditions will benefit from attending emergency, 
which seems consistent with GP5’s opinion that the emergency department will accept 
urgent conditions. That is, GP1 said:  
just presenting to ER (ie the emergency room) doesn’t, doesn’t seem to make 
a lot of difference. Obviously a deterioration, massive difference. 
GP1 further said that a patient presenting to Emergency ‘doesn’t seem to have a lot of 
effectiveness without a strong letter from me’. Therefore, GP1 seems to be indicating that 
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the presentation to Emergency Department to move up the waiting list may be dependent on 
the patient’s GP and their willingness and ability to write an effective letter.  
As discussed above, the data indicates that the GPs interviewed undertake a number of 
strategies in dealing with the hospital system to decrease their patients’ waiting time. These 
various strategies are discussed below.  
(ii) GPs’ perceptions were that a patient’s waiting time may be dependent on how their GP 
communicates with the hospital, these strategies include:  
Undertake proper investigations 
The majority of the GPs interviewed undertook proper investigations as a strategy for 
minimising the outpatient waiting time of their patients. GP2 said to ‘investigate to the 
extreme’ but ‘not over investigating’, as properly investigating ‘reduces the waiting time’. 
Similarly, GP3 said ‘if we investigate the patient properly’ then ‘it does make a difference’. 
GP8 also said ‘we try to do as many investigations as possible’. GP10, said ‘if you’ve got a 
diagnosis, it helps on the other end for nurses to make a good clinical judgment [about] 
where the patient is at’. For example, GP10 said: 
if you’ve got an x-ray, which shows a moderately severe or severe 
osteoarthritis, then they’re considered for an operation a lot sooner, so they 
would be put in say a category 2, instead of a category 3. This is what I 
think. It goes against the ethics of doing more investigations for people.   
Accordingly, it may depend upon the amount of investigations a GP is prepared to undertake 
as to a patient’s waiting time. Again, the level of investigations undertaken is GP dependent. 
GP4 said, ‘sometimes’ the hospital will ‘take over from you because we don’t want to go 
deeper into further investigations’. GP5 said the investigations undertaken by the GP may be 
influenced by a GP’s knowledge of the hospital the patient has been referred to: 
If you deal with the hospital, a particular department you tend to understand 
what they want, so you tend to do all that before you send, because you don’t 
really want to send the referral letter, and then he comes back and then you 
do a new referral, and then the patient goes in after a while to see the doctor, 
and then they tell you on the first consult you do this, so you want it sorted 
before a patient reaches their rooms. 
Conversely GP6 said ‘there is a list’ detailing ‘what each referral needs’ for sending a patient 
to the hospital, which suggests that the referral system is more objective than GP5 has 
experienced. But, GP6 conceded that even when ‘you think you’ve done them all and they’ll 
send it back saying we need this done’. ‘Digging’ out the lists and ‘finding out what each 
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referral needs’ involves the GP using ‘time in the middle of a consultation’. Similarly, GP9 
said ‘I’ve got a list and all the stuff they need before they can give you an appointment’ and 
‘I try to get them whatever they want’. 
However, the ability of GPs to undertake investigations may partly be inhibited by a 
patient’s ability to fund these investigations. That is, as GP4 said, sometimes the ‘patient is 
not happy to spend money’ and in that situation it may be unfair to those patients unable to 
afford these investigations. GP6 said it ‘definitely helps’ if patients have funds: 
The people that really can’t afford to use the system outside the hospital, 
really can’t afford ultrasounds and things that can help you make a 
diagnosis. So, sometimes you need to use the hospital for everything.   
However, GP6 noted that there is ‘a lot of cost sharing that goes on’, that is, tests outside the 
hospital are funded by the federal government. Although GP6 did not expressly state that the 
State hospitals are trying to ensure patients undertake as many tests outside the hospital to 
conserve State funds, it may be possible to infer this.  This of course may delay a patient’s 
waiting time, because a patient may be unable to be placed on a hospital outpatient waiting 
list until the proper investigations have been completed. But, according to GP4, if a patient is 
unable to afford further testing outside the hospital system, then GP4 will telephone the 
hospital and ‘explain’ the situation. But nevertheless, it is difficult to see how this could 
avoid causing a delay.  
Write a good referral letter 
Both GP1 and GP2 provided similar responses that a good referral letter for outpatients is 
important. GP1 said, ‘write a good letter at the start’ and GP2 said ‘if I don’t write the proper 
note, the proper symptoms, proper diagnosis’ it would mean ‘more waiting time’ for the 
patient. For example, GP2 said: 
if I write the patient has tonsillitis, a kid, that’s ENT, send a letter, tonsillitis, 
fine, wait for category 3. If I write tonsillitis, the patient snores, they have 
sleep apnoea attacks, effecting his daily school activities and sport activities, 
if I gave those examples and they triage it better. Rather than just tonsillitis, 
and those are the few words.  
GP2 further noted that the letter ‘takes my time, but that’s fine, it’s for my patients.  The 
referral letter content is a lot to do’ with the outcome. Again, the letter is GP dependent and 
dependent on the time a GP is prepared to spend with their patients.  The interview data did 
not indicate there were any GPs who were unhappy spending time with their patients to 
obtain results.  
 168 Chapter 6 
Considering Queensland Health outpatients’ policy states that ‘[p]riortisation within clinical 
urgency categories will be based upon factors that may include’ (amongst other factors) 
‘[p]atient social and community support’; it is not surprising that with such subjectivity that 
the content of a GPs letter may be influential for a patient’s outpatient wait time.1081 
Literature generally indicates that it is important for GPs to write good referral letters to 
specialists as ‘patient care hinges in part on adequate and timely information exchange 
between treating doctors’.1082 That is, ‘[e]nsuring that letters meet the needs of letter 
recipients saves time for clinicians and patients’. However, despite the importance of a good 
referral letter:1083 
[s]tudies of referral letters have consistently reported that specialists are 
dissatisfied with their quality and content. The concerns most often 
expressed are the frequent absence of an explanation for referral, medical 
history, clinical findings, test results and details of prior treatment. 
Therefore, it may be inferred that not all GPs are writing good referral letters for patients to 
have patients placed on the public hospital waiting list; this again suggests an ad hoc system 
for patients requiring timely elective surgery, as the patient is dependent on the level of the 
GP’s skill to write a good letter.   
Write to a specialist to circumvent outpatients 
Three GPs interviewed identified that one of their strategies was sending patients to private 
specialists to circumvent the outpatient waiting list and therefore decrease the patient’s 
overall elective surgery waiting time. GP3 advised patients to, ‘see a specialist privately’: 
For example, a patient presenting with abdominal pain and blood with stools 
and if I send them to the hospital for an outpatient, he might not be seen for a 
few months, but at same time if I refer them to a private gastroenterologist 
and he gets diagnosed with a colonoscopy or maybe some blood test or 
history to be having colitis or ulcerated colitis or Crohn’s disease, then it 
comes back to me. Again it’s outside my scope to manage a patient with 
ulcerated colitis, but then if I send that report from the private specialist to 
the hospital, and that, he will be seen fairly quickly. 
However, again this strategy is subject to a patient being able to afford to pay, in this case 
private specialist fees. Yet, GP3 indicated there doesn’t seem to be an issue with patients 
                                                
 
1081  Queensland Health, Queensland Health Standard: Outpatient Services, above n 16. 
1082 Martin H M Tattersall et al, ‘Improving Doctors’ Letters’ (2002) 177 Medical Journal of Australia 
516, 516.  
1083 Ibid 516. 
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paying. GP3 stated, it’s ‘around one hundred to two hundred dollars out of pocket to see a 
specialist, everyone’s happy to spend for their health’. Yet disadvantaged socio-economic 
patients paying for private specialist appointments may not be an option for those patients. 
However, GP3’s patients are of mixed socio-economic status, therefore it is not surprising 
that some patients would be able to afford to pay for a private specialist.  
Similarly, GP5 (whose patients are also of mixed socio-economic status) believed a private 
specialist causes the patient to be only a few hundred dollars out of pocket.  However, 
according to GP5, the patient must be able to afford this cost for this strategy to be effective. 
For those patients able to fund the specialist’s appointment, GP5 advised patients to visit:  
a consultant that’s also on the public system and discuss what his fees are. If 
you can afford it, fine, but he also works for the public system and he can do 
it for free, but at least you’re through the first part, you’ve seen the 
consultant directly and you don’t have to wait. 
Basically, GP5 said the patient pays ‘about three hundred to four hundred bucks to see the 
consultant, then he puts you on the public waiting list’. Again, this strategy is somewhat GP 
dependent. Similarly, GP7, (whose patients are also of mixed socio-economic status) may 
refer patients to specialists: 
I seek a specialist outside the hospital, ask him to write a letter so that 
basically gets them in a bit more quicker, because they have already seen a 
specialist outside or sometimes the specialist also works in the hospital and 
he’s seen the patient outside the hospital and in outpatients, he realises how 
complicated this case was, he’s happy to take them straight away into this 
list. 
GP7 provided the following example: 
A young man broke his wrist, he went to the hospital and he was put on 
category two, which is six months at least before they can see somebody,  
but then I had a letter to a private specialist, he saw him and he said no he 
cannot wait six months, [by] that time his wrists will be gone, he will lose 
movement, he got into [Hospital in another HHS District] quickly and he is 
playing cricket now. 
However, seeing a private specialist is not always effective. GP7 said, ‘[t]here have been 
cases where they’ve gone to the specialist and they’ve said look it’s not too bad at the 
moment let them wait in the public system’. Therefore, it appears that if a patient’s condition 
needs timely treatment, a private specialist may be a helpful option; however, if a patient 
does not necessarily need timely treatment, then a private specialist’s appointment may result 
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in an unfavourable outcome. Again, the patient must be able to afford the specialist 
appointment even though a ‘patient is only $150 to $200 out of pocket’, GP7 noted that ‘of 
course that person has to come up with the funds’. 
However, it appears this is subject to the GP selecting a specialist who is also on the public 
list, and perhaps indicates a level of unfairness that specialists who work both publically and 
privately may be playing the system. Thus, potentially, GPs who are prepared to play the 
system and send patients to private doctors also working in the public system may unfairly 
advantage their patients over other patients. Also, even GPs sending patients to private 
specialists who do not work in the public system may be sufficient to give patients an 
advantage to other patients waiting. Further unfairness results if a patient is of disadvantaged 
socio-economic status and is unable to afford to pay for a private specialist’s appointment. 
Additionally, unfairness may result for patients if their GP is not prepared to act as an 
advocate and provide the option of sending them to a private specialist. However, there was 
no express connection between playing the system and unfairness stated by the GPs in the 
interviews.  
Conversely GP10 said ‘I don’t think that works’ by sending patients to private specialists 
who also work in the public system to speed up patients waiting times.  Further, GP10 said, 
the situation is:  
the same for all patients. That is a good thing, that everyone is getting the 
same raw deal, but it’s not ideal. 
GP10 further said this strategy is not effective because:  
The whole referral system now is not in the hands of specialists, so if I knew 
someone, so for example in [name of a surgical speciality], I know a lot of 
people, because I’ve worked there for a long time, I can’t pick up the phone 
and say “could you put me onto the waiting list”. It is very difficult for them 
because there’s a whole gamut of people who are now managing the list, 
then it is very difficult for a specialist to get into that list and try to move up 
a particular patient. 
One may suspect that GP10 understands the system better than GP5 and GP7, because the 
GP has relatively recently worked at a Queensland public hospital. But GP5 also worked at a 
Queensland public hospital only approximately two years ago.  So one is assuming GP5 also 
understands how the public hospital system works and, as stated before, believes there is an 
advantage in using a specialist who also works publically. However, GP7 has never worked 
in a public hospital in Queensland, however, and conceded that referring to a private 
specialist is not always effective. Therefore, it is arguable that the effectiveness of sending a 
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patient to private specialist may be a variable option as a mechanism to decrease their 
waiting time.  
Write a good appeal letter 
The majority of GPs interviewed considered that sending appeal letters to hospitals had an 
effect on a patient’s elective surgery waiting time. However, it was also identified by some 
GPs interviewed that appeal letters are written to help themselves feel better (and also as an 
obligation to the patient) and to help the patient feel better. However, firstly, the 
effectiveness of the appeal letters will be discussed. In GP2’s opinion the hospital’s 
‘response is good’ to appeal letters, for example: 
I’ve got a patient who is waiting for bariatric surgery on the stomach, he’s 
come here every week, he’s having his problems and I send a letter maybe 
every two to three weekly to update them regardless, his missing work, I do 
not want him to lose his job. It has an effect, in sending letters, he came to 
see me today, I’ve got surgery booked in next month. 
GP3 said if a patient’s ‘symptoms are getting worse’ then GP3 will send an appeal letter. 
Although the appeal letter, ‘definitely works’ the letter must be ‘documented with reports’. 
GP3 also indicated that appeal letters are ‘quite good’ as a mechanism for decreasing a 
patient’s waiting time. However, GP1 has found that you need to send the letter to the 
medical team ‘directly’, otherwise GP1 thinks the letter: 
just goes through, and a clerk sees it and they just go here’s a letter and they 
just send a routine new appointment and no one seems to sort of realise that 
it’s actually me trying to communicate that there has been a critical 
deterioration with this patient, and can you, this sort of be shown to the 
Consultant, or the Registrar. 
In GP1’s situation, ‘the [local hospital’s] guys say send the letter to me and I’ll show it 
directly to the team’. GP5 believed that ‘if you really want the patient to be seen then you 
can’, if: 
you feel things are going wrong, you just write a very strong letter stating 
that you’re going to be responsible for [that patient], if something goes 
wrong, and then they tend to look at it. It depends on what words you use in 
the letter. 
However, GP5 conceded that ‘I can’t really justify... writing letters every week, it doesn’t 
work’. Some time has to have elapsed and the patient must have deteriorated. The GP will 
write a letter: 
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if they’ve been waiting for four to six months, then you do, you expect it to 
be one and a half years, but if the patient is really, really worse and you think 
maybe if his wait time is maybe decreased by maybe six months. But they 
won’t still see him straight away, but they see him in six months then I’ve 
helped the patient, I’ll definitely do that. 
According to GP4, appeal letters are only ‘[a] little bit effective’, the effectiveness of appeal 
letters ‘depends on what’s the condition and how bad is the situation’.  Similarly, GP5 
indicated the effectiveness of appeal letters depends on the patient’s condition: 
if someone was waiting on a total knee replacement, I don’t think that’s 
going to get much of a response. But something like urology, there was a 
patient I was concerned about and they saw him sooner than what the 
waiting list was. 
Similarly, GP9 said the effectiveness of the appeal letter depends on the patient’s 
condition, and said that patients ‘can’t get better than category two, unless it’s really 
serious’. GP10 said that if a ‘patient’s symptoms have gotten worse’, the GP will 
write a letter. GP7 would write an appeal letter ‘if a patient is suffering’. And GP9 
took the ‘opportunity’ to write an appeal letter when a patient lost their employment 
because of their condition. GP10 said that ‘sometimes they have been able to go and 
see the specialist to be assessed by them and a lot of times, the specialist has then 
decided that they need to go up on the list’. Similarly, GP8 said appeal letters are 
‘[s]ometimes’ effective. Again, GP5 seemed to indicate that sending appeal letters is 
sometimes effective; however, usually ‘out of ten referrals we say to speed up, 
maybe one is looked into’. When patients call the hospitals, the hospitals tell patients to:  
ask your GP to write another letter and then we decide when they have said 
that, then you kind of feel obligated, you kind of feel sometimes that maybe 
it’s not going to do anything if it’s a knee pain that’s been going on, a 
category 3, there’s not much that can be done, we know that, sometimes 
because it’s the hospital tells them, and if you don’t do that for the patient, 
they’ll ring up the hospital and tell that person we’re not doing much for 
them. 
Interestingly, GP10 said appeal letters are ‘good’ for the GP ‘psychologically and for the 
patient to think that something is being done’. However, sending letters merely to help the 
GP and patient feel better is not a solution to decrease a patients’ waiting time and perhaps 
reflects the level of frustration about the waiting times for both the GP and the patient. But 
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GP10 would send the appeal letter to the ‘same specialist’ but the GP understood there were 
‘constraints’ in the public system and so the GP would ‘try and use other avenues’ to treat 
the patient’s condition such as ‘analgesia’. GP6 was also not optimistic about appeal letters. 
GP6 ‘re-submits’ the outpatient referral and ‘might re-date it’, rather than sending an appeal 
letter. GP6 said ‘I don’t think there’s much difference’. If you rely on the opinion of GP2, 
the content of an appeal letter has an effect, if a GP is simply just resubmitting the referral 
and redating it, this may be a reason GP6 does not find appeal letters an effective strategy. 
Telephone the hospital  
Seven GPs considered telephoning the hospital for elective surgery patients to be somewhat 
effective if a patient’s condition is urgent. GP1 would call the hospital if a patient’s 
condition had worsened or even ‘where’s there’s a social deterioration’.  GP1 thought that 
calling the hospital, in terms of the public system’, was the ‘most successful strategy’. That 
is, GP1 would  
ring the Registrar or consultant straight off and sending a powerful letter at 
the same time and faxing it directly to them, you know, even ask them where 
they are, can I fax letter to you, and you take it to outpatients. 
GP1 believed this strategy to be effective because the specialists, ‘I think they have, have 
pull with the clerks that do the waiting list’. GP2 said ‘any changes in the patient’s 
condition’ that require urgent attention, then GP2 would call the hospital, which gives GP2 
‘access to all the doctors’. GP3 believed calling the hospital was effective, ‘it might save 
another week or ten days’. However, GP3 would call the Registrar for ‘urgent conditions’. 
Again, GP4 would call the hospital if a patient’s condition was ‘really serious’, and found 
the call to be ‘pretty helpful’. In addition, GP7 found calling ‘does make a difference, you 
talk to someone in medical language and he feels he is talking to another colleague’. 
Whether a phone call is effective, ‘a lot depends on who’s on the other side’, but ‘[m]ost 
times’ the call is effective. Although GP9 would call the hospital if a case was urgent, this 
GP ‘[r]arely calls’. GP3 found calling the hospital to be ‘a better way’ than writing an appeal 
letter. Similarly, GP6 said, ‘if you really want to get something done’ you need to call. GP10 
found it more effective to ‘communicate with either the specialist or the Registrar because 
they are at a level where they know their responsibilities so it works better’. Conversely, 
although GP4 called the hospital if a case was urgent, GP4 did not ‘think calling makes 
much of a difference’.  
Refer patients to another hospital 
GP3 noted that if a patient was ‘getting worse or the department is quite far away’ then GP3 
would consider referring a patient ‘somewhere else’. Interestingly, GP3 was the only GP to 
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consider this as an option, this is not surprising considering Queensland Health policy 
provides that it is not mandatory to accept a patient ‘outside of their geographic catchment’ 
unless ‘the service is not provided in the patient’s usual place of residence’.1084   
Refer patients early for surgery 
GP10’s strategy was referring a patient for the outpatient waiting list before a patient was 
ready for surgery. For example, GP10 would tell a patient that had: 
started having knee pains let’s get a referral done now, because by the time 
you’re ready for surgery you will get to see an orthopaedic surgeon. 
Considering not all conditions would have gradual onset, it is therefore unlikely this option 
would be available to all patients.  
(iii) Theme Four: Summary  
In summary, from the GPs’ interviewed, their strategies employed to minimise a patient’s 
waiting time result in a mixture of success and failures, inconsistencies, potential unfairness 
and are somewhat dependent on a patient’s financial situation.  Accordingly, the system 
appears ad hoc. It seems a patient’s waiting time is GP dependent, based on the selection of 
GPs interviewed, including the amount of effort the GP is prepared to expend. This appears 
consistent with outpatients’ policy that states that ‘[c]linical monitoring of patients for an 
Outpatient Service is most appropriately conducted by the referring practitioner’.1085 
However, there is no indication that any of the GPs interviewed would not be prepared to 
spend time advocating for their clients. However, GPs’ perceptions were that sometimes 
advocacy is not sufficient to create a favourable outcome for their patient; sometimes 
patients need to be their own advocate to obtain attention. The strategies available to patients 
to speed up their waiting times are discussed below.  
(g) The limited effectiveness of patients’ strategies for managing their elective 
waiting time 
Although there are strategies available to patients, the effectiveness of these strategies appear 
limited according to the perceptions of GPs interviewed. The patient strategies are discussed 
within the following sub-themes below. These subthemes include patients returning to the 
emergency department, returning to their GP, contacting the hospital, utilising political 
avenues and electing to leave the waiting list.  
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(i) Electing to receive surgery in the private hospital system is effective provided the patient is 
able to afford the treatment: ‘go privately if you’ve got the money’ 
Patients leaving the elective surgery waiting list to receive treatment privately is an option to 
patients who are able to afford surgery in a private hospital. GP1 considered private health 
an effective strategy and said, ‘go privately if you’ve got the money’. However, GP1’s 
patients left the public list and went privately only about ‘twenty percent of the time’. 
According to GP2, whether patients were able to fund private health ‘depends’ on the 
‘demography of the patients’.   
Conversely, GP3 said, ‘if a person feels that they need something done, some of them don’t 
mind paying’. However, four GPs limited this response to less expensive procedures. GP4 
said, patients would elect to undertake private treatment for ‘[v]ery minor procedures’ for 
example, ‘tonsillectomies’. GP5 had ‘one or two patients’ with ‘haemorrhoids’ leave the 
public list ‘where the cost involved maybe more than $3000’. Similarly, GP6 found that ‘a 
few’ patients ‘give up and go privately’ for ‘something that might be less than one thousand 
dollars’. Some procedures patients elected to undertake private treatment for included 
‘cataracts’, ‘colonoscopy and upper GI endoscopies’. 
Although some patients elect to go privately only for certain procedures, according to GP9 
‘[n]ot necessarily’ minor procedures. GP10 referred patients to the less expensive specialists. 
Similarly, GP10 had patients go private for sometimes expensive procedures except for the 
‘cardiac ward’: 
I don’t know where they stash all that money. But sometimes they come in 
and say “it’s taking so much time and I’m happy to pay to get a private thing 
done”. 
Although GP10 conceded that patients electing private treatment without private health 
insurance is ‘not very frequent’. 
According to recent statistics, 1,566 patients left the Queensland elective surgery waiting list 
during 2014-15 to be ‘[t]reated elsewhere’,1086 considering there were 37,804 patients 
waiting to be treated in January 2016,1087 those patients leaving the elective surgery waiting 
list appears to be minimal. 
However, if patients do leave the public elective surgery waiting list, is the private option 
effective? According to GP7, ‘[i]f it’s a short case they’d be better off paying for it 
                                                
 
1086 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Cth), above n 23, 11. 
1087 Queensland Health, Queensland Reporting Hospitals: Elective Surgery (January 2016) 
Queensland Health < http://www.performance.health.qld.gov.au/hospitalperformance/es-
main.aspx?hospital=99999>. 
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privately’. Conversely, in GP6’s opinion, there are ‘long waits’ privately.  However, as 
‘waiting times are not available’ for private hospitals, is not possible to assess GP6’s 
comment.1088 As an alternative, is the patient able to access the public emergency 
departments for assistance with their waiting time?  
(ii) Attending the emergency department is not an effective option: ‘What will they do?’ 
The GPs perceived that sometimes the patient will take the initiative themselves to present to 
the emergency department in an attempt to accelerate their waiting time.  According to GP2, 
if the patient had an ‘acute problem, it’s quite good’, however, GP2 said: 
the problem with the Emergency is they create more problems for us, giving 
Endone to the patients and then the patients come back, can I have more 
Endone? 
It is not surprising then that GP9 would not recommend patients attend the Emergency 
Department ‘for elective stuff’ because ‘what will they do?’ GP9 said that for a patient with 
endometriosis, all the Emergency Department is able to do is ‘give her more morphine and 
send her back’, ‘endometriosis is not something they can fix, that has to be a proper elective 
surgery’.   
Recent statistics indicate that only 886 patients during 2014-15 waiting for elective surgery 
were admitted via the Emergency Department.1089 Therefore, this substantiates GP’s feelings 
that the Emergency Department is not usually an effective option.  
If the public hospital is unable to assist, then should the patient be returning to their GP?  
(iii) Returning to their GP is encouraged: ‘If they don’t come, we think they’ve been fine’ 
According to the interview data, a patient’s waiting time may be dependent upon a patient’s 
relationship with their general practitioner (including the patient’s financial ability to pay for 
regular visits to their GP). GP2 felt that patients attending ‘quite regularly with genuine 
concerns’ would be an effective patient strategy. GP2 had a very minimal number of patients 
that the GP said ‘come and frustrate myself’ but ‘[m]ost of them are genuine’. Similarly, if 
there was a ‘genuine situation’ GP4 would ‘write up letter’ to the hospital but ‘if they don’t 
come, we think, they’ve been fine’. Unlike GP2’s experience, GP5 said patients ‘come and 
ask, can you write a letter, they come and ask you all the time’, however, whether this is 
effective ‘depends whether it’s worthwhile’. GP10 said patients seeing their GP ‘doesn’t 
speed anything in the public hospital’. Although GP10 conceded that: 
                                                
 
1088 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Hospitals: Australia’s Hospitals at a Glance (2013-14) 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare <http://www.aihw.gov.au/hospitals/>.  
1089 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Cth), above n 23, 11. 
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it does help them in the sense that you pick up new problems or you try to do 
something different and so they are not under the radar. You can make a case 
for them if you’re looking at them and you still feel like something can be 
done. You can always start jumping up and down and making noises for 
them. 
GP5 and GP7 seem to support a patient returning to their GP. GP5 said, ‘I think they should 
see the general practitioner a bit more often’. GP7 said ‘the patient should connect more 
often’ with their GP. However, whether a patient is able to attend their GP on a regular basis 
may be dependent upon their mobility, and those patients with difficulties may potentially be 
placed at a disadvantage.  Also, the patient’s ability to return to their GP may be dependent 
upon their financial situation, if their GP does not bulk-bill the cost of the appointment.   
In addition to GPs perception that patients should return to their GP if they are concerned 
about their elective surgery waiting time, Queensland Health also recommends patients 
return to their GP if their ‘medical condition has changed’.1090 A more proactive strategy 
than the patient returning to their GP involves the patient contacting the hospital directly. 
This strategy is discussed below.  
(iv) Contacting the hospital: ‘I don’t think it goes anywhere’ 
Four GPs who have had patients calling the hospitals in an attempt to speed up their elective 
surgery waiting times did not believe such a strategy to be effective. GP3 said patients 
telephoning the hospital ‘would just be going through the switch board I imagine’. Similarly, 
GP5 believed patients calling the hospitals ‘are not talking to doctors, patients are not talking 
to nurses’, the patients are merely advised ‘to go to your GP and ask them to write a letter’.  
Also, GP9 did not believe patients calling the hospital was effective because the person they 
call is ‘a clerk sitting there categorising it, all they can do is make sure you are still on the 
list, some office person’. GP9 further said, ‘I don’t think it goes anywhere, the person 
sympathises, that’s all that happens’. GP10 said patients ‘get a standard reply on the other 
side, from maybe the receptionist or the nurse’.   
Conversely, GP8 believed that ‘a lot of times’ patients: 
speak to the nurses who are part of the same department and when they share 
their problems they explain the urgency, a lot of times they are helped by 
bringing the appointment forward. Sometimes they will put them on a 
cancellation list so they can be called on one day’s notice or two days’ 
notice. 
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Similarly, GP6 indicated that activist patients may decrease their waiting time by calling the 
hospital. However, this strategy is not effective for non-activist patients. In relation to the 
activist patients, GP6 said: 
Some of them are really proactive and they get on the phone themselves. 
And I often think a patient patient and not a cranky doctor will often get 
further. Some of them, you should see mothers work the system, if they’ve 
got a sick child they just, they really get more flies with honey than vinegar 
they just keep going and they don’t lose their cool and they just keep asking, 
‘give me another phone number, who else can I try?’. 
However, GP6 noted there are individuals ‘who just don’t know how to even complain to 
us’. That is, ‘there are quite a lot of people that are just polite and don’t think to grizzle and 
complain and don’t know how to complain’. While GP4 said, referring to the outpatient 
department, ‘I don’t know’ whether calling the hospital was effective for patients.   
Alternatively, patients may write a letter to the hospital. GP8 said, ‘I have seen a few patients 
who have written letters to hospital directors’; however, the GP noted that was only 
‘[s]ometimes’ an effective strategy.  
Despite the GPs’ perceptions that a patient contacting the hospital is not usually effective, 
Queensland Health nevertheless encourages patients to contact the hospital if they are 
‘nearing the end of the clinically recommended time for’ their ‘urgency category and have 
not heard from the hospital’.1091  
(v) Utilising political avenues is not a frequent occurrence  
Patients utilising political avenues, according to those interviewed, does not appear to be a 
frequent occurrence. GP6 had ‘only one or two’ occurrences of patients contacting their local 
member of parliament. Although this strategy seemed to be effective, the GP conceded that 
the patients involved ‘were probably politically inclined anyway’. GP8 provided one 
example of a patient who ‘approached the local MP (Member of Parliament)’, ‘with the help 
of the local MP he got an appointment within a few weeks, for which he had waited for 
nearly a year and a half’. 
Conversely, GP2 was not aware of any patients utilising political avenues in relation to the 
elective surgery waiting list. In any event, GP2 said in relation to the politician:  
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I don’t know what he can do, poor fellow, he can’t do anything much, 
because it is the triage system at the hospital, he hasn’t really got any say, 
they follow the guidelines. 
While GP10 said: 
I think everyone’s a bit scared of involving the politician in it, because it’s 
not their problem anymore and it can go out of hand very quickly. 
(vi) Electing to leave the waiting list is not common  
Of course, patients may elect not to proceed with their elective surgery. Only one GP 
provided an example in this regard, saying: 
Sometimes they think, ‘oh, I can’t be bothered’, they just decide they don’t 
want to do it anymore, or they don’t need to, particularly if it’s just a hip or a 
knee, they say ‘I’m just living with it, I don’t know if I can bear to go 
through with the surgery’. 
However, considering elective surgery is generally not ‘elective’ but necessary, the ability of 
patients not to proceed with the surgery would not be significant. It is therefore not 
surprising that only one GP mentioned this strategy as an option. For those patients that feel 
they are not able to continue waiting, it is likely these patients continue suffering on some 
level.   
Interestingly, recent statistics indicate that in 2014-15, 12,117 patients left the elective 
surgery waiting list because their surgery was ‘not required or declined’.1092  However, it is 
difficult to calculate the percentage of those patients that later received elective surgery 
elsewhere, because if the patients did not inform the hospital they were receiving surgery 
elsewhere, then they would have been included in this ‘[s]urgery not required or declined’ 
category.1093  
(vii) Summary: The limited effectiveness of patients’ strategies for managing their elective 
waiting time 
In summary, according to GPs’ perceptions, the ability of patients to receive timely elective 
surgery utilising their own strategies appears limited. The private health option, while 
generally effective, requires patients to be able to afford to pay for private health treatment. 
According to the GPs interviewed, a patient leaving the public list does not appear to occur 
very frequently. Usually, but not always, those patients leaving the public list for private 
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treatment have conditions requiring less expensive surgeries. This means that patients 
requiring more expensive conditions are potentially disadvantaged. In terms of the 
emergency department option, GPs’ feelings were that unless the patient’s condition was 
acute, the emergency department did not appear to be an effective avenue for speeding up a 
patient’s waiting time.  Conversely, the majority of GPs interviewed thought patients 
returning to their GP for review was an effective strategy. This is consistent with the concept 
discussed earlier that a patient’s length of waiting time is somewhat GP dependent. Again, 
this results in an ad hoc system. GPs interviewed thought a less effective strategy was 
patients taking the initiative to contact the hospitals directly. Generally, this strategy does not 
appear effective, and may potentially disadvantage those patients that are not proactive. Even 
less effective, according to the GPs interviewed, appears to be patients contacting politicians. 
The least effective strategy is for patients to elect not to proceed with the surgery. This is 
unlikely to be a viable option for the majority of patients. However, despite the limited 
effective strategies available for patients, does the government already have sufficient 
strategies to manage patients’ waiting time? 
(h) The limited government strategies available for managing patients on an elective 
surgery waiting list 
GPs’ perceptions were that the government was using a number of strategies to manage the 
elective surgery waiting times. These strategies identified include the government providing 
some private practice clinics and treating patients in private hospitals, some intermediate 
treatment, interim treatment for orthopaedic patients, and managing patient expectations. 
These strategies are discussed within the following sub-themes below.  
(i) When private practice clinics or private hospitals are available to public patients, then 
these strategies are effective  
According to GP2 and GP6, the government has arranged private practice clinics for 
outpatient departments at public hospitals. GP2, considered that this arrangement ‘makes a 
lot of difference’ to a patient’s waiting time. That is, if a patient is seen quickly on the 
outpatient list, then they then proceed to the elective list sooner.  Similarly, GP6 considered 
that ‘private practice clinics have made things more accessible’. GP6 said ‘[t]here are some 
good physicians’ and patients ‘can get into see those people reasonably quickly’. Although 
only two GPs mentioned private practice clinics, their views seemed to strongly indicate 
these clinics were effective. However, given only two GPs commented in this regard, it may 
be possible to infer that this was not a widely utilised practice, at least among those who 
participated in the study.  
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Also, both GP4 and GP5 indicated that the government is utilising private hospitals for 
public patients to receive surgery. GP4 said they had been informed by ‘someone’ that ‘they 
had the surgery done privately’ paid for by the government.  And GP5 said the government 
‘already’ have patients seen ‘privately’.   
GPs’ perceptions about outsourcing to private hospitals for patients waiting too long for 
elective surgery are substantiated by Queensland Health’s ‘Surgery Connect’ program. In 
this program, some public patients receive their surgery privately; however, this is at the 
discretion of Queensland Health. Considering 37, 804 patients were waiting for elective 
surgery in January 2016 and 1,492 patients received their elective surgery through the 
‘Surgery Connect” program in July, August and September 2015, it does not appear that the 
‘Surgery Connect’ program has made a substantial contribution to managing the waiting 
list.1094  
(ii) If a patient can afford intermediate treatment and such a strategy is available, then this 
strategy is effective 
According to some GPs interviewed, hospitals provide intermediate beds to public patients. 
That is, according to GP2, specialists ‘do have arrangements with the hospital’ for 
‘intermediate’ patients. GP2 described the intermediate system as ‘basically where they use 
doctors in private practice’ to treat public patients. GP4 believed this arrangement to be an 
effective strategy to mitigate a patient’s waiting time. However, GP2 considered 
intermediate beds as: 
ad hoc, again where you’ve got local GP’s knowledge of who to send, and 
that’s pretty spotty, depends on, again that depends on the person at the 
centre of the web. 
But nevertheless, GP2 provided an example of potentially successful intermediate option 
with a specialist who: 
can do a three hundred dollar arthroscope and she had a three week wait, and 
she was very impressed with that. But, the problem was it was only three 
hundred dollars as an intermediate patient. Now she has a three or four 
month wait, but there’s certainly ways of getting around it by using 
intermediate lists. 
However, as the example provides, the effectiveness of the intermediate option depends on a 
patient’s ability to fund the treatment, even though the treatment discussed was not very 
expensive, it is still dependent on the patient being able to afford the funds.  
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However, conversely GP9 noted that: 
some private specialists used to do surgeries in the public hospital, which 
they used to call intermediate, then they say generally doctors [are] fleecing 
the public system, so then they stopped, that was one way of outsourcing to 
public patients the private doctor sees and he operates in the public, it was 
giving the patients the private money, which is not happening so much now, 
so that was what was happening and that was scrapped. 
(iii) For orthopaedic patients, treatment provided while waiting for surgery is only effective if 
the patient does not need to proceed with surgery 
Three GPs noted that for orthopaedic patients, they are now assessed and treated by a 
physiotherapist prior to being seen by a specialist. GP6 seemed to indicate this strategy was 
effective as ‘[s]ometimes it obviates the need to get’ to the ‘specialist’.  Conversely, GP10 
said, ‘[i]f it is like a sprain or strain then it’s fine, so he’s now getting physio help and he can 
get better, but in the case where there is osteoarthritis that does need surgery, it doesn’t help’. 
Therefore, if an orthopaedic patient genuinely needs elective surgery, this strategy is unlikely 
to be of assistance. In fact, it may even increase their waiting time, as GP10 said that after 
physiotherapy, a patient ‘waits for that referral to go for whatever time frame that is’. 
(iv) Hospitals assist in managing patients’ expectations about their waiting time, however, this 
does not change their waiting time 
Somewhat similar to GPs managing patient expectations, two GPs considered hospitals 
managed patient expectations about the long wait. GP3 said, ‘[m]ost’ patients are: 
Accepting, because initially they will generally have an appointment at the 
hospital, which explains [to] them fairly clearly what their condition is and 
how urgent or how non-urgent it could be, and how long they’ll be waiting, 
so they have a fair idea of that. 
GP6 said hospitals respond to patients that their ‘application, it is being assessed’, this occurs 
‘usually within ten days, so they have a very quick turnaround’ and then maybe patients will 
‘get another one some months later saying you have been assessed as a category so so’. 
However, GP6 did not appear to believe that this timely response to a patient’s application 
was effective, because: 
often they won’t get an appointment until even some weeks before they’re 
actually getting an appointment, so they don’t even get notified that you’ll be 
seen in October, they might get told in September, you’ll be seen in October. 
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GP9’s comments are consistent with Queensland Health policy, which advises patients 
that:1095 
[o]nce you are added to the wait list, the hospital will send you and your GP 
a letter. This letter will tell you what urgency category you have been 
assigned and the date you were added to the elective surgery wait list. The 
hospital will contact you to confirm the date of your surgery. If you are in 
category 2 or 3, this is approximately 4 weeks prior to your proposed surgery 
date.  
 
(v) Summary: The limited government strategies available for managing patients on an 
elective surgery waiting list  
In summary, according to the perceptions of the GPs interviewed in this study, it appears the 
government strategies available to manage patients waiting for elective surgery are limited. 
The strategy that had the most support from the GPs interviewed seemed to be private 
practice clinics minimising the outpatient wait, that is, minimising the waiting time of 
patients before being placed on the elective surgery waiting list.  Also, utilising the private 
system for surgically treating patients funded by the public system also seemed be effective. 
However, both of these strategies are dependent on the government providing these services. 
Considering a minority of GPs interviewed mentioned these strategies, it is possible to infer 
these options were not widely available to the patients of those interviewed. Similarly, 
intermediate treatment of patients also seemed to be an effective strategy. However, again 
this strategy is dependent on the government providing this option, and further dependent on 
the patient being able to afford this intermediate level surgery. The option of receiving 
treatment while waiting for surgery appears limited to orthopaedic patients, and if the patient 
was never going to benefit from physiotherapy and needed surgery regardless, then this 
strategy may even result in further delaying the patient receiving elective surgery. In terms of 
the hospital managing patient expectations, this does not equate to a strategy for those 
patients to receive timely elective surgery. Accordingly, the perceptions of the GPs are that 
government strategies are limited for ensuring that patients receive timely elective surgery.  
(i) Conclusion: Is there a need for timely elective surgery? 
In conclusion, it can be inferred from the participant GPs’ comments that there is a need for 
timely elective surgery. Although the majority of GPs interviewed indicated that patients are 
waiting too long for non-urgent categories, GP1 was strongly of the opinion that patients are 
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waiting too long in all categories. It is arguable that a need for timely elective surgery is only 
required for less urgent conditions, however, given the examples provided by the GPs 
interviewed, adverse consequences of waiting too long occur across all categories of elective 
surgery. In any respect, although the elective surgery statistics discussed earlier in this 
chapter indicate patients waiting for urgent conditions are generally seen within their waiting 
times, not all patients are seen within that time frame (additionally not all patients are seen 
within clinically indicated times on the outpatient list). Given the urgency of their conditions, 
there is a need for these urgent patients to receive timely elective surgery. The GPs 
interviewed also indicated that the waiting list is not transparent and not predicable.  It is 
arguable that waiting in excess of their time frames and being unaware of their surgery date 
would be frustrating to patients. In addition, these patients may be suffering and 
experiencing secondary adverse consequences while waiting and likely assessing alternative 
options would be difficult when their surgical date is unable to be accurately predicted. 
Interestingly, some GPs accepted that waiting too long is simply part of a public health 
system. This difficulty of distributing resources to ensure patients are not waiting too long 
for elective surgery was discussed in Chapter 5, and a right minimising the usage of public 
resources was selected to mitigate this problem.   
According to the perceptions of GPs, it appears a patient’s waiting time is, to an extent, GP 
dependent, equating to an ad hoc and potentially an unfair system, which is at the discretion 
of the GP and the strategies chosen to be utilised by that GP. The waiting time of patients is 
also dependent on other variables, such as a patient’s location, the speciality required, the 
bureaucracy, the administrative processing of their referral, and the outpatient list. Again, 
these variables may potentially equate to an unfair and ad hoc system for patients. Further, 
GPs expressed concern that the options of patients managing their wait time or the available 
government options to manage patients wait times appear limited.  Further, the system 
potentially disadvantages those patients with limited financial resources. Even though there 
appears to be a need for timely elective surgery, did GPs consider there should be a right for 
patients to enforce timely elective surgery? 
2 Part B 
(a) Should there be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery? 
Part B explores whether there should be a right to timely elective surgery. That is, this 
part establishes participant GPs’ thoughts about the idea of imputing patients with a legal 
right to enable them to enforce receiving their elective surgery within the stipulated category 
time frames.    
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The normative aspect of whether patients should have a right to timely elective surgery was 
discussed in the previous chapter. The normative discussion concluded that society has 
limited resources to distribute for health care,1096 and therefore an unlimited right to timely 
elective surgery is unlikely to be sustainable. Accordingly, it was concluded that there needs 
to be a formula to prioritise patients waiting.  Similarly, GPs interviewed identified practical 
difficulties with an unlimited right to timely elective surgery. However, firstly, it is 
necessary to establish whether GPs thought patients needed an avenue to complain about 
waiting too long for surgery.   
(b) Part B: Themes 
In considering whether there should be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery, there 
were three major themes identified. The first major theme related to GPs’ perceptions about 
the complaint options available to patients waiting too long for elective surgery. The second 
major theme related to GPs’ perceptions about imputing a patient with an enforceable right 
to timely elective surgery.1097 The third major theme from the data related to GPs opinions 
about imputing a patient with a limited type right to timely elective surgery.1098 The above 
themes for Part B, should there be a right to timely elective surgery, are discussed below.  
(c) GPs’ perceptions about the complaint options available to patients waiting too 
long for elective surgery 
This theme discusses GPs’ views about the complaint options available to patients, including 
the adequacy of current complaint options available to patients and whether there needs to be 
better complaint options for patients. These sub-themes are discussed below.  
(i) The current complaint options for patients are limited 
GP1 and GP2 seemed unsure of the complaint options available to patients. GP1 said in 
relation to complaint mechanisms available to patients, ‘I presume there is, I don’t know if 
I’ve actually used them, but I’m sure there is’. Similarly, GP2 said, ‘I think there’s nothing 
that I know that patients can go ahead and do’. While GP3 indicated complaint options for 
patients were limited. GP3 said there were only two complaint options for patients, ‘I’m just 
aware of these two things about the complaints, just calling the hospital or coming back to 
the GP’. Similarly, GP2 was only aware of two options for patients, ‘[t]hey can come back, I 
                                                
 
1096 See, Tobin, above n 833, 12. 
1097 Note, the sub-themes for the second theme will be based on four governance assessment criteria – 
namely, whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable, manageable’: see, Fiona 
McDonald, ‘Working to Death: The Regulation of Working Hours in Health Care’ (2008) 30(1) Law 
and Policy 108, 113, 113.    
1098 Note, the sub-themes for the third theme will be based on four governance assessment criteria – 
namely, whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable, manageable’: see, ibid. 
 186 Chapter 6 
think they can ring the outpatient department and find out where they stand’. GP3 said once 
patients have ‘rung up, they’ve gone to emergency, perhaps spoken to someone political’ 
then ‘I don’t think there’s really anything much else they can do, they can complain to us’.  
GPs’ beliefs that there are limited complaint options for patients waiting too long for elective 
surgery appear to be substantiated, as Queensland Health only nominates two avenues for 
patients to complain, firstly, returning to their general practitioner1099 and secondly, 
contacting the hospital.1100  
(ii) There needs to be better complaint options for patients: ‘if it helps, why not’.   
Six GPs agreed there needs to be better complaint options for patients. GP9 said patients: 
should definitely have some place to approach in case there is a concern, the 
system can be within the hospital, like some type of department within 
Queensland Health that can listen to their complaints. 
GP10 also thought patients should have complaint options because:  
if you don’t complain, no-one notices. Even if I don’t see it as a direct cause 
and reaction, it still does work, because if you’re not complaining then that 
means you’re happy, then no-one is going to worry about you. 
Interestingly, GP1 said ‘more complaint options’ that ‘would be good’ because ‘it would 
take the pressure off me’. Similarly, GP4 also thought complaint options for patients would 
help the ‘GP who’s taking the brunt’: 
we are a buffer between the public system and the patient, so if there is much 
delay and the patient isn’t happy, if they can complain to the system, it 
would be easier for them and they can get a direct answer. 
Also, interestingly, GP3 considered complaint options for patients would help patients ‘be 
more patient’ if patients had ‘a fairer system of understanding of the wait time’. Again, GP3 
seemed somewhat accepting that there would be wait times and was focused on merely 
managing the patients’ expectations. It is therefore not surprising that GP3 also thought there 
should be a system where GPs were informed by the hospitals about waiting times to enable 
GPs to ‘communicate better to our patients’. Again, GP3 is merely considering managing the 
patient’s expectations rather than patients being entitled to have a positive complaint option. 
Akin to GP3, GP5 also accepted that patients would have to wait. GP5 believed the ‘public 
system is pretty crowded’ and ‘[e]veryone’s trying to do their job’, therefore, patients are ‘on 
                                                
 
1099 Queensland Health, above n 96. 
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a waiting list for a reason’, however, GP5 agreed with complaint options for patients and 
said ‘if it helps, why not’.  
Conversely, GP6 said ‘I’ve never thought’ patients need more complaint options because the 
complaint options are adequate. However, GP6 said: 
I don’t know if the hospitals have anybody, they almost need a hospital 
Ombudsman themselves, somebody who could deal with complaints in a 
conciliatory and mediatory form rather than a combative form about dealing 
with the complaint about the system. 
GP6 seemed supportive of a complaint option that would involve managing the patient about 
the waiting time rather than giving the patient mechanisms to effect direct change. GP9 also 
indicated a problem with resourcing in hospitals by saying ‘I think we are very, very 
understaffed specialist wise in the hospital’. Although GP9 agreed patients should have 
complaint options, ‘but more than complaint options, we shouldn’t have complaints’. That is, 
GP9 said:  
We should not waste money on complaint forms. If I was the one in charge, I 
would put all my money into resources, so there is never an issue. 
Similar to GP5, GP2 also believed the ‘doctors in the hospitals’ are ‘working hard’ they are 
‘not sitting and doing nothing’, if patients can enforce their waiting times, it will involve 
‘more paper work’ and result in ‘less clinical’ work.  
(iii) Summary: GP’s perceptions about the complaint options available to patients  
In summary, GPs’ perceptions indicated that elective surgery waiting time complaint options 
were limited. Considering the limited options available to patients, GPs interviewed seemed 
to support improved complaint options for patients. However, did the GPs support extend to 
imputing patients with an enforceable right to timely elective surgery?  
(d) GPs’ perceptions about imputing a patient with an enforceable right to timely 
elective surgery  
This theme discusses GPs’ views about imputing a patient with an enforceable right to 
timely elective surgery. The sub-themes of GPs’ perceptions about imputing a patient with 
an enforceable right are discussed below.  
(i) A legal right would be effective for patients 
GPs were specifically asked about the idea of imputing patients with a legal right. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, patients may have a theoretical right to timely elective 
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surgery derived from Nussbaum’s theory of justice. The majority of GPs interviewed 
agreed with the concept of a legal right for patients, because: 
• justice as fairness1101 indicates that people should have a right to complain (ie 
there should be a degree of transparency in relation to wait times); 
• there may be adverse consequences suffered by patients to their capabilities in 
terms of their physical and/or psychological functioning if timely elective surgery 
is not delivered to patients; and 
• timely health is a human right. For example, GP8 thought that ‘[t]he right to 
health is very important for everyone’.  
The majority of GPs considered a legal right would be effective, for example, GP1 
thought the ‘certainty’ of a right should result in ‘change’. GP2 also thought a legal 
right may be effective because the ‘bureaucrats will have to do something’. 
However, even GPs interviewed supporting the effectiveness of a legal right, noted 
the practical limitations of such a right including the limited efficiency, 
manageability and equity of the right. For example, GP1 said ‘I think in theory, yes’ 
there should be a legal right, ‘I just don’t know how that would work in practice’. The 
GPs’ views are set out below. 
 
(ii) A legal right would not be efficient  
The majority of GPs interviewed identified the financial constraints in realising a right to 
timely elective surgery and the ‘negative’ impact ‘on the expense wise’ of ‘tax payers’. GP2 
said that with a ‘growing population’: 
If the hospitals are not capable or equipped enough with staff and operation 
theatres and operation times, then it’s going to be getting worse day by day. 
And GP3 further noted that with the resources directed towards elective surgery if 
there was a legal right, that is, ‘if everyone’s’ utilising the ‘legal system how are 
things going to be diagnosed’. GP1 also queried how a legal right would work 
practically with limited resources: 
with a legal right comes a funding requirement, and it’s just the way, the 
way of the world, there is optimal funding to give the surgery that we want, 
                                                
 
1101 See generally, Rawls, above n 710, 3. 
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you know, whether it’s private or public, so I don’t really know how that 
would work in practice. 
GP8 indicated that a right would need to be supported by adequate resources: 
there should be provisions for having more medical staff to accommodate 
those types of procedures and surgeries, like being humans, they can only 
perform a certain amount of work in a day. 
While, GP10 saw the effect of a legal right as causing an ‘increase in litigation’ and 
associated costs and said:  
If we start suing each other like the Americans do, we’ll have a health 
system that is much more costly, [be]cause then costs will be included in the 
whole treatment plan. 
It is not surprising that GPs expressed concerns about the efficiency of an absolute right to 
timely elective surgery. As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature does not support 
an absolute right to timely elective surgery due to resource constraints.1102 
(iii) A legal right would not be manageable 
Practically, five GPs identified that it would also be difficult to manage a legal right for 
patients. GP2 thought that a legal right would be ‘making things more complicated’ 
than required ‘not only’ for ‘the public system, but the court system’.  A legal right 
would also ‘put more pressure on the doctors’, and create additional 
‘documentation’, which would ‘reduce’ doctor’s ‘efficiency’. GP7 also thought 
‘courts are to get overburdened’ and further indicated that a patient’s entitlement 
would be ‘very hard to prove, every human being is different, we can’t quantify what 
went wrong’. Therefore, GP7 thought that, ‘[a] legal right would have to be defined 
very clearly and who would define that right?’ and ‘[w]ho’s going to decide?’ GP9 
also considered managing a right might be complicated as ‘pain is very subjective, 
it’s very difficult to prove’. Similarly, GP6 said ‘I don’t think so’ in response to a 
legal right because ‘there’s too many greys in medicine’. GP5 identified the 
difficulty with prioritising patients and said: 
if there are two category 3 patients, how [are] you going to say to one, ‘I’m 
going to operate him on first’? 
                                                
 
1102 See, Tobin, above n 833, 12. 
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This difficulty of managing the prioritisation of patients was discussed in Chapter 5.  
Although the prioritisation of patients will involve some difficulty and will inherently 
involve subjectiveness, the overall prioritisation aim will be to prioritise patients with well-
defined and objective criteria.  
(iv) A legal right would not be equitable 
GP2, GP4 and GP10 did not consider that a legal right would be fair to surgeons, the public 
hospital system and GPs, respectively. GP2 said a legal right: 
may [cause] some unnecessary legal complications to the professional, 
who’s doing his job right and just because of the waiting period, it will be 
affecting him efficiency wise as well. 
While GP4 did not consider there should be a legal right because the public ‘system is trying 
to help the patients’. And GP10 noted a legal right is ‘not a good thing because this 
profession initially was based on trust’. GPs will also be ‘doing more hours’ for even ‘a 
simple thing like a headache’ to avoid being ‘sued later on’.   
However, the intent of the legal right distilled in Chapter 5 is to deliver timely elective 
surgery to those who have fallen below the capability threshold, the intent is not to give 
patients an unequitable right to sue medical providers for negligence. 
 
(v) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about imputing a patient with an enforceable right to timely 
elective surgery 
In summary, although the GPs interviewed were supportive of imputing patients with an 
enforceable right to timely elective surgery, there was hesitation regarding the practicality of 
such a right. That is, there was concern in relation to the efficiency, manageability and equity 
of the right. In view of the discussion in Chapter 5, the GPs difficulties with the right 
generally appear justified. However, the nominated right in Chapter 5 is framed to minimise 
these practical difficulties. 
(e) GPs’ feelings about imputing a patient with a limited type right to timely elective 
surgery  
This theme discusses GPs’ views about imputing a patient with a limited type enforceable 
right to timely elective surgery. That is, imputing patients with a limited right rather than an 
absolute right, so only patients waiting too long for elective surgery who are unable to 
pursue sufficiently good health are entitled to enforce a right, rather than patients who are 
merely frustrated with their waiting time. The sub-themes of GPs’ perceptions about 
imputing a patient with a limited enforceable right are discussed below.  
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(i) A limited legal right would be effective 
GP1 and GP2 considered this limited legal right might be effective for patients. GP1 did not 
believe a patient should be able to enforce a right to timely elective surgery if that patient 
was ‘doing fine’. The right should only apply to patients waiting outside the time frame 
where ‘there is... deterioration’. Similarly, GP2 thought patients ‘should have some sort of 
legal right to help’ if ‘their quality of life is completely down the drain’. GP1 and GP2’s 
views appeared consistent with a right to timely elective surgery based on Nussbaum’s 
approach, that is, individuals should be entitled to ‘truly human functioning’.1103   
 
 
(ii) A limited legal right would not be efficient: ‘going to cost a hell of a lot of money’ 
Conversely, GP3 was not supportive of a limited right. Again, GP3 relied on the difficulty of 
the hospital’s resourcing constraints. GP3 considered that it ‘comes back to how well the 
hospital has been equipped with their conditions’. Similarly, GP3 also identified 
‘[r]esourcing’ as a difficulty to implementing this right. Additionally, GP10 queried the 
efficiency of a right and believed the administration of such a legal right was ‘going to cost a 
hell of a lot of money, so I don’t know how they are going to implement it’. 
(iii) A limited legal right would not be manageable  
GP5 again noted the difficulties with managing the prioritisation of such a right, ‘it’s a very 
tough one to distinguish’: 
There’s a problem just categorising in category 2 and category 3, so it’s 
another kind of administrative thing, where you have to sit and further 
categorise who is in severe pain and then more people or somebody saying, I 
have severe pain and I think I need some legal help.   
GP3 also considered the subjective nature of pain causes difficulties prioritising patients 
entitled to a limited legal right, for example: 
There might be ten patients waiting for the hernia suffering from it in their 
day to day life, they might be leading a sedentary lifestyle. One of the ten 
might be a labourer for his job and his work [is] affected because he can’t 
work, because he gets pain of that, so again I think it’s very difficult. 
                                                
 
1103 Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
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The subjectiveness of a limited legal right caused GP10 to say ‘I don’t know how that’s 
going to work’: 
Who would decide whether this patient is adequately not being seen, if a 
patient is really needy or is he just really making a complaint? Then if it is 
true, then who takes up these issues for the patient on their behalf? Is it 
going to be a government agency, which is going to tackle all this, as the 
government backing off from a lot of things which cost money. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, managing the right would not be without its 
difficulties, however, the right should be applied as objectively as possible according to a 
patient’s health capabilities.  
(iv) A limited legal right would not be equitable 
Interestingly, GP8 thought a legal right should not apply to a select group of patients but 
instead a ‘right should be for everyone’ but ‘prioritised into categories’. GP8’s view is akin 
to Nussbaum’s belief that everyone should have a right to health care.  
(v) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about imputing a patient with a limited type right to timely 
elective surgery 
In summary, GPs interviewed had similar difficulties with a limited right as an 
absolute right. Again, GPs expressed doubts about the efficiency and manageability 
of the right. However, the equitability of the right troubled one GP because the right 
should include every patient. Although in theory, a right for all patients would be 
ideal and satisfy the capabilities approach, for reasons of finite resources, a limited 
right was considered necessary in Chapter 5. Essentially a limited type right was 
selected in the normative chapter to mitigate the practical difficulties of that right and 
to ensure its sustainability.   
(f) Conclusion: Should there be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery?  
In conclusion, the themes presented in Part B do not fully support an enforceable right to 
timely elective surgery. Although GPs interviewed believed that the complaint options 
available to patients were limited and patients’ complaint options needed improving and 
supported a right in theory, there was hesitation about whether an enforceable right or even a 
limited right was necessary or appropriate in reality. It may be possible to infer from the data 
that the underlying hesitation stemmed from GPs’ expressed concerns for their own 
profession and other medical professionals within the hospital system and the risk a legal 
right may pose to them. However, as discussed in Part B of this chapter, the right would not 
a right of negligence against medical staff. Yet, the more obvious hesitation from GPs 
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interviewed stemmed from manageability and resources type difficulties GPs had with such 
a right.   
Assuming there was an enforceable right, how did GPs view the possible implementation 
strategies for a right to timely elective surgery?  
 
 
3 Part C 
(a) How would a right to timely elective surgery be implemented? 
Part C explores how a right to timely elective surgery would be implemented. The data 
collected for this part primarily stems from the ranking question provided to the GPs to 
complete and the discussion related to those answers. GPs were asked to rank elective 
surgery remedies for patients who have waited too long to receive elective surgery. 
Implementation remedies applicable to Part C included GPs considering a Health 
Ombudsman, an expert tribunal, courts, and monetary compensation as options. The ranking 
answers provided by GPs indicated that an expert tribunal was the most supported 
implementation option for a right to timely elective surgery, followed by a health 
ombudsman, the courts, and finally, monetary compensation.  
(b) Part C: Themes 
In considering whether there should be an enforceable right to timely elective surgery, four 
major themes were identified. The first theme related to GPs’ perceptions about a Health 
Ombudsman.1104 The second theme related to GPs’ perceptions about an expert tribunal.1105 
The third theme related to GPs’ perceptions about the courts.1106 The fourth theme related to 
GPs’ perceptions about monetary compensation.1107 The above themes for Part C, how 
would a right to timely elective surgery should be implemented, are discussed below.  
(c) GPs’ perceptions about a Health Ombudsman 
                                                
 
1104 Note, the sub-themes for theme one are based on four governance assessment criteria – namely, 
whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable, manageable’: see, McDonald, above n 
1097, 113.    
1105 Note, the sub-themes for theme two are based on four governance assessment criteria – namely, 
whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable, manageable’: see, McDonald, above n 
1097, 113. 
1106 Note, the sub-themes for theme three are based on five governance assessment criteria – namely, 
whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable, manageable and politically legitimate’: 
see, McDonald, above n 1097, 113. 
1107 Note, the sub-themes for theme four are based on three governance assessment criteria – namely, 
whether the policy would be ‘effective, efficient, equitable’: see, McDonald, above n 1097, 113. 
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GPs’ feelings about a Health Ombudsman as an implementation strategy for an enforceable 
right to timely elective surgery are discussed below.   
(i) A health ombudsman would be effective provided the Ombudsman was appropriately 
trained 
Four GPs believed a Health Ombudsman would be an effective implementation body. GP3, 
GP4 and GP8 seemed to indicate a Health Ombudsman would be able to assume an 
investigative type role for patients waiting too long. GP3 said the health ombudsman: 
might look into complaints and see if, out of those people who have been 
waiting too long, they would be better by having the surgery done earlier, so 
that might work well. 
GP8 specifically thought in cases where there has been: 
Malpractice, or vindictive, or problematic [issues] to a patient, some kind of 
problem, the Health Ombudsman is approached, they can look after that. 
GP4 thought a Health Ombudsman: 
would be a good option for somebody who’s not connected to either 
department to take the complaint and try to find out the cause and sort it out. 
Similar to GP4, GP7 also indicated a Health Ombudsman needs to be independent and 
additionally possess the requisite medical knowledge, that is, a health ombudsman:  
should be appropriately trained, they should be a doctor and their position 
has to be a temporary position. 
Conversely, GP9 did not believe a Health Ombudsman would be effective based on their 
lack of medical expertise, similar to GP7’s views of ensuring the health ombudsman should 
be a doctor. GP9 described the Health Ombudsman as: 
like having an expert tribunal but no medical experience. I went to the 
Ombudsman once and they gave a good reason, so they just take facts... 
...What I know about these guys, they will give you whatever the facts are, 
on what your rights, so they will show you the light, that’s all that they do. 
(ii) A Health Ombudsman would not be efficient 
A number of GPs indicated that implementing a right through the Health Ombudsman would 
involve efficiency difficulties, because the process would be time consuming. GP1 indicated 
that the health ombudsman would ‘become this massive bureaucracy’, which would take 
time for patients ‘to get seen’. GP3 also indicated a Health Ombudsman would be ‘time 
consuming’ and GP6 said it would be ‘slow’. It ‘depends on how much does it take for the 
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Health Ombudsman... to decide the case’, it could turn into a ‘nightmare for the patient’ 
unless patients ‘didn’t have to wait, that would be a good option’. GP10 queried the time it 
would take the health ombudsman to hear a case.   
 (iii) A Health Ombudsman would not be manageable  
GP1 and GP3 noted that a Health Ombudsman would involve manageability difficulties. 
GP1 said the Health Ombudsman would ‘get defunded by the next subsequent government 
anyway, it will get too expensive’. GP3 referred to the option of a Health Ombudsman 
requiring ‘more money’ and ‘financial constraint’. 
(iv) A Health Ombudsman would not be equitable 
The impartibility of a Health Ombudsman might assist in ensuring equitable outcomes for 
patients. GP4 thought that it’s a: 
good option for somebody who’s not connected to either department to take 
the complaint and try to find out the cause and sort it out. 
And GP7 considered the Health Ombudsman’s term should be ‘temporary’ rather than 
indefinite. Interestingly, GP6 thought Queensland’s Health Quality Complaints Commission, 
which is now the Health Ombudsman, was ‘heavily weighted against the medical people’. 
However, the Queensland Health Ombudsman Act 2013 states that the Ombudsman ‘must 
act independently’.1108 While GP5 thought a Health Ombudsman would not be fair to 
doctors, it will cause ‘stress’ and ‘everyone will protect themselves’.GP5 provided the 
following example: 
I think complaints are for poor performance, where medicine is concerned 
they are absolutely liable. But these are matters of something which you do 
even if you write a referral. If I’m going to write a referral that’s categorised 
based on what I write, he has not seen the patient himself, so he does a 
referral, he does categorise a patient based on what I write on my, on what I 
think, not what I would think is not, is consequential, when he sees the 
patient then he may find that would be consequential, he’s a specialist, but 
he categorises the patient then very strong what he read on the referral. So 
when he sees the patient, he says I think we should have seen you earlier, so 
then who is liable, is it the GP, is the specialist liable? So obviously, so the 
GP protects himself, the specialist will protect himself. 
(v) Summary: GPs’perceptions about a Health Ombudsman 
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In summary, GPs’ perceptions were that a Health Ombudsman would be effective although 
there was indication that the Ombudsman would need to be appropriately trained. There was 
also a concern raised by a GP regarding the expense of administering complaints, although 
interestingly, the other 9 GPs did not raise such a concern suggesting that they may not have 
seen the Health Ombudsman as being a significant resourcing concern. Supporting this view 
is Flood and May’s argument that an Ombudsman should be able to ‘economically resolve’ 
issues relating to timely treatment.1109   
In terms of the manageability, GPs’ feelings were that a Health Ombudsman would be a 
slow process and may have a potential bias against doctors. However, the Health 
Ombudsman’s ‘vision’ states:1110 
[t]o be the cornerstone of a transparent, accountable and fair system for 
effectively and expeditiously dealing with complaints and other matters 
related to the provision of healthcare in Queensland. 
Also, Flood and May indicated that an Ombudsman should be able to resolve matters 
relating to timely treatment ‘quickly’;1111 however, in reality this may prove to be different. 
It further appears there may be an underlying self-interest of the GPs interviewed to protect 
their profession against potential liability as an indirect consequence of a patient’s 
complaints process about their waiting time.  
Another concern raised by one GP was that the position of the Health Ombudsman should 
hold a temporary position. Although the current Health Ombudsman does not occupy a 
temporary position, the aim of the Health Ombudsman is nevertheless intended to be a 
‘transparent, accountable and fair system’.1112 Flood and May also indicated an ‘Independent 
Ombudsman’ would be the preferred option ensuring timely treatment of patients.1113 
Therefore, it may be possible to add to the current Health Ombudsman’s authority the ability 
to manage patients’ rights to timely elective surgery. Overall, the GPs’ perceptions towards a 
Health Ombudsman were supportive; however, the GPs’ views were more or less supportive 
of an expert tribunal?  
(d) GPs’ perceptions about an expert tribunal 
GPs’ perceptions about an expert tribunal as an implementation strategy for an enforceable 
right to timely elective surgery are discussed below.   
                                                
 
1109 Flood and May, above n 18, 1583, 1586. 
1110 Office of the Health Ombudsman, About Us (2016) <http://www.oho.qld.gov.au/about-us/office-
of-the-health-ombudsman/>. 
1111 Flood and May, above n 18, 1586. 
1112 Office of the Health Ombudsman, above n 1110. 
1113 Flood and May, above n 18, 1586. 
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(i) An expert tribunal would be effective, provided the tribunal is comprised of professionals: 
‘I think they can be a good assessor’ 
The majority of GPs considered that an expert tribunal would be an effective body to manage 
a patient’s waiting time complaint. Three GPs thought the expert tribunal would effectively 
assess the complaint. GP1 said ‘I think they can be a good assessor’ based on ‘experience’; 
but GP1 also noted that ‘it’s just going to be doctors’ that are ‘just going, yes, whatever’. 
GP4 noted that an expert tribunal would ‘assess’ the ‘cause’ of a patient’s ‘delay’. GP5 
thought the tribunal ‘can discuss, if and what can be done and look at the complaint’. 
Additionally, GP5, GP9 and GP2 thought the tribunal should be comprised of medical 
practitioners. GP8 said, the tribunal: 
should be professional, because we are asking for a professional opinion, we 
are not asking for an emotional support, it’s just like if you need legal 
advice, you go to a lawyer. 
Similarly, GP9 thought the tribunal should be comprised of medical practitioners, that is, 
GP9 said ‘[s]olve it clinically’ – ‘[i]t’s a clinical problem, only a clinical person will satisfy a 
GP and the patient’. GP2 said ‘what I like about’ the expert tribunal is that ‘medical 
practitioners’ ‘comprise’ the panel, ‘at least they will know both sides’. In addition, GP5 
considered that a relevant specialist on the expert tribunal panel would be beneficial, namely:  
a honouree position from each speciality, so which speciality case you’re 
talking about. [Be]cause someone from surgery cannot decide on the priority 
of someone from some other area. 
Conversely GP6 did not believe the tribunal should be comprised of a specialist but rather 
GPs and community members. Although GP6 said ‘if you get... experienced medical’ 
professionals ‘they can usually come to a fairly smart, timely decision’; GP6 said: 
I think it’s good to have some community members, it’s just very useful to 
have it level and the medical people shouldn’t be specialists, because they 
have no idea what goes on outside the real world, there should be some GPs 
in there. 
That is, GP6 thought ‘common sense is not very common but some good sensible people 
they’ve got an idea of what it’s like for the outside world’ – ‘I think it’s very useful for 
people to have an opinion from a non-medical person about – do you realise how 
inconvenient it is for this person to wait so long?’ Additionally, GP7 provided a similar view 
of the expert tribunal to GP6 by saying, ‘there should be some members from the 
community’. While GP3 considered ‘it might be more beneficial putting doctors to treat 
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rather than’ having an expert tribunal ‘dealing with’ patients’ ‘complaints’. That is, rather 
than taking resources away from the frontline to manage complaints, resources would be 
better directed towards patients receiving surgery. Although the expert tribunal would 
inevitability cost money (although less money than most other implementation strategies), it 
would be a necessary cost to ensure the right was effective for patients to receive timely 
elective surgery.  
(ii) An expert tribunal would not be efficient 
Similar to the option of a health ombudsman, GP3 referred to the option of an expert tribunal 
as a body that would require ‘more money’ and involve ‘financial constraint’. Likewise, a 
number of GPs queried the length of time an expert tribunal would take to consider a claim. 
Akin to a health ombudsman, three GPs considered an expert tribunal might be slow. GP3 
said, an expert tribunal would be ‘time consuming’. GP6 thought an expert tribunal was ‘not 
necessarily going to be much faster’ than a Health Ombudsman; although GP6 also 
considered that if the tribunal was comprised of ‘experienced’ practitioners they would 
‘usually’ arrive at a ‘timely decision’. GP10 considered that it ‘all depends on how much’ 
time it would ‘take for the’ expert tribunal ‘to decide the case’.  
(iii) An expert tribunal would not be manageable  
GP6 considered the subjectivity of illness and because ‘each hospital waiting lists are 
different, each area is different, departments are different’ it would be difficult for the 
tribunal to prioritise patients. GP described the situation as ‘very complex’: 
Sometimes you have a patient with grade four arthritis, you look at the 
history and it’s like totally worn out, but the patient doesn’t have any 
symptoms, sometimes quality of life is good and sometimes [the] patient has 
grade one arthritis and quality of life is totally bad, so which one needs to be 
done first?  
(iv) An expert tribunal would not be equitable 
GP1 considered that an expert tribunal comprised only of doctors may be a ‘little biased 
towards doctors and back-up triaging system’. While GP7 thought that if the tribunal 
members included community members rather than individuals ‘in a government position 
they tend to be more logical, [be]cause they know this is not everything, so let me do the 
right thing while I’m here’. However, some GPs’ views, as stated above, indicated that 
medical professionals would be the most appropriate persons for solving the clinical 
dilemma, this may result in the most equitable outcome for patients.   
(v) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about an expert tribunal  
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In summary, GPs interviewed thought an expert tribunal would be effective.  Although more 
GPs considered an expert tribunal should be comprised of doctors, there was also opinion to 
suggest the tribunal should be comprised of some community members. As one GP 
suggested, an expert tribunal comprised of doctors could be biased towards doctors. Of 
course an expert tribunal with some community members may balance any potential bias. 
However, the following chapter will argue that the most effective administrative forum for 
the right to timely surgery may likely be a tribunal panel comprised of ‘subject-matter’ 
experts, that is, medical practitioners.1114 Literature indicates that it is more likely that health 
provider compliance will be achieved provided the body is impartial; therefore, it is 
important the tribunal is structured as an independent body.1115  
Interestingly, only one GP expressed concern about the resources required for an expert 
tribunal. It may be possible to infer that this was not a significant concern of GPs 
interviewed regarding the expert tribunal. Literature also indicates that administrative 
avenues (such as an expert tribunal) are less expensive, which would create a fairer avenue 
for individuals to claim their right to health care and not be unduly disadvantaged due to 
limited finances.1116  
Furthermore, GPs’ concerns related to how the tribunal would manage the right.  Some GPs 
were concerned an expert tribunal could be slow and may have difficulties prioritising 
patients to receive timely elective surgery. However, literature indicates that administrative 
avenues (such as an expert tribunal) would be a more timely option than litigation, this 
would be particularly important, as individuals would be waiting outside of their clinically 
indicted time frames.1117 In terms of difficulties prioritising, the right would need to be 
framed for objective implementation (although some subjectivity is inevitable) with clearly 
defined prioritisation formula, as discussed in Chapter 5, so as mitigate this manageability 
dilemma.  
(e) GPs’ perceptions about the courts 
GPs’ perceptions about courts as an implementation strategy for an enforceable right to 
timely elective surgery are discussed below.   
(i) The courts would not be effective 
Interestingly only GP1 thought implementing a right to timely elective surgery through the 
courts would be an effective option. GP1 thought ‘if there’s actual legal precedent’ then 
                                                
 
1114 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 88. 
1115 Flood and May, above n 18, 1583. 
1116 King, above n 1114, 91. 
1117 Ibid 86. 
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there is ‘often change as a result of that’. While GP8 and GP9 considered the option of the 
courts would only be useful in limited circumstances.  GP8 thought courts would be useful: 
in cases where people get slipped out of the system and sometimes there can 
be some type of miscommunication between the doctors in that case. 
And GP9 thought courts would be effective if a patient ‘got harmed’ but should be heard at 
the expert tribunal level first and the courts can ‘take advice from the expert tribunal’.    
(ii) The courts would not be efficient: ‘we shouldn’t fill the courts up with stupid medical 
stuff’   
Three GPs thought utilising the court system was a poor utilisation of the legal system’s 
resources. GP1 said, ‘I think the courts tend to actually have a lot more important things 
than’ implementing a right to timely elective surgery. Similarly, GP9 thought: 
Courts have more important roles to play, if there are other authorities that 
can look after these things, why clog up the legal system, again using the 
resources. 
GP9 also said, ‘we shouldn’t fill the courts up with stupid medical stuff’. GP7 thought ‘that 
the last thing you want to do is burden our courts’ as this would be inefficient.  
(iii) The courts are not manageable: ‘I just think of law as being slow, taking ages’  
GPs perceived the court system to be slow at delivering judgements. As GP6 said, ‘I just 
think of law as being slow, taking ages’. GP10 thought that if patients ‘didn’t have to wait, 
that would be a good option’. GP2 also thought courts would be ‘[t]ime consuming’ and said 
this option: 
would put a lot of pressure on everyone, obviously the patients and the 
doctors and the hospitals and a lot of paper work involved, a lot of 
documentation, you have to go back two years to get everything out. 
The ‘pressure’ of a legal right identified by GP2 was also noted by GP5, specifically, GP5 
said, ‘how do you expect a doctor to actually perform what he’s doing?’ 
While GP8 noted the difficulty managing the prioritising of patients: 
If the court tries to force getting the surgery done, for example, if someone 
has an in growing toe nail, which [is] problematic but it’s not life 
threatening, but if the court says ‘no, this has to be done tomorrow at this 
hospital’ and they have someone with a burst appendix, which takes 
priority? 
(iv) The courts are not equitable 
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A potential difficulty of implementing a right to timely elective surgery through the courts is 
the potential disadvantage to those patients unwilling or unable to pursue such action, as 
described by GP3:  
legal proceedings, it does not mean everyone would go for legal 
proceedings, whoever went for the legal proceedings would be granted by 
the court to go and have that surgery done, but what if someone is sitting 
home with more urgent conditions and cannot afford for the legal 
proceeding, then he might be going down the list. 
That is, legal proceedings may: 
Discriminate for the people for those who do not go for the legal 
proceedings; [they] may go down the list and if that happens then everyone 
would want to go for the legal proceedings. 
While two GPs did not believe the court system would be fair to doctors. GP4 said:  
legal is more if they’re at fault, if they’ve been re-assessed and seen and 
there is no problem with the life or their general condition, why should they 
be put through that system? 
Similarly, GP5 said:  
I think everyone struggles to realise that every doctor sitting there is not 
related to anything, so if they make a decision based for a patient they are 
doing it in the best interest of the patient and not that because they have 
something against one patient. The system, the public system, is already so 
clogged up, they’re already subject to so many different suits and already 
different ways of doing this and doing that. 
(v) The courts are politically legitimate: ‘courts always make things transparent’ 
GP1 noted that implementing a legal right to timely elective surgery through the court 
system is ‘a reasonable option, [be]cause I think courts always make things transparent’. 
(vi) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about the courts 
In summary, GPs expressed strong opposition to the idea of courts implementing rights to 
timely elective surgery. In fact, only one GP thought courts would be a good idea to effect 
change and ensure transparency. This GP’s comment is consistent with the literature, that is, 
courts are required to deliver transparent reasoning for their decisions ‘subject to scrutiny for 
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its rationality and consistency’;1118 the courts are independent from the government;1119 and 
also, court decisions create a platform for ‘publicity’ sometimes to ‘rally political support 
and draw media attention to particular issues’.1120 However, interestingly, GPs considered a 
right to timely elective surgery as not sufficiently important to implement through the court 
system.   
There were also management difficulties identified by GPs, namely problems with the length 
of court proceedings, prioritising rights and the adverse pressure suffered by doctors. The 
literature indicates that the judicial process is in fact expensive and time-consuming,1121 and 
therefore courts are an unequitable implementation strategy for public hospital patients 
requiring timely elective surgery. However, in terms of the difficulties of prioritising 
patients, this would be mitigated similarly as for the expert tribunal, as discussed above.  
In terms of the equity of utilising the courts, there was concern that courts would not be a fair 
method for doctors, as it is not their fault. This is again, a possible indication that GPs 
interviewed may be trying to protect their own profession. However, the right, as discussed 
previously, would not be a right of negligence against medical staff, merely a right of 
prioritisation. However, GPs’ views were balanced by indicating courts may be unfair to 
patients, that is, disadvantage those patients who do not bring court proceedings or cannot 
afford to bring proceedings due to lack of resources. The literature supports the GPs’ 
concerns, that is, it is predicable that within those deserving a right to timely surgery, an 
individual with the resources to bring a court action may be prioritised before a more 
deserving individual. That is, an individual bringing the action with more capabilities may be 
given precedence over an individual with less capabilities – this situation could harm the 
poor without the financial resources to bring a court action.1122   
In addition, similar to the views of interviewed GPs, it will be concluded in the following 
chapter that the courts would not be the preferred platform to primarily implement the right.  
(f) Monetary Compensation  
GPs’ feelings about monetary compensation as an implementation strategy for an 
enforceable right to timely elective surgery are discussed below.  
(i) Monetary compensation would not be effective: ‘Don’t give compensation’ 
                                                
 
1118 King, above n 1114, 61.  
1119 Ibid. 
1120 Ibid. 
1121 Ibid 85. 
1122 Ram-Tiktin, above n 56, 340; Frank B Cross, ‘The Error of Positive Rights’ (2001) 48 UCLA Law 
Review 857, 924.  
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None of the GPs interviewed indicated that unfettered monetary compensation would be an 
effective option for patients wishing to implement their right to timely elective surgery. Four 
GPs indicated that if the monetary compensation was directed towards patients receiving 
their surgery privately then in that situation compensation may be effective. GP2 said: unless 
patients ‘can access private doctors’, then ‘[t]he problem is still there’. GP3 thought that 
‘rather than giving one to one patient and not to the others’, it would be better ‘to get the 
surgery done privately’. In GP5’s view: 
instead of awarding monetary compensation to the patient, I think they’d be 
better giving the same amount to the doctor to do it privately, which they are 
actually, do it anyways. 
GP10 said if patients have ‘waited outside their time, then the public system should pay them 
to get it done quickly in a private hospital’. While GP1 thought that, ‘money doesn’t make it 
adequate’ for patients. GP6 communicated the most negative response by saying, ‘giving 
them money for being late, that’s just ridiculous’ and ‘outrageous’. 
(ii) Monetary compensation would not be efficient 
Again, this option caused concern for GPs interviewed regarding the availability of resources 
to fund monetary compensation. GP7 said: ‘money compensation, we are already stretching 
our budget, who’s going to provide the “money”’. GP9 thought ‘all that money will go from 
Medicare to compensation, so no, we cannot afford’ monetary compensation. While GP6 did 
not agree with compensation since ‘[i]t’s a free system, why should we pay with an arbitrary 
time frame?’ 
(iii) Monetary compensation would not be equitable 
Similar to GP4’s view about utilising the court system for a legal right to timely elective 
surgery, GP4 also thought monetary compensation would not be fair to doctors because:  
they are doing their job and they are trying their best, if there is a delay they 
should not be considered as a failure to pay them. 
While GP8 and GP9 were concerned about monetary compensation not being appropriately 
utilised by some patients, GP8 said: 
I know a lot of people that [would] try to evade the procedure themselves 
just to get compensation one way or the other, like delay everything within 
the legal perimeters. 
Similarly, GP9 thought: 
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Compensation, it will confuse the system, so they will deliberately go 
beyond that wait, like change their address or they didn’t get the letter, so 
they play with the system, go beyond the waiting time and then want 
compensation.  
GP9 further warned: 
Don’t give compensation, it will become like Centrelink, they give funny 
excuses to get on Centrelink and they will get paid, then it will become 
another Centrelink, it will allow the system to be abused. 
(iv) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about monetary compensation  
In summary, there was even stronger opinion from GPs interviewed against monetary 
compensation than utilising the courts for implementing a right to timely elective 
surgery. One GP even described compensation as ‘outrageous’. The majority view 
did not consider compensation appropriate and would prefer for that money to be 
directed towards patients receiving the surgery privately. The efficiency of monetary 
compensation was also objected to on the basis of limited resources in a public health 
system. Finally, monetary compensation was viewed as being unfair to doctors who 
are merely undertaking their jobs and as a potential avenue for some patients to take 
advantage of the system. Again, these concerns are discussed in the following 
chapter and it is concluded that monetary compensation has a significant difficulty, 
that is, the mechanism would not deliver timely elective surgery to patients, and 
would therefore be an unlikely suitable implementation strategy for a right to timely 
elective surgery.  
(g) Conclusion: How would a right to timely elective surgery be implemented?  
In conclusion, from the GPs’ interviewed, the expert tribunal was the preferred 
implementation strategy for an enforceable right to timely elective surgery, followed by the 
Health Ombudsman. There were practical concerns raised by GPs in relation to both entities 
and these issues are considered further in the following chapter. The literature supports an 
impartial, inexpensive, and timely body to hear issues relating to delayed treatment,1123 
which could be effectively executed by an expert tribunal. However, the data indicates GPs 
interviewed were the least supportive of implementing a right through the courts and 
monetary compensation. The literature also aligns with GPs’ concerns that courts would be 
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expensive,1124 and may unfairly disadvantage those without the funds to pursue litigation.1125 
In terms of monetary compensation, as discussed, this is not a solution for patients to receive 
timely elective surgery, that is, the objective of the right would not be met with this strategy.  
The discussion in the following chapter also aligns with the GPs’ views that the courts or 
monetary compensation would not be the preferred implementation strategies.   
4 Part D 
(a) If not an enforceable right, then what are the GPs’ views about the respective 
strengths of the alternative strategies for ensuring patients receive timely elective 
surgery? 
Part D explores the following scenario: if there was not an enforceable right to timely 
elective surgery, then what are the GPs’ views about the respective strengths of the 
alternative strategies for ensuring patients receive timely elective surgery. The data collected 
for this part primarily stems from the ranking question provided to the GPs to complete and 
the discussion related to those answers. Similar to Part C of this chapter, GPs were asked to 
rank elective surgery remedies for patients who have waited too long to receive elective 
surgery. Implementation remedies applicable to Part D included GPs considering increasing 
private health insurance subsidies, not changing the current system, and introducing a wait 
time guarantee. As the wait time guarantee was only introduced at the time of interviewing 
GP6, only GP6 to GP10 were asked to consider a wait time guarantee as an option. Although 
as previously discussed, the wait time guarantee in Queensland has since ceased.  
The ranking answers indicated that increasing private health insurance subsidies was the 
most supported by GPs interviewed, followed by the wait time guarantee and finally, no 
changes to the current system. Additionally, GPs interviewed also discussed other options to 
decrease the waiting time of patients, these included strengthening the public health system, 
better managing the wait lists, improving transparency/communication with GPs, improving 
the waiting list complaint system, decreasing the outpatient waiting list, outsourcing to 
private hospitals, and strengthening the private health system.  
The themes stemming from Part D are discussed below.  
(b) Part D: Themes 
In considering the question of whether there was not an enforceable right to timely elective 
surgery, then what were the GPs’ views about the respective strengths of the alternative 
strategies, there were four major themes distilled. The first theme related to GPs’ perceptions 
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about private health insurance. The second theme related to GPs’ perceptions of a wait time 
guarantee. The third theme related to GPs’ perceptions about whether the current system 
should be changed. The fourth theme related to GPs’ perceptions about alternative strategies 
not provided in the ranking questions. 
The above themes for Part D: if there was not an enforceable right to timely elective surgery, 
then what were the GPs’ views about the respective strengths of the alternative strategies for 
ensuring patients receive timely elective surgery, are discussed below.  
(c) GPs’ perceptions about private health insurance 
GPs’ perceptions about increasing private health insurance subsidies are discussed within the 
following sub-theme below.  
(i) Increasing private health insurance would be effective: ‘it would take the load off from the 
public hospitals’ 
The majority of GPs interviewed believed increasing private health insurance subsidies could 
be an effective strategy for ensuring patients receive timely elective surgery. GP2 thought 
this strategy would ‘take the load off from the public hospital’, GP4 said it would be ‘less 
strain on the public system’, GP7 thought this strategy ‘would help’, GP8 considered it 
would minimise the pressure on the public hospitals, GP9 said it would ‘take the pressure 
off’, and GP3 thought it would be it would be a good system to ensure patients ‘get proper 
care’.   
However, GP10 thought increasing private health subsidies: 
only catches someone who’s been already waiting. The private health 
insurance is going to have a wait list – they normally won’t be covered for 
twelve months. If the government can also say that these patients can have 
shorter waiting.  
Conversely, GP5 said ‘I don’t agree’ that private health subsidies should be increased. GP5 
made the point that in relation to private health insurance subsidies ‘I think the government 
is already doing, quite a bit of it’. While GP6 noted that ‘some’ degree of ‘private heath 
rebatable stuff has just been removed by the Federal government, so quite a few people 
dropped out again’. Additionally, GP6 noted the practical difficulty with private health 
insurance, that is:  
if you have full private health insurance, there can be huge gaps, and I really 
know why people don’t take out private health insurance, because the gaps 
are just unmanageable and sometimes I think some of the specialists ask 
ridiculous fees. 
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(d) GPs’ perceptions about a wait time guarantee 
The wait time guarantee was introduced by the previous Queensland government during 
November 2014. Interestingly, GP6 thought the introduction of the wait time guarantee was 
the: 
government being a bit narky and thumbing their nose a bit at the public 
doctors, whom they could also get to do some of this, if they were more 
efficient and worked a bit more actively. 
It is assumed GP6’s comment stems from the tension between the previous Queensland 
government and public hospital doctors concerning the difficult negotiations with 
employment contracts, which occurred prior to the introduction of the wait time 
guarantees.1126 However, with the change of government, the wait time guarantee was 
abolished. GP1 to GP5 were interviewed prior to the introduction of the wait time 
guarantees.  Accordingly, data was only collected from GP6 to GP10 in relation to the wait 
time guarantee. Interestingly, the majority of GPs interviewed thought a wait time guarantee 
would be effective.   
GPs’ feelings about the wait time guarantee are discussed within the following sub-themes 
below. 
(i) A waiting time guarantee would be effective provided elective surgery was also outsourced 
to private hospitals  
GP7 generally thought a wait time guarantee was a ‘good idea’ and said at the time, ‘at least 
something will be done’. While GP6, GP9 and GP10 thought a wait time guarantee would 
need the support of the private system to be effective. GP6 thought: 
they’ve got a good chance if the private hospitals are going to benefit, they’ll 
work like crazy to make it work cause they’re efficient, cause if you open 
your eyes, you’re out in the private hospital. They can really turn patients 
over and really effectively do things if it’s involving the private, they’ve got 
every chance.  
Similarly, GP9 did not believe public hospitals have the capacity to take more patients and 
said in relation to the wait time guarantee working – ‘I will believe it when I see it’. GP9 
thought if surgeries were outsourced to public hospitals then the wait time guarantee ‘[t]hat 
                                                
 
1126 Kelmeny Fraser and Janelle Miles, ‘Campbell Newman Can’t Get Foreign Doctors to Replace 
Public Specialists in Time, Says Australian Salaried Medical Officers Federation’ (21 March 2014) 
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doctors-to-replace-public-specialists-in-time-says-australian-salaried-medical-officers-
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could work, [be]cause that is another way of increasing staff’. At the time of interviewing 
GP10, the wait time guarantee had been in operation and GP10 thought the guarantee ‘had 
started to show some results’; however, noted that: 
Things have stalled a bit, I think they are waiting for the government to 
make some sort of a policy whether it’s going to be shelved or not, I think 
people are waiting in part to see which side the tide is going to turn, then 
they decide what needs to be done. So I think everyone has slackened off a 
bit. 
GP8 also believed a wait time guarantee was subject to ‘[l]imited staff and limited resources; 
but when they are outsourcing yes the chances are better’. As the government did rescind the 
wait time guarantee, whether the wait time guarantee would have significantly improved 
patients’ waiting time is unable to be assessed.  
(e) GPs’ perceptions about whether the current system should be changed 
GPs’ perceptions about whether the current system should be changed is discussed within the 
following sub-theme below.  
(i) The current system should be changed: ‘there has to be some changes’ 
Three GPs thought the current Queensland Health system for managing wait times of 
patients was acceptable. GP2 said ‘I’ve got good experience’, GP3 said the system is ‘not too 
bad, it’s not a complete disaster’, and GP4 thought the system was not ‘too bad’.   
Conversely, four GPs thought the current system needed changes. GP5 said ‘there has to be 
some changes’, GP7 thought there should be ‘some real positive’ change, GP8 also agreed 
the system ‘needs changes’ and GP10 said, ‘[t]here needs to be some change’.   
(f) GPs’ perceptions about alternative strategies not provided in the ranking 
questions 
GPs’ perceptions about alternative strategies not provided in the ranking questions are 
discussed within the following sub-themes below. Some of the GPs did include some of their 
own suggestions for improving the waiting list for the ranking answers, other suggestions 
were verbal. Strategies discussed included strengthening the public health system, including 
better management of waiting lists, improving transparency and communication of the 
waiting times with GPs, improving the waiting complaint system, and decreasing the 
outpatient waiting list. Additionally, strengthening the private system was discussed, which 
included outsourcing to private hospitals and improving private health.  
(i) Strengthening the public health and private health systems would assist in decreasing the 
waiting time of patients 
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Strengthening the public health system 
Firstly, in terms of strengthening the public system, GP1 provided the most support for 
improving public health as a solution to long waiting lists. GP1’s suggestion was:  
committing more to public health, and personally, and not so much focusing 
on the fact that the private will relieve the public pressure, because it won’t.  
You need to actually make public health work better and not just sort of have 
this sort of, ad hoc, sort of, a system. 
It was not surprising GPs interviewed thought more resources were required for patients to 
receive timely elective surgery. GP4 said: ‘I’m sure with more doctors and more funding 
there won’t be any issues’. GP9 also thought there should be ‘more staff’, although GP9 only 
ranked this as a lesser preferred remedy in the ranking question, perhaps indicating more was 
required to improve waiting lists than simply resources.  
GP8 also believed ‘they need to increase the number of staff’ and GP9 said ‘[p]ut more 
doctors into the hospital system and avoid those problems’. 
Similarly, GP7 thought more staff was required. GP7 said: 
With the elective list, employ more doctors, have more trainees there, if the 
trainees are there, simple procedures can be done by them with the 
supervision of the other doctors, so the list can be reduced. 
The effect of involving GPs would mean ‘the surgeon can be free to do more procedures’. 
Additionally, GP7 commented in relation to employing more staff that public ‘surgeons 
should be at private rates on par with their private colleagues’.  However, GP7 noted this 
would cost more money and ‘we’d have to pay more tax’. 
Another strategy to improve the public health system involved better management of the 
current system. GP10 said: 
I think what the government can do is that the government monitors this, 
they can have a special cell or something that can monitor what’s happening 
with the wait and ask the people in the public system how they are going to 
be dealt with in terms of what is their expectation of how quickly they 
should do the operations, what should be done. 
GP10 also thought:  
There was a policy by the previous government where they said they’ll do 
the KPI indexing for doctors. It should be done for the hospitals, not for the 
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doctors, then everyone can improve the productivity if that is the whole idea 
of seeing whether the hospital is productive or not. 
However, GP10 only appeared to moderately support this ‘[a]uditing of the public hospitals 
by the government and creating more accountability’ according to the ranking answers.  
Interestingly, GP7 considered waiting lists would be better managed if patients have a 
‘regular GP’, that is, ‘[t]he government needs to make sure everyone has one GP’ because 
‘[t]he elective list is a lot of times, it depends on the GPs involvement’ and the GP ‘can keep 
a track [of] what is happening’. 
A further strategy of improving the public system included ensuring the system has 
improved transparency of waiting times and waiting times are communicated to GPs. As 
discussed in Part A, there was concern expressed by GPs that the waiting list is neither 
transparent nor predicable. Accordingly, it is not surprising that GP5 believed the wait time 
guarantees needed to be more realistic: ‘if you’re saying it and claiming it, it’s got to be sixty 
to ninety days’ for a category two. GP3 thought it would be a good idea if ‘GPs would be 
liaisoned’ by the hospital about the waiting times of their patients. GP5 also said ‘I’m happy 
if someone will tell me exactly what’s going on’ and strongly suggested there should be an 
‘open book’ system. In fact, GP5 strongly considered an ‘open book’ system was required 
according to the ranking answers. 
GPs also thought the current system should have improved complaint strategies to improve 
the public system. GP6 and GP7 thought the complaint system needed to be improved. In 
fact, GP6 ranked a ‘Conciliatory complaint system at the hospital’ as relatively strongly for 
the ranking answers. While GP7 thought ‘[e]very hospital has to have a committee... with 
members of the community’. This committee ‘can decide how long for each diagnosis, for 
category three in six months’ time they should review’. 
Some GPs also considered imputing patients with a right to be heard about their lengthy wait 
to be problematic. GP6 argued that the system doesn’t ‘need more layers, they’ve got human 
rights’, ‘I’m not inclined to create any more bodies’. Again, GP10 indicated that with a right 
to be heard there would be resource restrictions implementing this right. GP10 explained:  
[t]here is an independent body, there is the HQCC – the HQCC has now be 
dissolved and been replaced by the Health Ombudsman, so they are there 
and patients are made aware of those most of the time. But that’s not in the 
case of the waiting list, because a lot of GPs understand the waiting lists are 
a constraint on the public system, because it’s overloaded, so it’s not an easy 
balance to send in a complaint to the HQCC saying that, say if [hospital 
within HHS district] is full, all of the other hospitals are doing the same 
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thing. It’s about capacity and it leads us to a whole lot of other things like 
health funding and so on. Our population is increasing we need to have more 
beds in the hospital, we need to have more staff in the hospital, more 
doctors, more nurses, more equipment. 
GP10’s comment that the population is rising is supported by statistics. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Queensland has a significantly increasing population and this will place more 
demand on the public hospital system.1127  
GP9 again thought a right to be heard similar to a right to enforce timely elective surgery 
could be taken advantage of by some patients. GP9 said: 
Yes, they really should have the right to be heard, but that would be very 
difficult to implement, because patients also push their boundaries a lot. The 
moment they get that right you’d have to shut it off in about two weeks. But 
I think, if they have that, there should be guidelines, if you have been 
referred for this and if you do not get an appointment in this time frame, then 
you can please call this number and we’ll hear you, because otherwise, we 
refer someone today and they will ring the hospital the day after tomorrow 
and say they’re in misery not being treated fairly. 
Accordingly, the government would need to ensure sufficient criteria defined an individual’s 
right to be heard, otherwise the manageability of such a right might adversely affect its 
effectiveness. Ensuring there is a right to be heard would create a level of transparency about 
a patient’s waiting time. As GP5 said, ‘I feel there’s not enough transparency about who’s 
waiting for how long and that’s the reason why there’s so much of frustration that’s created’.   
GP10 provided a possible solution to enable individuals to voice their concerns by asking 
patients their views about their waiting times, as discussed previously.  Finally, to strengthen 
the public system, one GP thought the outpatient list needed to be decreased. GP7 thought 
more funds should be placed into primary care to decrease the outpatients load. That is, GP7 
said:  
the government has to put more money into primary care so things are 
caught more early. We can put more money into community health, so 
basically we can prevent these things from happening, more education like 
not to take up smoking, things like that. 
GP7 also thought:  
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GPs can be involved to run the outpatient part of it, where some outpatient 
clinics where consent has to be taken, some specialist needs to be there for 
consent to be taken, a patient needs all the information. But I think an 
experienced GP would be good enough to get that consent for [the] patient. 
GP7 also thought that because ‘the public hospitals have a lot of non-urgent, non-essential 
referrals’, ‘[t]he government has to invest more into general practice so that GPs can take 
more smaller cases’, ‘[s]o the hospitals can deal with the more complicated elective cases on 
a more timely basis’. That is, ‘[y]ou need to unclog the system, support the general practice 
more’. 
Strengthening the private health system  
Secondly, in terms of strengthening the private health system, GP8 strongly indicated in the 
ranking answers that outsourcing to private hospitals would help the waiting list: ‘A lot of 
places are happy to do things that are very low costs’. 
Additionally, in terms of strengthening the private system, GP10 thought the private health 
system could minimise patients’ waiting time:    
If they increase the subsidises, more people would have private health 
insurance, it only catches someone who’s has been already waiting for a 
knee replacement. The private health insurance is going to have a wait list – 
they normally won’t be covered for twelve months. If the government can 
also say that these patients can have shorter waiting [times].  
While GP3 thought it would be equitable for the government to: 
even pay out of pocket for everyone rather than giving one to one patient and 
not to the others. 
(ii) Summary: GPs’ perceptions about alternative strategies not provided in the ranking 
questions  
In summary, GPs’ perceptions were that there should be more resources to strengthen the 
public health system and therefore improve elective surgery waiting lists.  However, in a 
system where only a limited amount of money is able to be spent on health, it is unlikely that 
this mechanism alone will ensure patients receive timely surgery. Further strategies to 
improve the public system included better management, including auditing and monitoring 
of the hospitals. Improved complaint strategies were also supported by GPs interviewed. In 
terms of a right to be heard about waiting too long by patients as opposed to a right to 
enforce timely elective surgery, GPs were reluctant to support this strategy. Although GPs 
supported better complaint options, again the idea of a right, even though it was not an 
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enforceable right to receive surgery, was nevertheless opposed. Better management and 
better complaint options, including a right to be heard, are unlikely to ensure patients receive 
timely elective surgery; these options would be supportive or indirect mechanisms for timely 
elective surgery, but patients are still likely to be waiting too long. Some GPs supported 
better transparency of the waiting times and one GP even suggested making the stipulated 
category waiting times more reflective of the real category waiting times (for example, if 
patients are waiting more than the stipulated time frame of 30 days for category one, then the 
duration of the real waiting time should be the time frame instead of stating the wait is only 
30 days). Though this would likely decrease patients and GPs’ frustration and result in better 
management while the patient waits, this mechanism in isolation would not enable patients 
to receive timely surgery within their clinically recommended time frames. In terms of 
attempting to decrease the outpatient waiting list, this is likely a helpful strategy and would 
likely assist in decreasing patients’ wait for elective surgery. However, the outpatient list is 
one part of a patient’s waiting journey and would not directly ensure their elective surgery 
was received within the stipulated time frame. Again, decreasing the outpatient list would 
only be a supportive type strategy, although an important component.  
There was also support for strengthening the private system to assist in decreasing patients’ 
waiting times by waiving the waiting time to be accepted for private health insurance and 
even the government funding out of pocket private health gaps. While strengthening the 
private system would likely assist in decreasing the public waiting times, patients still need 
to be able to afford private health insurance premiums, which are not an option for all 
patients. Accordingly, strengthening private health is a supportive mechanism to decrease 
demand for public hospital elective surgery but not a direct mechanism for all patients who 
need to ensure they receive timely elective surgery. In any event, the government has already 
undertaken strategies to encourage individuals to have private health insurance1128 and there 
are still some patients waiting too long to receive elective surgery in the public system.  
In terms of the wait time guarantee, although GPs interviewed considered this strategy 
should be successful due to outsourcing to private hospitals, the reality is that the 
government is already outsourcing to private hospitals through the surgery connect program. 
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cent/5172326>. 
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Even with this program, some patients are still waiting too long for elective surgery.1129 
Further, the guarantee is not a right, patients could not enforce receiving their surgery within 
their clinically indicated time frame.  
(g) Conclusion: If not an enforceable right to timely elective surgery, then what were 
the GPs’ views about the respective strengths of the alternative strategies for 
ensuring patients receive timely elective surgery? 
In conclusion, the themes in Part D detailing alternative options to a right to timely elective 
surgery would not be sufficient to ensure patients in need of timely elective surgery actually 
receive that surgery within the clinically indicated time frame. Firstly, increasing private 
health insurance subsidies received support from GPs, however, some GPs also identified 
problems with such a strategy, and in any event, this method alone would be unlikely to 
ensure all patients in need of surgery received it within the stipulated time frame. Secondly, 
in terms of the wait time guarantee, this strategy, while supported by GPs, would only likely 
be a supportive strategy for patients to receive timely surgery, patients would have no right 
to enforce the surgery being received within the time frame. In any event, the government 
has abolished the wait time guarantee in Queensland. As indicated earlier in Part A of this 
chapter, the waiting list appears to somewhat be at the mercy of politics, in addition, a GP 
indicated in Part D that even the introduction of the wait time guarantee may have been part 
of a political game. Thirdly, GPs accepted there needed to be changes to the current elective 
surgery waiting list system. This also supports the conclusion in Part A of this chapter, that 
there is a basis for considering a right to timely elective surgery. Fourthly, in terms of the 
alternative strategies to a right to timely elective surgery discussed with GPs, two major 
strategies were suggested – strengthening the public system and strengthening the private 
system. However, while likely supportive for improving the waiting list, none of the 
strategies discussed would enable a patient to ensure their surgery was provided within their 
recommended time frame, again the patient would likely be at the mercy of the system.  
5 Conclusion: Part A, Part B, Part C and Part D  
Firstly, the GPs’ views considered in Part A of this chapter confirm there is a need for timely 
elective surgery. GPs interviewed identified long waiting times for less urgent conditions and 
the examples provided by GPs for less urgent conditions indicate that long waiting times in 
these categories may cause a range of adverse consequences for the patient and for society. 
However, a need for timely elective surgery should not apply only to less urgent conditions, 
as the severity of an adverse consequence for a patient with an urgent condition (for 
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example, cancer) waiting too long may potentially be even more severe than for a less urgent 
category, as GP1 said: the patient may be asking ‘what happens if I die’ waiting for the 
appointment.1130 In any event, the statistics indicate, as discussed in Part A of this chapter, 
that not all patients with urgent conditions receive their surgery within their clinically 
indicated time frame, so the need for timely elective surgery should therefore include urgent 
conditions, as well as non-urgent conditions. Also, the need for timely elective surgery 
should extend to the outpatient list (the precursor to the elective surgery waiting list), as GPs 
interviewed also indicated long waiting times (also substantiated by statistics) and outpatient 
waiting time management difficulties for GPs and patients. Further, the data indicates the 
strategies available to ensure patients receive timely elective surgery are variable, somewhat 
dependent upon the GP and are generally ad hoc. This is not surprising given patients and 
GPs are trying to navigate a non-transparent waiting list. Patients and GPs should be 
informed of the expected waiting time, not only because elective surgery involves the 
utilisation of public funds, but also because it is good patient management to communicate 
effectively with patients. Further, the most successful strategy to ensure timely elective 
surgery identified by the GPs was to leave the public list and receive surgery in the private 
health system. Another strategy, which is at times successful, identified by some GPs 
interviewed involved patients attending private specialists to avert the outpatient waiting list.  
However, attending a private hospital for elective surgery or attending a private specialist for 
an outpatient appointment are obviously not options for the majority of public hospital 
patients. Private treatment gives an unfair advantage to those with the financial ability to 
game the system. Therefore, the need for timely treatment is particularly important for those 
individuals who cannot afford to play the system.  
Secondly, the GPs’ views considered in Part B of this chapter indicated there are inadequate 
complaint mechanisms available to patients waiting too long for elective surgery and there 
needs to be better complaint options. However, the GPs interviewed did not support an 
enforceable right or limited right to timely elective surgery beyond a theoretical concept. 
There was a possibility GPs may have been averse to a right to timely elective surgery 
beyond theory, because GPs are protecting their own profession from involvement in legal 
type actions. Although, as discussed in Part B of this chapter, a right to timely elective 
surgery would not equate to a right in negligence against medical staff.  Also, there were 
numerous practical difficulties the GPs identified with such a right, including resource 
constraints. However, these practical difficulties should be able to be mitigated with the 
                                                
 
1130 For example, see, Office of the State Coroner, Investigation into the Death of Sylvia Crane (11 
August 2014) Queensland Courts 
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/276540/cif-crane-s-20140811.pdf>. 
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Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory1131 discussed in Chapter 5, that is, patients 
would be prioritised to ensure there is not a flood of patients straining limited health 
resources. The governance issues will be mitigated by selecting an appropriate right to 
timely elective surgery in Chapter 7, this right also addresses the resource limitations.   
Thirdly, GPs’ views considered in Part C of this chapter align with the preferred 
implementation strategy for a right to timely elective surgery. Assuming there was a right to 
timely elective surgery, the answers to the ranking question indicated strong support for the 
right to be heard by an expert tribunal. Although the GPs indicated practical difficulties with 
an expert tribunal; the independence, timeliness of the decisions and inexpensive nature of 
the body should be a suitable strategy for implementing the right.1132 
Fourthly, GPs’ views considered in Part D of this chapter indicate that GPs support a range 
of strategies other than a right to timely elective surgery. These strategies include 
strengthening both the public and private health systems. While these strategies may be 
supportive for improving waiting times of patients, the patients would remain vulnerable to 
the variability of the public hospital system and its ad hoc nature and if a patient was in need 
of timely elective surgery, then that patient would have no direct mechanism to ensure the 
elective surgery was received within the clinically indicated time frame, or at least fairly 
prioritised to receive the surgery as soon as possible.  
In conclusion, GPs’ feelings confirm the theory in Chapter 3 that there needs to be a right to 
timely elective surgery. The data also confirms the theory in Chapter 5, namely a right to 
timely elective surgery should be contingent upon balancing the right with resource 
constraints. These issues were theoretically considered in the previous chapter and a suitable 
theoretical right was nominated, namely a right based on Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach,1133 curtailed with the prioritisation strategy of Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian 
sufficiency theory. The following chapter considers how a right to timely elective surgery 
may be implemented in Queensland and how GPs’ comments may generally operationalise 
this right.  
 
  
                                                
 
1131 Ram-Tiktin, above n 56. 
1132 King, above n 1114, 86, 91; see generally, Flood and May, above n 18, 1583. 
1133See generally, Nussbaum, above n 644; Ram-Tiktin, above n 56. 
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Chapter 7 
VII APPLICATION OF A RIGHT TO TIMELY ELECTIVE SURGERY IN 
QUEENSLAND AND CONCLUSION 
A Introduction 
This thesis has established that there is no domestic law enabling patients to enforce a right 
to timely elective surgery in Queensland.  Further, there is no legal right to timely elective 
surgery based in international law, although there is perhaps a weak moral right sourced in 
some international law. Without a right being incorporated into domestic legislation and the 
inherent lack of enforceability by the international community, there is essentially no 
‘meaningful’1134 way to enforce any such right for patients.  Further, this thesis identified a 
gap in the literature concerning whether an enforceable right to timely elective surgery in 
Australia should be conferred on patients.  
This chapter integrates the findings from Chapters 1 to 6 of this thesis and makes a 
significant contribution to knowledge by considering whether the literature and the 
qualitative data support a right to timely elective surgery. Specifically, the contribution to 
knowledge encompasses the first systematic exploration of the legal and policy framework in 
Queensland in relation to a right to timely elective surgery; the first analysis of international 
law in relation to a right to timely elective surgery; exploring Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach as the basis for a robust theoretically grounded right to timely elective 
surgery; analysing distributive justice theories (namely, Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian 
sufficiency theory and Amitai Etzioni’s responsive communitarian theory) to explore the 
nature and scope, respectively, of a right to timely elective surgery; and the first qualitative 
study of general practitioners to ascertain their views about the need for, nature of, and 
implementation of a right to timely elective surgery.  
In considering whether the literature and the qualitative data support a right to timely 
elective surgery, it is firstly necessary to determine whether there is a sufficient need for 
timely elective surgery; secondly, whether there should be a right to timely elective surgery; 
and thirdly, if there should be such a right then what is the theoretical basis, nature, and 
scope of the right; and finally, would the scope of the right prove to be effective and 
sustainable for Queensland.   
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B Whether there is a Sufficient Need for Timely Elective Surgery in Queensland 
Essentially this part discusses and analyses whether there is a sufficient problem concerning 
the delivery of timely elective surgery in Queensland to justify a discussion later in this 
chapter as to whether patients should have an enforceable right to timely surgical treatment. 
To assess the gravity of the wait time problem, it must firstly be determined what the 
importance of receiving timely elective surgery is, and secondly, the extent of the current 
and future wait time problem.   
1 The Importance of Receiving Timely Elective Surgery 
Ensuring patients receive timely elective surgery is not only important for individuals, but 
also important for the community. For individuals, a lack of timely surgery may result in 
patients experiencing prolonged pain, psychological and social consequences, medication 
dependence, and perhaps even permanent harm or death.1135 Economically, individuals 
suffering prolonged poor health may have impaired productivity and may even lose their 
jobs.1136 For the community, a lack of timely elective surgery may cause adverse impacts 
upon individuals’ family units, unnecessary medical costs to manage individuals’ conditions, 
and the risk of ongoing medical costs if permanent harm results.1137 Economically, there may 
be decreased productivity and the payment of unemployment benefits.1138 The occurrence of 
negative effects of prolonged waiting for elective surgery is substantiated by both the 
literature1139 and by the perceptions of the GPs who participated in this study.  Although, as 
discussed in chapters 2 and 6, the GPs’ perceptions do not reflect actual patient perceptions.  
As a health system is not one-directional,1140 a patient’s poor health outcome not only 
impacts upon individuals and their families, poor health means less available taxation from 
these individuals to pay for the health system, and may also result in decreased community 
trust in the system.1141   
2 The Extent of the Current and Future Waiting Time Problem  
The current elective surgery waiting time problem is a result of limited resources, the high 
demand for surgery and the long outpatient list that patients are required to wait on before 
being placed on the elective surgery waiting list.1142 Although the NEST strategy improved 
                                                
 
1135 Sicilani, Borowitz and Moran, above n 3, 27; National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 
A Healthier Future for All Australians, (June 2009), 3. 
1136 Hurst and Siciliani, above n 40, 4. 
1137 See generally, Sicilani, Borowitz and Moran, above n 3, 3. 
1138 Hurst and Siciliani, above n 40, 4. 
1139 Ibid. 
1140 Duckett and Willcox, above n 176, 4. 
1141 Ibid 1-3, 6. 
1142 Curtis et al, above n 65, 217; Georgia Morris, Submission to the AIHW and RACS on National 
Definitions for Elective Surgery Urgency Categories (April 2012) Australian Medical Association 
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the elective surgery waiting times, the ultimate target of ensuring 100% of patients1143 being 
treated within their clinically indicated time frame by 20151144 was not achieved. In 
particular, the statistics and the participating GPs’ perceptions indicate that the number of 
days patients are waiting in excess of their elective surgery waiting times is most significant 
for the less urgent categories.1145  However, surgery for patients waiting for less urgent 
categories is not optional; they still need the surgery and may suffer adverse consequences 
from waiting too long.1146  Further, NEST did not seek to solve the outpatient waiting list 
dilemma, therefore NEST only attempted to minimise part of a patient’s waiting time and not 
holistically remedy the waiting time problem.   
Nevertheless with the loss of the incentive NEST ‘carrot’1147 funding, it is likely risk elective 
surgery wait times may deteriorate from the current level, as there will be a significant loss 
of Commonwealth funding to states to fund public hospitals, and hence elective surgery – 
this has already reignited the ‘blame game’1148 between the states and Commonwealth.1149 
Furthermore, the Queensland government’s current strategy of interim elective surgery 
targets has been set too low without a sufficient ‘stick’ policy and/or incentive or 
disincentive ‘carrots’1150 to achieve them, accordingly the current Queensland policy is less 
than optimal for improving elective surgery (and similarly low targets for the outpatient list 
are less than optimal for improving waiting times). Although the State government has a 
Surgery Connect program to outsource patients to private hospitals to manage the elective 
surgery waiting list, statistics indicate this is not so frequently utilised so as to have any 
substantial impact upon the waiting list.1151 
A further risk is that the percentage of patients waiting too long for elective surgery may 
increase due to Queensland’s rising population, the rise of chronic diseases including 
obesity, and advancing medical technologies.1152 Compounding this problem is the current 
                                                                                                                                     
 
<https://ama.com.au/sites/default/files/documents/AMA_Submission_re_elective_surgery_urgency_c
ategory_defini%E2%80%A6.pdf>; Queensland Health, above n 519. 
1143 Council of Australian Governments, above n 20, tables A5-7. 
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on 
Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2012, above n 23, 19; Council of 
Australian Governments Reform Council, National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public 
Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above n 23, 19. 
1146 See, Council of Australian Governments, above n 4, 35. 
1147 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9. 
1148 See generally, Wheelwright, above n 209. 
1149 Griffiths, above n 28. 
1150 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9. 
1151 Queensland Health, above n 1087. 
1152 National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, above n 19, 11, 12.  
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era of a consumer centred community.1153 With high consumer expectations, this likely 
means a higher threshold to acquire or retain community trust in the health system. 
Further, the elective surgery waiting list only represents part of a patient’s waiting list 
journey. Patients must wait on the ‘hidden’ waiting list, that is, the outpatient list, before they 
are placed on the elective list.1154 The waiting times for an outpatient appointment are 
significantly higher than the elective surgery waiting list. The perceptions of GPs 
interviewed also indicated that patients are waiting too long on the outpatient waiting list. 
The most recent outpatient statistics indicate that for the quarter year at 1 January 2016, 
approximately 62,544 patients were waiting outside their clinically indicated time frame for 
an outpatient appointment (ie approximately 20,848 patients waiting too long each month for 
an outpatient appointment)1155 whereas, for the month of January 2016 there were 406 
patients waiting too long for elective surgery. Although the Queensland government is now 
attempting to decrease the outpatient wait for patients, including providing additional 
funding, the policy measures are unlikely adequate to resolve the problem. That is, the 
interim targets set for the outpatient list are too low (set at 48%, 33% and 90% for category 
1, 2 and 3, respectively)1156 and despite these low thresholds, not all outpatient results are 
even meeting these low targets (for example, for the quarter year at January 2016, only 11% 
of neurosurgery patients waited within their clinically indicated time, meaning 89% of these 
category 1 patients waited too long for an outpatients appointment).1157 Furthermore, there is 
an absence of sufficient ‘stick’ policy and/or incentive or disincentive ‘carrot’1158 policy to 
attain optimal results.   
In summary, considering the potential gravity of consequences to patients if elective surgery 
is not received within clinically indicated time frames and also to the community; the current 
extent of the waiting times for both the elective and outpatient waiting list and the future risk 
of escalating waiting times – it is therefore necessary to consider whether it’s time for 
patients to have a right of enforcement to timely elective surgery.    
C Whether There Should Be a Right to Timely Elective Surgery in Queensland 
Although there is a need for patients to receive timely elective surgery supported by the 
literature and the qualitative findings, does this mean that patients should have a right to 
timely elective surgery? Health care rights are socio-economic rights, that is, health care 
                                                
 
1153 Ibid. 
1154 Moore, above n 580. 
1155 Queensland Health, above n 519. 
1156 Queensland Health, Queensland Budget 2015-16: Service Delivery Statements (2015) Queensland 
Health, 12 <http://www.budget.qld.gov.au/budget-papers/documents/bp5-qh-2015-16.pdf>. 
1157 Queensland Health, above n 519. 
1158 Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (eds), above n 195, 9. 
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rights create an obligation on the community, as resources are required to fulfil the right1159 – 
this appears to be a universally accepted limitation that resources for health care are not 
infinite.1160 As noted in Chapter 5, there are simply ‘no free lunches’1161 – someone must pay 
for the right – and that someone is the community. Free public hospital elective surgery 
treatment already creates an obligation on society by using taxpayers’ contributions, it is 
therefore not surprising that one GP commented that ‘I don’t feel too bad’ about the waiting 
times ‘it’s tax payer’s money, they can’t be seen tomorrow’. Furthermore, GP perceptions 
were that a right to timely elective surgery would not be an efficient and manageable option 
due to the amount of resources required to provide the additional surgery.  
However, as stated earlier, the health system is not one-directional, although the community 
has costs from free public health, it also receives benefits.1162 Firstly, a health system 
providing patients with the capability to live ‘truly humanly’1163 and have ‘human 
dignity’1164 (based on Nussbaum’s capabilities approach) is a ‘common good’ in itself (based 
on Etzioni’s responsive communitarian approach).1165  Also, as a by-product of enabling 
individuals to live ‘truly humanly’, the community should benefit because better health may 
mean individuals increase their participation and economic contribution to society.1166 
Similarly, GPs interviewed indicated that patients failing to receive timely surgery may 
result in those patients losing their ability to continue with employment and consequential 
dependence on government unemployment payments. Further, as waiting lists are ‘portrayed 
as one of the major problems of publicly funded health systems and are a perpetual source of 
community and political discontent’1167 – good health outcomes from elective surgery 
waiting lists are therefore likely to significantly improve community trust in the health 
system.   
Considering the potential gravity of consequences patients may suffer as a result of waiting 
too long for elective surgery (or even if the patient has a lost the ability to live ‘truly 
humanly’1168 based on their condition alone without deterioration and they are waiting 
outside their clinical waiting time frame), there should be a right to timely elective surgery 
for patients below the capabilities threshold. Similarly, GPs interviewed agreed with the 
concept of a right to timely elective surgery based on the idea that people should have a right 
                                                
 
1159 Cross, above n 1122, 864; Carney, above n 548, 114. 
1160 See generally, Tobin, above n 833, 12. 
1161 Etzioni, above n 916, 5. 
1162 See generally, Duckett and Willcox, above n 176, 3. 
1163 Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
1164 Nussbaum, above n 1, 31. 
1165 See, Etzioni, above n 956, 113. 
1166 McKee, above n 186, 63. 
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1168 Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
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to complain and have a degree of transparency in relation to wait times (ie justice as 
fairness)1169; also because patients may suffer adverse physical and/or psychological 
functioning if timely elective surgery is not delivered to patients; and further, because timely 
health is a human right. However, the literature and the GPs’ views support this right, being 
sensitive to resource limitations. That is, the benefits to individuals should not be at 
considerable expense to the community, the answer is a right that balances community 
interests and individual interests.1170 The scope of the right that could be implemented in 
Queensland is discussed below. 
D The Theoretical Basis, Nature and Scope of the Right to Timely Elective Surgery for 
Queensland 
The theoretical basis for the scope of the right to timely elective surgery for Queensland is 
based upon Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.1171 At the core of the approach is the idea of 
respect for ‘human dignity’ 1172 – that everyone should have the choice to be entitled to a 
‘basic social minimum’1173 threshold of health to enable them to have ‘truly human 
functioning’1174 (except those near death), regardless of whether a person needs more 
resources to reach the health capability than others.1175  A patient requiring a more complex 
and expensive surgical procedure is equally entitled to be raised to the health capability 
threshold as a patient requiring a simple, inexpensive surgical treatment. This is consistent 
with Queensland Health policy in terms of elective surgery urgency category prioritisation, 
that is, resources should not play a role in determining a patient’s priority to receive 
surgery.1176 The reason Nussbaum’s theory was selected is because it is based on the idea of 
social justice and as this thesis is concerned with the publicly funded health system – a 
system supporting the idea of social justice1177 – the theory was consistent with the broader 
commitments of the health system. Further, justice equates to fairness,1178 and as this thesis is 
concerned with the just distribution of health resources, selecting a theory of justice seems 
suitable for analysing the research problem.  
Nussbaum’s capabilities theory does not provide a basis for an absolute right to timely 
elective surgery, because only patients below the capabilities threshold would be entitled to 
enforce a right. Similarly, GPs interviewed supported a non-absolute right to timely elective 
                                                
 
1169 See generally, Rawls, above n 710, 3. 
1170 Etzioni, above n 916, 26-7. 
1171 Nussbaum, above n 1, 36. 
1172 Ibid 31. 
1173 Holst, above n 788, 8; Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
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1175 Ibid 75. 
1176 Queensland Health, Elective Surgery Service Implementation Standard, above n 12, 7. 
1177 See, Lawrence O Gostin and Madison Powers, above n 711, 1053. 
1178 See generally, Rawls, above n 710, 3. 
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surgery, that is, GPs’ perceptions were that only patients in need of timely surgery should 
have a right, not simply because they have been waiting too long. The right based on 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach needs to be further curtailed to take into account resource 
constraints – especially if the right applies to the outpatient list as well, where a significant 
number of patients are waiting too long for an appointment. As Nussbaum’s theory 
deliberately omits a system of prioritisation below the capabilities threshold, because 
Nussbaum considers that justice requires everyone to be raised above the threshold,1179 
another theory of distributive justice, namely, Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency 
theory should be employed to limit the right by providing a fair system of prioritisation 
below the capabilities threshold – with the ultimate aim of raising everyone above the 
capability threshold, but with a system of prioritisation.1180 According to Ram-Tiktin, 
prioritisation should be allocated to those ‘worse off’, and to those who will receive more 
benefit, rather than maximising the number of patients receiving elective surgery.1181 
However, patients would need to firstly prove that they are waiting outside their clinically 
indicated waiting time frame and have lost ‘basic human functional capabilities’1182 before 
they would be entitled to bring a claim.   
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to derive a model for prioritising patients 
entitled to a right to timely elective surgery, it is envisaged that existing Queensland Health 
policy could form the basis for the prioritisation (also extending to the outpatient waiting 
list) because the urgency categorisation of patients has been objectively specified according 
to clinically indicated guidelines. Although there will inevitability be some level of 
subjectivity involved in prioritising patients, evidence-based prioritisation of patients should 
form the main impetus of the model. Queensland Health policy already prioritises patients 
according to those that are ‘worse off’1183 (ie according to their clinical need),1184 however, 
additional information would be required to assess the extent a patient would receive benefit 
from the surgery. A patient entitled to a right of timely elective surgery would need to be 
assessed against those already waiting and not receive an unfair preference to other patients 
simply because they complained; only if necessary should the patient be re-prioritised. Not 
surprisingly, this was a concern of some of the GPs interviewed, that patients complaining 
may receive preferential treatment; however, this should not eventuate if patients are 
objectively assessed. Of course, patients waiting too long who haven’t fallen below the 
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capabilities threshold should not have to wait indefinitely for their elective surgery, that is, 
from a practical perspective, they should not be indefinitely moved further down the waiting 
list with no prospect of receiving their surgery. The Queensland Health ‘treat-in-turn’1185 
policy would still need to be utilised; however, this may be able to be modified so that the 
majority of patients waiting outside their clinically indicated time frames are seen according 
to whether they are entitled to a right to timely elective surgery, rather than the current 
system where the majority of patients are treated in-turn rather than according to their 
clinical need.  
However, will this right adequately balance individual and community interests to ensure the 
right will be sustainable right for Queensland?  
E The Suitability of the Selected Right to Timely Elective Surgery for Queensland 
As discussed earlier, it is important to balance community and individual interests to ensure 
‘reciprocity’ between these two interests for a sustainable right.1186 If there is too much focus 
upon individual interests (ie the right benefits individuals too much by using excessive 
community resources with no or minimal benefit to the community) – this would create 
instability. If there is too much focus upon community interests (ie the right insufficiently 
benefits individuals because of inadequate community funding meaning the problem of 
individuals with poor health and productivity are not mitigated) – this would also create an 
unsustainable right.1187  However, does the proposed scope of the right to timely elective 
surgery for Queensland effectively balance individual and community interests?   
As a right to timely elective surgery may create a conflict between individual and 
community interests, (since prima facie, the right is focused upon individuals) – the right 
may need to be balanced. Amitai Etzioni’s ‘key modes of accommodation’ for any possible 
‘conflict’ between individual and community interests includes firstly considering whether 
the right is able to avoided.1188 Secondly, if the right cannot be avoided, then is it in the 
public interest to introduce the right? Thirdly, if it is in the public interest to create the right, 
then will there be limited adjustment to the right? Fourthly, will there be an unbiased 
resolution for resolving conflicts?   
Firstly, could the right be avoided? According to Etzioni, ‘the best accommodation between 
rights and the common good is where conflict between them is avoided in the first place’.1189 
One strategy for avoiding a right would be if there is are effective complaint options for 
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patients to ensure the delivery of timely elective surgery. However, are the complaint options 
for patients waiting too long for elective surgery as stipulated in Queensland Health policy 
adequate to avoid a right to timely elective surgery? Complaint options include patients 
returning to their general practitioner and contacting the hospital.1190   
The qualitative study included exploring GPs’ perceptions about the effectiveness of 
complaint options for patients waiting too long for elective surgery and the study found 
complaint options to be limited for patients and this supports the discussion that a right 
cannot be avoided. Specifically, GPs’ perceptions were that patients returning to their 
general practitioner was helpful if the patient’s case is ‘worthwhile’ and helpful if patients 
see their GP ‘a bit more often’, but generally, it ‘doesn’t speed anything up in the public 
system’. This is an ad hoc complaint system, because the patient is reliant on the GP’s 
discretion about whether to advocate for the patient, including their skill level of advocacy. 
In addition, patients who are more inclined to visit their GP on a regular basis and who are 
willing and able to self-advocate may receive preferential treatment, which obviously 
disadvantages those with limited funds who are unable to or who can’t or won’t self-
advocate or who are unable to afford regular visits to the GP or who have mobility 
difficulties. Patients contacting the hospitals were also considered by GPs interviewed in this 
project. GPs interviewed considered patients contacting the hospital to be generally less 
effective than returning to their GP, as one GP commented: “I don’t think it’ (ie the 
complaint) ‘goes anywhere’. 
In addition to patients returning to their GP or contacting the hospital, GPs interviewed 
considered patients waiting too long for elective surgery had other options, including visiting 
the Emergency Department, contacting their local politician, leaving the waiting list, or 
leaving the waiting list to receive treatment privately. However, GPs’ perceptions were that a 
patient visiting the Emergency Department was not an effective option unless the condition 
was acute. Furthermore, they perceived that patients contacting politicians was not a frequent 
occurrence and potentially disadvantaged those unwilling to involve politicians. In terms of 
patients leaving the elective surgery waiting list, according to GPs interviewed, this is not a 
common occurrence. However, interestingly, statistics indicate that during 2014-15, 12,117 
patients left the waiting list because surgery was ‘not required or declined’1191 – of course, if 
patients failed to inform the hospital that they received treatment privately, these numbers 
would be less than stipulated. Nevertheless, elective surgery is not considered optional 
surgery, it is often necessary, and therefore a patient’s choice just to leave the waiting list is 
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unlikely to be a viable option for the majority of patients. However, GPs’ perceptions were 
that patients electing to leave the list and receive treatment privately was effective, provided 
patients have ‘got the money’. That is, the significant barrier to this effective strategy is that 
patients need to have the funds to pay for such treatment. Considering only 1,566 patients 
left the elective surgery waiting list to be ‘[t]reated elsewhere’,1192 this strategy does not 
appear to be a viable option for the majority of patients. In summary, according to the GPs 
interviewed, patients’ complaint strategies do not appear to be generally effective to ensure a 
patient will receive timely elective surgery.   
Another strategy to avoid a right would be if GPs had adequate strategies to ensure patients 
received timely elective surgery. The GPs interviewed listed a number of strategies they 
employ in attempting to minimise a patients waiting time. These strategies include 
undertaking proper investigations and writing a good referral letter to decrease the amount of 
time patients need to wait for an outpatient appointment.  However, these strategies are 
dependent upon the skill of GP to write a good letter and somewhat dependent upon the 
extent a patient is able to afford all the necessary investigations outside the hospital system. 
Moreover, patients are dependent upon whether their GP is prepared to refer them to a 
private specialist to circumvent the outpatient waiting time, and of course, the patient’s 
ability to pay for a private specialist appointment. This is a potentially unfair strategy for 
patients not referred to or unable to afford a private specialist outpatient appointment, as 
patients referred to a private specialist also working at a public hospital may receive 
preferential treatment. It is important to note that some GPs’ perceptions were that this 
strategy is not effective. GPs’ perceptions about writing an appeal letter to the hospital if a 
patient has been waiting too long for surgery received mixed responses. GPs’ perceptions 
towards telephoning the hospital to decrease a patient’s waiting time was more supportive if 
a patient’s condition was urgent. Yet one GP conceded that the hospital’s response ‘depends 
on who’s on the other side’ of the phone call. Less utilised options by GPs interviewed 
included referring patients to another hospital to decrease their waiting time and also 
referring patients early for surgery.   
The GPs’ strategies to manage a patient’s waiting time appear to be ad hoc, potentially 
unfair, and with success sometimes dependent upon a patient’s financial situation. However, 
given the GPs’ concern about the lack of transparency and predictability of their patients’ 
waiting times, it is therefore not surprising that GPs’ management of their patients’ waiting 
time is somewhat limited and ad hoc.  
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Despite the limited and ad hoc patient and GP strategies to manage or avert the waiting 
times, would other strategies be able to utilised to avoid a need for a right to timely elective 
surgery? Other strategies include rationing unnecessary government services and/or 
increasing funding for elective surgery. However, both of these strategies have been 
employed by governments previously without any success of ensuring all patients receive 
timely elective surgery.1193 In fact, one GP indicated that cutting services caused decreased 
‘morale’ amongst hospital staff and negatively impacted upon waiting times. A wait time 
guarantee for Queensland (which has been abolished) using private hospitals to increase 
capacity is also not a viable alternative approach, because a guarantee has no legal force; 
there is no supportive independent complaints body; and in any event, the public hospitals 
already utilise private hospitals and there are still patients waiting an excessive duration of 
time.1194  Strengthening the public health system by increasing resources was nominated by 
some GPs interviewed as a strategy to manage the waiting list; however, this is more likely a 
supportive strategy rather than an alternative approach to a right. Yet, funding in isolation 
has not been sufficient to solve the waiting list dilemma.  Ensuring patients have a regular 
GP was also nominated by one GP interviewed as a potential strategy for the waiting list, 
although GPs ‘can keep a track on what is happening’, it is unlikely a suitable alternative to a 
right, especially given the ad hoc nature of GPs’ strategies, it may not be fair to restrict 
patients to one GP.   
Some GPs indicated that the system needs an improved complaint strategy and increased 
system transparency, although both measures would likely be helpful for patients, neither 
strategy in isolation would likely be sufficient to solve the waiting list problem. This is 
because there is no right of enforcement to timely surgery for patients in relation to a 
complaint option and regarding improved transparency, it is merely an informative measure 
to help GPs and patients assess the duration of their wait. In any event, there is already a 
‘HHS complaints coordinator’ patients are able to complain to, however, there is no right to 
ensure timely elective surgery is actually received.1195 Interestingly, this avenue of complaint 
was not mentioned by any of the GPs interviewed. This mechanism is either viewed as an 
unhelpful strategy or GPs interviewed are not aware of this complaint strategy.   
                                                
 
1193 Ironside, above n 1002; Australian Medical Association (Qld), above n 1002; Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 23-4, 44; See, Council of Australian Governments Reform 
Council, National Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance 
Report for 2012, above n 23; Council of Australian Governments Reform Council, National 
Partnership Agreement on Improving Public Hospital Services: Performance Report for 2013, above 
n 23. 
1194 Queensland Health, above n 1087. 
1195 Queensland Government, above n 528. 
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Finally, some GPs suggested that strengthening the private health system would be helpful to 
decrease the quantity of patients waiting for elective surgery; this is also unlikely to be a 
suitable alternative to a right. While an incentive and disincentive ‘carrot’ health insurance 
policy may improve the quantity of patients with private health insurance,1196 this strategy 
has never solved the waiting list problem.  Nevertheless, it is a supportive strategy that 
should be the focus of greater measures to increase the number of individuals able to afford 
private health insurance.   
As the creation of a right is unable to be avoided, the second question is whether it is in the 
public interest to introduce the right. It is argued that it is in the public interest to introduce a 
right, as a lack of timely elective surgery may affect individuals physically, socially, 
psychologically and/or economically, with a resultant cost to the community socially and 
economically. Further, the right is not ‘trivial’1197 to the public interest due to the quantity of 
individuals waiting too long for elective surgery (particularly on the outpatient waiting list); 
the right is focused upon prioritising those individuals likely significantly straining the 
community’s resources; and the right would not apply to those who would likely only 
receive insignificant benefits from the right (such as those in a permanent vegetative state). 
Even though some members of the community may not directly benefit from the right, the 
right is a good that society should support,1198 as it would provide equitable access to those 
individuals unable to afford private hospital treatment within a just society that supports free 
public hospital access, and the right would also promote government accountability and 
transparency.   
Thirdly, the right should balance individual and community interests because there should be 
limited adjustment to the right.1199 That is, there should be limited disruption to the 
community with the introduction of the right,1200 especially since the right is less onerous 
than the previous NEST strategy’s aim of having 100% of patients treated within clinically 
indicated time frames. Whereas the current proposed right would only apply to those patients 
who have fallen below the health capability, and then the right may not necessarily mean 
those patients receive the surgery immediately, they may be subject to prioritisation. 
However, there is a risk of some indirect negative effects from the right – although these are 
manageable. These include re-direction of resources from outpatients to the elective waiting 
                                                
 
1196 Private Healthcare Australia, Privately Insured Downgrade Their Cover (8 August 2013) Private 
Healthcare Australia <http://www.privatehealthcareaustralia.org.au/news/stats_and_data/privately-
insured-downgrade-their-cover/>. 
1197 Etzioni, above n 971, 139. 
1198 Etzioni, above n 956, 114. 
1199 Etzioni, above n 977, 44. 
1200 Ibid. 
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list; however, a right that also applies to the outpatient waiting list would avoid this problem. 
There is also a risk to patient safety with the creation of a right; however, as there was no 
significant problem resulting from NEST it is unlikely a right would cause further 
problems.1201 Some GPs interviewed were concerned about the impact of the right on 
medical professionals; yet as the right is not a right in negligence, and is merely focused 
upon timely surgery, it is unlikely medical professionals would be significantly impacted by 
the right. A further risk is that ‘surgeons will be expected to treat less urgent patients before 
more urgent cases, because the former have reached their waiting time ceilings’, similar to 
the situation of the wait-time guarantees that were introduced internationally (as discussed in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis).1202 However, as the proposed right to timely elective surgery is not 
absolute upon attaining the ‘waiting time ceilings’,1203 and only applies to patients if those 
patients have fallen below the capabilities threshold (and even then the patients may be 
subject to further prioritisation based on Ram-Tiktin’s theory), it is arguable that less urgent 
categories will not be treated preferably to urgent categories.   
Finally, to ensure the right balances individual and community interests, the right requires a 
procedure to resolve conflicts. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to distil a model 
for the implementation of the right; according to Flood and May for a right to be worthwhile 
the selected body should be formulated on the following key principles:1204 
• inexpensive;1205 
• easily accessible (ie timely);1206 
• impartial;1207 and 
• ‘powers to gather information... on systemic matters such as resource allocation’ 
and ‘wait times’.1208 
In terms of the implementation body being inexpensive,1209 it is arguable that there should be 
no application cost involved to patients, so as not to disadvantage those individuals without 
the funds to bring a complaint.  Also, to ensure no additional cost to patients, patients should 
not be entitled to engage legal representation, as this may disadvantage patients unable to 
afford legal fees. The body would also need to be able to resolve complaints quickly, 
                                                
 
1201 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 23, 47. 
1202 Hurst and Siciliani, above n 40, 51. 
1203 Ibid. 
1204 Flood and May, above n 18, 1585. 
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1207 Ibid. 
1208 Ibid. 
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otherwise it would only equate to another waiting list for patients. The body should also be 
impartial1210 from the public health system to ensure a fair outcome is attained between 
patients and the public health system. Further, the body should have investigatory powers to 
assess the resource availability and actual waiting lists to better determine the fair 
prioritisation of patients entitled to a right to timely elective surgery.1211 In addition, it would 
be envisaged that such investigative powers could ‘help drive improvements in the quality 
and timeliness of care’.1212  
Flood and May recommended an ombudsman or commissioner for resolving patient health 
right complaints.1213 However, Flood and May also indicated that ‘lack of sufficient... 
training among ombudsmen’ has been identified as a concern.1214 It is not surprising that in 
general GPs interviewed expressed their concern about the lack of medical knowledge of an 
ombudsman and generally preferred an expert tribunal to implement a right to timely elective 
surgery, because their clinical expertise should be better able to resolve clinical issues. Given 
the complexity of some patients’ clinical conditions, it is arguable that an expert tribunal 
should be the preferred implementation body, especially as an expert tribunal should be able 
to be structured on the same key principles to enable a ‘meaningful’ right, as discussed 
above. Some GPs identified difficulties resolving elective surgery priority to a right due to 
the subjective nature of medical issues; however, this dilemma should be able to be 
adequately managed by ensuring well defined criteria is provided as to whether a patient has 
fallen below the capability threshold by providing the criteria for the meaning of ‘worse off’ 
and how a patient would be considered to benefit more from the surgery.1215   
Flood and May supported an implementation body with only ‘moral suasion to effect 
change’ rather than the ability to legally enforce a patient’s right1216 Flood and May argued 
that a non-binding decision ‘makes the complaints process less contentious, and health care 
providers are thus more receptive to the process than if it were binding and more 
adversarial’.1217 Furthermore, the implementation body could ‘also provide the media with 
the names of institutions found to have breached patients’ rights, creating a reputational 
incentive for compliance’.1218 1219 Therefore, the advantage of a non-legal right would be to 
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effect change without patients and health system staff enduring an adversarial complaints 
process.  However, the disadvantage of a non-legal right is that such a right is unlikely to be 
effective in Queensland. The current Queensland Health Ombudsman powers in relation to 
public hospital access complaints are already more akin to ‘moral suasion’1220 than legally 
enforceable for public hospitals.1221 Given the insignificant number of patients utilising the 
Health Ombudsman avenue to complain about public hospital access (ie only three hospital 
access complaints, which may or may not have been related to elective surgery, were 
received for the second quarter of 2015-2016)1222 and also, the interviewed GPs general 
apparent lack of patient referral to the Health Ombudsman as a complaint option – it does 
not appear ‘moral suasion’1223 decisions alone are a popular option to effect change. As one 
GP said, an ombudsman ‘will show you the light, that’s all that they do’. In any event, the 
ombudsman’s jurisdiction does not extend to enforcing timely elective surgery. It is therefore 
arguable that the tribunal would need to have the power of legally enforceable orders if 
necessary (for example, this may mean the government is ordered to fund a patient’s 
treatment in a private hospital if the public health system fails to comply with the expert 
tribunal’s order).   
Even though a disadvantage of an expert tribunal would be its inherent adversarial nature, 
this could be mitigated if the tribunal also had ‘powers to gather information’ to ‘drive 
improvements in the quality and timeliness of care’, similar to the Ombudsman powers 
proposed by Flood and May, as previously discussed.1224 Such ‘powers to gather 
information’, would also be beneficial for the tribunal when deciding the prioritisation of the 
applicant with the competing interests of other individuals on the elective surgery waiting 
list.1225 However, because the right would be adversarial, this has the potential of benefiting 
patients who complain about their lengthy waiting time and disadvantage those patients who 
do not complain.  However, as discussed earlier, provided the expert tribunal had no 
application fee and applicants were self-represented, this would minimise such a 
disadvantage.  Also, by ensuring the tribunal has ‘powers to gather information’ to properly 
                                                                                                                                     
 
1219 Ibid. 
1220 Ibid.   
1221 Note, the Ombudsman has the power to take action against individual providers (ie health 
professionals) but it does not appear that any enforceable action is able to be taken against a public 
hospital generally: see, Office of the Health Ombudsman, Health Consumers (2016) Health 
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assess a patient’s right to timely treatment against the needs and size of the surgical benefit 
size for other individuals on the waiting list, this tribunal power should minimise 
disadvantaging those patients who do not complain.1226 Therefore, the proposed legal right to 
timely treatment would encompass the benefits of Flood and May’s proposed ‘moral 
suasion’ right with the additional advantage of being legally enforceable if required.1227  
Overall, in assessing the right with Etzioni’s theory, it is likely the scope of the right 
described above should adequately balance individual and community interests.   
F Conclusion 
This thesis has made a significant contribution to knowledge with the exploration of 
Queensland as a case study concerning a right to timely elective surgery. That is, the 
literature gap has been closed by conducting the first systematic exploration of the legal and 
policy framework in Queensland, the first analysis of international law in relation to a right 
to timely elective surgery, and by conducting the first qualitative study of general 
practitioners regarding a right to timely elective surgery. Although it was concluded there is 
no enforceable legal right in domestic or international law, it was established by exploring 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (for the first time in the context of elective 
surgery) that there is a basis for a robust theoretically grounded right to timely elective 
surgery. The nature and scope of that right was then analysed with distributive justice 
theories (namely, Efrat Ram-Tiktin’s non-egalitarian sufficiency theory and Amitai Etzioni’s 
responsive communitarian theory – for the first time in the context of timely elective 
surgery) to provide a sustainable right to timely elective surgery for Queensland. However, it 
is outside the scope of this thesis to specify the operationalisation of this right to timely 
elective surgery, as the focus of this thesis is to distil a just strategy for determining the basis, 
nature and scope of a right to timely elective surgery. 
‘No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent’1228 - similarly an 
individual’s health cannot be separated from the community (for example, poor health may 
mean an individual is unable to work and contribute economically to society). Accordingly, 
the right selected for Queensland is sensitive to both individual and community interests and 
should benefit both individuals and the community – justly and equitability – to ensure an 
                                                
 
1226 Ibid; Note, the court in the case of R J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1992] All ER 614, 
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1227 Ibid, 1585. 
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effective and sustainable resolution to the elective surgery dilemma for patients who have 
fallen below the threshold of ‘truly human functioning’.1229   
In summary, the findings of the thesis support a contention that the proposed right to timely 
elective surgery for Queensland that balances individual and community interests, would be: 
• a legal right; 
• apply only to individuals that have waited outside their clinically indicated time 
frame and have fallen below the health capability threshold; 
• a right that only provides eligible individuals the ability to access an expert 
tribunal that will determine whether the individual needs immediate surgery, 
better prioritised surgery, or whether their waiting time should remain unchanged; 
and 
• the right should apply to surgical patients’ entire public hospital waiting time 
from the outpatient list to the elective surgery waiting list (not just the elective 
surgery waiting list), especially given the significant outpatient waiting time for 
many patients.    
However, even if a right to timely elective surgery fails to empower patients functioning for 
individuals, the right should nevertheless pressure the government to improve waiting list 
transparency and to confront the underlying waiting list efficiency issues.1230 It is also 
possible that politicians and the community will not be in favour of a right, as the right 
inevitability involves costs. These costs include the resources necessary to support an expert 
tribunal and also the resources required to ensure patients receive timely surgery (either by 
outsourcing to the private hospital sector or by increasing resources in the public system). 
Although there will be costs involved with the right, it is arguable that there are three key 
common good1231 reasons why the community may be agreeable to supporting this right to 
empower patients with the following ancillary mechanisms. Firstly, just as individuals have a 
right to appeal many government decisions,1232 they should also, as a matter of justice, have 
a right to appeal the government’s waiting list decision for their condition, especially 
considering that a failure to receive timely elective surgery may even be life-threatening. 
Secondly, it seems unjust to have patients waiting in a non-transparent waiting list system 
                                                
 
1229 Nussbaum, above n 644, 70. 
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that involves the usage of public funds. Thirdly, the community owes a duty to its citizens to 
ensure they have ‘truly human functioning’ to be able to participate in society1233 – 
ultimately society should benefit because these individuals may be able to increase their 
economic and social contribution.   
However, in the event the community does not support funding a right to timely elective 
surgery, then the future of the health system may mean that public patients endure escalating 
elective surgery waiting times; patients may suffer harm; and, the efficiency of patients’ 
treating general practitioners may be impaired through the increasing management of 
elective surgery long wait patients. It is therefore recommended that at a minimum the 
following improvement occurs to the waiting list system: increased transparency and 
communication of patients’ outpatient and elective surgery waiting times. Not only would 
improved transparency and communication be just for patients and possibly improve their 
treatment outcomes, but ensuring the implementation of these two factors would also be in 
the interests of the ‘common good’1234 as discussed above.  Further, improved transparency 
and communication, although potentially politically unfavourable, would illuminate the 
waiting list dilemma and hopefully result in system improvements, and ultimately better 
patient outcomes. However, if society is agreeable to supporting a right based upon the 
‘common good’1235 arguments discussed above (despite the costs involved), then the right 
summarised at the beginning of Part F of this chapter would be the preferred 
recommendation for Queensland, as that right should prove to be the most effective and just 
strategy to ensure patients are given an opportunity to live ‘truly humanly’,1236 and to best 
ensure that waiting list fatalities (such as the death of Sylvia Crane1237 discussed in Chapter 1 
of this thesis) will be avoided in the future.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
A    Qualitative Interview Questions  
 
1.  [“INTRODUCTORY QUESTION”]: Can you please tell me about your 
experience with the waiting time of your patients on both the elective surgery 
waiting list and outpatient waiting list at Queensland public hospitals? 
 
• Probing Questions: 
(i) Can you confidently advise patients how long the wait will be?   
(ii) Do you consider the waiting times to be generally acceptable? 
Examples of lengthy waits.  
(iii) Which list – the outpatient or elective surgery list causes the greatest 
wait for patients? Justification.  
 
2. Would you please describe your strategy/ies for managing patients on a 
Queensland Public Hospital waiting list? 
 
• Probing Questions: 
(i) How common is it for patients to return to you because they have 
waited outside the time frame?  Is this usually for patient’s conditions 
that have deteriorated (physically or psychologically) or just because 
they have waited longer than recommended (or both)?  
(ii) Obtain all strategies utilised (eg do you refer patients for private 
treatment or advise them to go to Emergency Department or “hospital 
shop” or attend outside the district).  Obtain an explanation for the 
strategies and the usual outcomes of the strategies.  When do you 
employ these strategies ie only when a patient needs acute care or 
their condition has deteriorated or because of the patient’s impatience 
(or a combination of these or other reasons). 
(iii) What is your most successful strategy/ies to assist patients obtain 
treatment? When would you use this stategy/ies?  How effective are 
they/is it? Justification.  
(iv) How frequently do patients on a Queensland public hospital waiting 
list proceed privately? Is this usually because their condition 
psychologically, physically or socially has deteriorated or just because 
they do not wish to wait further? Do these patients usually have 
private health insurance with hospital cover? 
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3. In your opinion, are there waiting list complaint options for patients; and if 
so, what are the options?   
 
• Probing Questions: 
(i) In relation to patients that have attended upon your practice unsatisfied 
with their Queensland Public Hospital waiting time, what complaint 
options have such patients discussed with you? How frequently and to 
which organisation did they complain?  
(ii) What is your view of each of the complaint options available to your 
patients? Are they adequate? Please provide examples of successes (for 
example a patient obtaining treatment as soon as possible at another 
hospital) and failures (for example, patient continues to wait despite 
physical distress and/or is the blame passed to another eg Hospital Boards 
blaming Queensland Health for lengthy wait). 
(iii) Which is the most successful and least successful complaint option?  
Explain. 
(iv) Also discuss for outpatient list.  
 
4. In your view, do you consider patients need improved waiting list complaint 
options? 
 
• Probing Questions: 
(i) Seek justification as to why/why not complaint options need to be 
improved. 
(ii) Is there a need for patients to have a legal right to receive elective 
surgery within their clinically indicated time frame? Justification.  
What do you think that legal right should be? (for example, only if 
their condition has deteriorated or just because they have waited 
outside the time frame) Should a legal right include outpatients 
waiting time? Justification.  
(iii) Should the legal right take into account whether it is cost-effective to 
the hospital for patients to receive surgery within clinically indicated 
time frame? Explanation.  
 
5. Discuss Queensland government’s new strategy to improve elective surgery 
wait times.    Ask whether they are aware that the Queensland government is 
introducing an Australian first elective surgery wait time guarantee in 
February 2015. Explain that the guarantee is supposed to ensure patients 
receive their elective surgery within clinically indicated time frames, and if 
not, the patient can receive surgery at another public hospital or alternatively 
a private hospital, and if the hospital is more than 50km away, the 
government will reimburse the patient’s travel expenses. Explain that this is a 
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guarantee only, it does not equate to a legal right and is therefore not 
enforceable by patients, GPs or the hospital if wait times are not met.  
- Do you consider this new strategy will improve the waiting time 
of patients? Why/why not? 
- Do you consider the government will be able to ensure all patients 
in Queensland receive their elective surgery within their clinically 
indicated time with this new strategy? Why/why not? 
- If GP thinks patients needed a right to timely elective surgery – do 
you think they will still need a right after the guarantee 
commences in 2015? Why/why not?  
- If GP thinks patients need improved wait time complaint options – 
do you think they will still need improved options after the 
guarantee commences in 2015? Why/Why not?  
 
6. Participants will be asked to complete Ranking Question A.  See following 
page.  
 
• Probing Questions:  
(i) Seek justification for choices 
(ii) Do you think the remedies should also extend to the outpatients list? 
Explanation  
(iii) Any other suggestions? Justification. Any difficulties you foresee with 
these options? 
 
RANKING QUESTION 
Listed below are some nominated complaint options for patients who have waited 
outside their clinically indicated time frame.  Please rank these nominated options 
between 1 (most preferred option) to 7/8 (least preferred option) to indicate which 
complaint options you consider would be the most effective for patients to receive 
timely elective surgery treatment: 
 
Individual elective surgery remedies if an individual is 
not treated within their clinically indicated time frame 
 
Please number from 1 
(most preferred) to 8 
(least preferred) 
Patients could bring legal proceedings before a court to 
assess whether they have a right to timely elective surgery.  
If the patient has a right to timely elective surgery, the 
court could order the health authority to treat the patient in 
a timely manner.  
	
	
Patients could make a complaint to the Health 
Ombudsman for the Health Ombudsman to assess whether 
they have a right to timely elective surgery.  If the patient 
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has a right to timely elective surgery, the Health 
Ombudsman could recommend that the health authority 
treat the patient in a timely manner.   
 
Patients could make a complaint to an expert tribunal 
(comprised substantially of medical practitioners) for the 
tribunal to assess whether they have a right to timely 
elective surgery.  If the patient has a right to timely 
elective surgery, the tribunal could order the health 
authority to treat the patient in a timely manner.  
 
 
Patients who have waited outside the clinically 
recommended time frame for their elective surgery would 
be awarded monetary compensation. 
 
 
Governments could increase private health insurance 
subsidies to enable patients to access elective surgery and 
therefore remove the patients overdue for surgery from the 
public hospital elective surgery waiting list.    
 
 
No changes required to the current system (that is, prior to 
introduction of wait time guarantee in February 2015)  
 
 
Wait time guarantee (commencing in February 2015)  
 
 
Please specify any other remedy (other than increased 
resource funding to Queensland Health): 
 
 
 
